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My dissertation consists of two topics: the relation between derivatives and corporate 
finance, and the relation between bank deregulation and interstate risk sharing. 
In the first essay, I study the use of commodity derivatives among U.S. oil and gas 
producers. Using hand-collected data, I find large variations in hedging intensity and hedging 
profits.  On average, firms generate significantly positive profits, and their profits relate 
positively to the intensity of hedging. I further decompose the hedge ratio into two components: 
the pure hedging component and the market timing component. I find that the hedging profits 
relate strongly and positively to the market timing component. I also identify a group of firms 
that can consistently generate profits from their hedging activities. Among firms who actively 
change their hedging positions, the winners tend to be the larger firms. The hedging outcome 
does not increase equity beta while the pure hedging component tends to decrease equity beta. 
The positive profits are exclusive for the commodity derivative transactions of the oil and gas 
producers, while they do not profit from their interest rate or foreign exchange derivative 
transactions. 
In the second essay, I look at the relation between the trading of CDS contracts and 
corporate’s risk-taking behavior. Because the CDS hinders successful debt renegotiation with 
creditors and weakens shareholders’ put option to strategically default, equity values of CDS 
firms are more sensitive to cash flow risk. As a result, I show that the onset of CDS trading is 
accompanied by a rise in equity market beta and return volatility, particularly for firms with poor 
credit ratings, high liquidation costs, and a more liquid CDS market. In the years after CDS 
trading is initiated, I find that firms reduce corporate risk-taking by expanding diversification 
across industries, scaling back risky investment, and reducing demand for leverage. 
 
 
The final essay studies the impact of two types of banking deregulation, interstate 
banking deregulation, and interstate branching deregulation, on interstate risk sharing. We 
consider both the initial permission of interstate banking and interstate branching, and the 
follow-up changes in state-level restrictions. From the residential perspective, interstate risk 
sharing has two components: personal income smoothing and personal consumption smoothing. 
Our results provide evidence that interstate banking deregulation plays an important role in 
improving personal income smoothing, while it slightly hinders personal consumption 
smoothing. On the contrary, interstate branching deregulation does not have a significant impact 
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Chapter 1 




Corporate risk management is an important part of corporate finance. With the growing 
popularity of financial derivatives in the capital markets, firms are increasing their use of 
derivatives for hedging. While many studies have focused on how hedging increases share- 
holder value and why firms hedge,1 a critical but neglected area is the empirical study of 
monetary outcome of hedging. If hedging does not generate the cash flow as expected in the 
downturn, all claims of hedging benefits are unfounded. Although two firms may both hedge, the 
extent and the contract terms in the hedging programs can differ a lot. In an adverse market 
condition, one firm may generate large hedging profit to offset the negative impact while the 
other firm may earn little hedging profit. Hence, the value of hedging lies not only in hedging 
activity itself but also in hedging outcome. A related and widely debated issue is whether firms 
should take a view on the timing of their use of derivatives in hedging and its consequence (e.g., 
Stulz 1996; Faulkender 2005; Adam and Fernando 2006; Brown et al. 2006; Géczy et al. 2007; 
Chernenko and Faulkender 2011).2 To answer this question, we need to know the extent that 
market timing hedging practice affects the hedging outcome. Drawing on a hand-collected panel 
data of hedging positions and hedging profits, we provide new insights into these issues. 
Recent accounting rules allow us to examine the consequences of corporate derivative 
transactions more closely. Seow and Tam (2002) examine the usefulness of disclosure of trading 
                                                 
1 The literature has proposed several channels for hedging to affect shareholder value including reducing 
cost of financial distress (e.g., Stulz 1984), tax saving (e.g., Smith and Stulz 1985; Graham and Smith 
1999), alleviating under-investment (e.g., Froot et al. 1993), product market competition (e.g., Zhu 2011), 
and changing information environment (e.g., Lin et al. 2017). Smith (2008) provides a survey on 
corporate risk management. However, the empirical evidence is mixed; see a review paper by Aretz and 
Bartram (2010). Bodnar et al. (2016) use survey data and find that managerial risk aversion plays a role in 
the decision to hedge. 
2 Since the literature also uses terms such as “selective hedging” and “speculation” for market timing 
hedging, we use these terms interchangeably in our paper. 
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and nontrading derivative fair value required by FASB 105 and 119. FASB 133 requires firms to 
disclose the details of their hedging activities. FASB 161 further requires firms to disclose the 
purpose of their derivatives transactions and profits. We hand-collect the details of derivatives 
contracts and hedging profits of 105 U.S. oil and gas producers from 2007 to 2011.3 Firms can 
choose to record their hedging activities and resulted profits using hedge accounting or non-
hedge accounting. The fact that a firm elects to use the non-hedge accounting indicates that its 
derivative transactions may deviate from pure hedging, which makes it harder to comply with the 
requirements of hedge accounting (Liu et al. 2011).4 
We find that there are large variations in the hedge ratios and profits among the U.S. oil 
and gas producers. The firm at the 75th percentile of hedge ratio hedges three times as much as 
the firm at the 25th percentile. The firm at the 75th percentile of hedging profit generates a 
hedging profit five times as much as the firm at the median level while the firm at the 25th 
percentile suffers a loss. Similar patterns of large variations in hedge ratios and profits exist each 
year during the sample period. The finding shows that firms adopt quite different hedging 
strategies and that some firms are more successful at hedging than others. On the other hand, 
firms on average generate profits from their use of derivatives for hedging. The average hedging 
profit is a gain of 1.78% relative to assets, which contrasts with an average 3.48% loss of return 
on assets. Thus, hedging indeed has a material impact on corporate earnings. The mean and 
                                                 
3 Although the effective date for FASB 161 is the fiscal year beginning after Nov 15, 2008, most firms in 
our sample also reported the profits from the use of derivatives in 2007. 
4 We do not claim that all firms use non-hedge accounting for market timing activities, as Demarzo and 
Duffie (1995) suggest that the choice of hedge accounting may also be affected by information 
asymmetry and career concerns. Lin and Lin (2012) show a non-linear relationship between hedging 
decision and information asymmetry. On the other hand, hedge accounting may cause mismatch of 
accounting period between the underlying transaction and the corresponding hedging transaction. A firm 
may not choose hedge accounting due to the earning-smoothing preference (e.g., Zorzi and Friedl 2014; 
Frestad 2018). The association between the use of non-hedge accounting and market timing activities is 
an empirical question, on which we provide some evidence. 
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median of the cumulative profits over the 5-year sample period are $283.19 million and $30.18 
million, respectively. Our findings indicate that derivative hedging itself can be a profitable 
activity in the oil and gas industry. 
A question then arises: are the profits driven by favorable market conditions or market 
timing? Adam and Fernando (2006) find that gold mining firms’ hedging profits are due to the 
persistent positive risk premia in the gold futures market. Similarly, oil and gas producers might 
also happen to benefit from the positive risk premia in their hedging transactions. We show that 
the hedging profits are not only associated with the risk premia in oil futures contracts, but are 
also positively and strongly related to market timing. We adopt two approaches to decompose 
firms’ hedging activities into two parts: the pure hedging component and the market timing 
component. The first approach regresses the hedge ratio on firm characteristics and risk premia. 
We then use each firm’s predicted hedge ratio as the pure hedging component and the residual as 
the market timing component. Since there can be unknown firm factors that cause a firm to 
persistently hedge differently from others, our second approach uses firm fixed effects in the 
regressions to further control for the unknown factors. We find that total profits and profits 
recorded on the non-hedge account are positively related to the market timing component in both 
decomposition approaches, while the profits recorded on the hedge account are unrelated to the 
market timing component. Hence, besides the risk premia, the market timing component of 
hedging indeed contributes to the positive profits. 
We conduct three additional analyses on the implications of the market timing and 
hedging profits. First, we identify a group of “good hedgers” who are able to generate profits in 
most of the years throughout the sample period. The total reported profits of 27 good hedgers are 
five times as large as the other firms, but the hedge ratios of the good hedgers are not 
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significantly different from the other firms. This result shows the importance of investigating 
hedging outcome in addition to the hedge ratio when we study the value of hedging. We further 
show that among the firms who actively change their hedge ratios, good hedgers tend to be larger 
and have a credit rating. Second, we investigate the outcome of derivative transactions on 
interest rate and foreign exchange. We hypothesize that oil and gas producers do not have an 
information advantage in the interest rate or the foreign exchange markets and should not be able 
to generate positive profits on these derivative transactions. Indeed, we find that the profit from 
interest rate derivatives is negative, on average, and the profit from foreign exchange derivatives 
does not differ significantly from zero. This provides further support that the U.S. oil and gas 
producers have an advantage in hedging only in the commodity market. Lastly, we calculate the 
equity beta to measure the firm’s systematic risk and find that the hedging profits and hedging 
activities do not increase the firm’s beta. In fact, the pure hedging component tends to reduce 
equity beta, which is in line with predictions of the theories on hedging. 
One may argue that our results are driven by the short sample period and that the 
producers are just lucky to gain from the hedging activities. However, this is not necessarily true. 
From Fig. 1, we can see that the oil and gas prices experienced multiple ups and downs during 
the period of 2007–2011. There were large variations in both oil and gas futures risk premia 
across the sample period. The average oil risk premia is actually negative for most of the years. 
Therefore, it is not true that firms who hedge more could simply generate larger profits. More 
importantly, our results rely more on the cross-sectional comparison among the producers and 
decomposition of hedge ratios rather than on a particular sample period. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
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Our contribution to the literature is several-fold. First, we show direct evidence of the 
extensive use of derivatives with large monetary outcome, and we find vast variations in hedge 
ratios and hedging profits in the U.S. oil and gas producers. This is in contrast to Guay and 
Kothari (2003)’s study based on a sample of non-financial firms which finds that the extent and 
impact of the use of derivatives for hedging are small. Adam and Fernando (2006) use survey 
data on gold mining industry to estimate the cash flow of derivatives contracts and show that 
firms are able to generate significantly positive cash flow from hedging. Our results based on oil 
and gas producers give new evidence of the importance of corporate hedging from another 
industry. Our use of the accounting hedging profit data provides more accuracy and reliability 
than survey data and estimated cash flow. While Campello et al. (2011) argue that hedging can 
reduce the cost of borrowing and alleviate capital expenditure restrictions, our analysis speaks to 
the direct effect of hedging on corporate earnings. 
Second, we decompose the hedge ratio and find that the hedging profit is positively 
associated with the market timing component. Our research provides new insights on the study 
of selective hedging. Stulz (1996) suggests that firms possessing information advantage may 
benefit from selective hedging. However, the findings on gold mining industry show that the 
profits of selective hedging are trivial (Adam and Fernando 2006; Brown et al. 2006). Our 
finding on the oil and gas exploration and production industry shows that the size and the 
economic effect of selective hedging are substantial. Oil and gas producers collect information 
on the demand and supply of commodities and make production decisions based on their 
predictions of future market prices. This information can be transferred to their risk management 
teams to make hedging decisions. Although not all firms that use selective hedging are 
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successful, our results show that at least some firms can consistently deliver positive profits from 
market timing. 
 Third, we show that the use of derivatives in hedging does not increase firm’s risk. 
Hence, the investors do not require a higher risk premium for the hedging profits, indicating that 
hedging profits add to the firm value directly. Similarly, Adam and Fernando (2006) show that 
cash flow hedging profits in gold industry do not increase firm’s stock market equity beta. 
Previously, there is mixed evidence on the value of hedging. Allayannis and Weston (2001), 
Carter et al. (2006), Mackay and Moeller (2007) and Pérez-González and Yun (2013) show that 
hedging increases shareholder’s wealth and the use of weather derivatives in hedging increases 
market-to-book ratios, while Jin and Jorion (2006) find no evidence that hedging affects firm 
value in the oil and gas industry. However, none of the study investigate the monetary outcome 
of hedging. Our use of reported hedging profits provides a more direct test on the value of 
hedging. 
Fourth, our analysis also contributes to the study of derivative traders in the commodity 
markets. Within the trend of financialization of commodity markets (Cheng and Xiong 2014a), 
the crude oil and natural gas markets are among the most dynamically traded markets worldwide 
not only for speculators but also for hedgers including producers and users. Cheng and Xiong 
(2014b) use the data from the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and show 
that hedgers in the agricultural products exhibit excessive fluctuations in their hedge ratios, 
which indicates speculation. Our finding of large hedge ratio fluctuations among the oil and gas 
producers echoes their finding. Using the data from CFTC, Dewally et al. (2013) study the 
traders on crude oil, gasoline, and heating oil futures markets. They identify 14 independent 
producers and show a slightly negative return on the futures positions. However, a limitation of 
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their study is that they do not know the traders’ cash market, forward positions, swap positions, 
or positions in other futures markets. We show that the oil and gas producers mainly use swap 
and collar contracts in hedging and our results provide a more comprehensive assessment of the 
profits from hedging activities. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
describes data sources, collection methods, and summary statistics. Section 3 discusses the 
empirical strategy and regression results. Section 4 provides additional analyses on market 
timing and hedging outcome. Section 5 discusses the results of robustness tests, and Section 6 
concludes. 
 Data and sample description 
We focus on all oil and gas producers with SIC code of 1311 in the United States for 
which data is available from 2007 to 2011. The initial dataset contains 1029 firm-year 
observations. We then drop 60 firm-year records with missing asset values. We further remove 
362 observations for firms whose assets are less than $100 million, as small firms are often not 
required to provide disclosure of derivatives positions and do not actively use derivatives for 
hedging, due to the lack of expertise. We also require that the data on hedging con- tracts, 
hedging profits, and financial information should be available. Our final sample for analysis 
consists of 105 firms and 397 firm-year observations. 
 Derivatives contracts and hedge ratio 
To study firms’ use of derivatives, we hand-collect derivatives contracts from the annual 
10-K reports. We write a PERL program to collect the entire text of 10-K for each firm from the 
SEC Edgar database. Using the algorithm, we search for financial hedging keywords such as 
“hedg” “derivative”, “financial instrument”, “risk management”, “item 7a”, “market risk”, 
“commodity risk”, “price risk”, “notional”, “commodity contract”, “commodity option”, “option 
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contract”, “forwards”, “forward contract”, “forward exchange”, “oil forwards”, “natural gas 
forwards”, “futures”, “futures contract”, “commodity futures”, “oil futures”, “natural gas 
futures”, “swap”, “collar”, “fixed price” and “volumetric production”. 
We then read through the surrounding text of each highlighted keyword and manually 
record the contracts data. We collect all derivatives contracts for firms’ crude oil, natural gas, 
and natural gas liquids (NGL) production. Following Jin and Jorion (2006), NGL contracts are 
converted into standard crude oil contracts and treated as oil equivalents. The types of contracts 
include call options, put options, ceiling and floor contracts, fixed price swaps, forward and 
futures contracts, two-way collars, and three-way collars. We collect contract-specific 
information such as the notional amount, the maturity, the strike prices (option-type contracts), 
the settlement prices (futures and forwards), and the pay and receive prices (swaps). As in Jin 
and Jorion (2006), oil and gas basis contracts are not included in our analysis. 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of firms’ derivatives contracts. Panel A shows 
that oil and gas related derivatives have balanced representation in our samples. The number and 
notional amount of derivatives contracts in both commodities vary over years. Panel B 
summarizes the number and notional amount for each type of derivatives each year. Swap is the 
most popular instrument used by oil and gas firms. Collar comes next. Firms also use put option 
and floor substantially. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Following Jin and Jorion (2006), we calculate the delta of every single contract. For 
linear hedging contracts such as futures, forwards and swaps, we assume that delta = -1 for short 
positions, and delta = 1 for long positions. For nonlinear hedging contracts such as call options 
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and put options, the delta is calculated using the Black-Scholes option pricing model. 
Specifically, the inputs include the maturity of the contract, the futures settlement price of the 
commodity, the strike price of the contract, the volatility of commodity futures settlement price, 
and the risk-free rate. For nonlinear hedging contracts with multiple legs such as floor, ceiling, 
and collars, we use Black-Scholes option pricing model to calculate the delta of each leg and 
aggregate the net delta across the different legs. Once we obtain the delta of each contract, we 
multiply it by the notional amount of each contract to get the total delta for the contract. 
Next, we aggregate the deltas across contracts to obtain the firm’s portfolio delta (the 
firm level total delta) for the specific year. 
When calculating the contract deltas as described above, we follow the literature (e.g., 
Haushalter 2000; Kumar 2013; Ranasinghe et al. (2013) to combine oil and gas hedging 
positions by converting natural gas to a barrel of oil equivalent (BOE). The industry standard for 
this conversion is that 1 Bbl of oil has the same heat content as 6 Mcf of natural gas. Therefore, 1 
Bbl of oil is equivalent to 6 Mcf of natural gas. The transformation between oil and gas enables 
us to examine the net hedging position and combine the hedging deltas of both oil and gas 
contracts for each firm. 
Finally, the firm’s portfolio delta is scaled by their reported production for the year. The 
scaled delta is the firm’s hedge ratio in oil and gas production in that year and it represents the 
intensity of hedging activity (e.g., Tufano 1996; Jin and Jorion 2006).5 
                                                 
5 For example, a firm lists its outstanding derivatives contracts that would be in effect from January 2010 
in the 2009’s annual report. These derivatives positions are actually scheduled to hedge the oil and gas 
production in fiscal year 2010 and forward and hence are used to calculate the portfolio delta in 2010. The 
portfolio delta is then scaled by the production in 2010. Chen et al. (2003) utilize a theoretical approach to 
derive the optimal futures hedge ratio. We empirically study the actual hedge ratio of oil and gas 
producers by examining the actual hedging activities conducted by these firms. Besides, our hedge ratio 
11 




As a robustness check, each firm-year’s total notional amount of derivatives positions is 
calculated and scaled by annual production as another measure of hedge ratio. 




[Insert Table 2 here] 
Panel A of Table 2 summarizes statistics of firms’ Relative Delta Production and 
Relative Notional Production. Our regression samples include 397 observations from 2007 to 
2011. The mean and the median hedge ratio are 0.8448 and 0.6257 for the sample years. The 
hedge ratio at the 75th percentile is 1.137, which is three times as large as the hedge ratio of 
0.2915 at the 25th percentile. The value of Relative Delta Production appears to be greater than 
that in Jin and Jorion (2006), whose sample period ranges from 1998 to 2001. We use the delta 
calculation example in their paper and verify that our procedure obtains the same number for 
Relative Delta Production. The calculation example is presented in Appendix B. There may be 
three reasons for the difference. First, firms in our sample are larger. We only include firms with 
assets of at least $100 million, while Jin and Jorion (2006) require assets greater than $20 
million. Large firms tend to use more derivatives. Also, we drop firms with no use of derivatives, 
as we are interested in investigating the profits of derivative transactions. However, if we include 
those firms, the sample mean and median of Relative Delta Production would be 57.56% and 
                                                 
calculation considers all types of derivatives including non-linear derivatives while Chen et al. (2003) 
only consider the futures contract. Chen et al. (2003) show that the effectiveness of a hedge increases with 
the hedge horizon. We leave this topic to future exploration. 
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38.93%, respectively.6 Second, Jin and Jorion (2006)’s sample period is from 1998 to 2001 with 
an average oil price of $22 per barrel. As in Figure 1, oil and gas prices were much higher 
(average around $80 per barrel) and more volatile (oil price ranges from $41 to $140 per barrel) 
during our sample period from 2007 to 2011, which created more incentives for producers to use 
derivatives in hedging. Similarly, Cheng and Xiong (2014a) find that hedger’s short positions 
increase with higher price. Moreover, the accounting rules that took effect in 2008 could have 
improved the quality of firms’ disclosures of derivatives positions. Some derivatives information 
disclosed in our sample years may not have been clearly disclosed previously. Third, we use all 
derivatives positions, including those with maturities longer than one year. Firms may have also 
increased their long-term hedging, given the high price and volatile market conditions. If we 
exclude those long-term contracts, the mean and median of Relative Delta Production would be 
72.69% and 46.92%, respectively. 
 Derivative gains and losses 
To obtain the actual gains and losses from hedging, we use the same PERL algorithm to 
locate gains and losses in the 10-Ks and manually compile them into our database. 
With FASB 133, firms are required to disclose the outcome of derivatives positions. If a 
firm designates derivatives as cash flow hedges and records derivative outcomes using hedging 
accounting, then only realized gains or losses will impact earnings. The realized gains or losses 
are recorded as Reported Realized Hedge Profit in this paper. The unrealized gains or losses will 
be recorded in the other comprehensive income and accumulated until actualized. A firm can 
also elect not to designate its derivative instruments as cash flow hedges, but then the gains or 
                                                 
6 The tables are not reported in the paper to save space and are available upon request. 
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losses are recorded on income statement immediately, whether they are realized or unrealized. 
We record this type of profit as Reported Non-Hedge Profit. For the cash flow hedge designated 
derivatives, part of them can become “ineffective”, due to changes in market conditions and 
firms’ production. The gains or losses on the ineffective portion of cash flow hedge will also be 
immediately reflected in earnings, whether realized or unrealized, and are recorded as Reported 
Ineffective Hedge Profit. The Reported Total Profit is the sum of Reported Realized Hedge 
Profit, Reported Non-Hedge Profit, and Reported Ineffective Hedge Profit. We hand-collect the 
gains and losses for the above items whenever they are available in 10-K files. All of the 
derivative profits are normalized by total assets. 
Panel A of Table 2 also provides summary statistics of firms’ derivative profits.7 Overall, 
our results resemble those of Manchiraju et al. (2013). U.S. oil and gas firms generate profits in 
the use of derivatives on average, with the mean total profits being 1.78% of total assets and the 
median total profits being 0.63% of total assets (The mean of total raw profit before normalized 
by assets is $74.9 million, and the median is $5.92 million.8). T-tests show that the mean of 
Reported Total Profit and all of its components are significantly greater than zero. The 25th 
percentile of Reported Total Profit is -0.62% of assets. The 75th percentile is 3.76%, which is 
about seven times larger than the 25th percentile in absolute value. Clearly, the gains from 
hedging far exceed the losses. 
The finding of positive profits is surprising. According to hedging theory (e.g., Stulz 
1984; Stulz 1990; Smith and Stulz 1985; Froot et al. 1993; Demarzo and Duffie 1995; Mello and 
                                                 
7 Out of the 397 observations, several firms only report “net of tax gains or losses.” We address the tax 
issue by calculating the firm-year’s corporate income tax rate and adding back the taxes to its gains and 
losses.    
8 These numbers are not obtained by multiplying the mean and median of total profit in Panel A of Table 
2 by the mean of asset in Panel B due to the normalization.  
14 
Parsons 2000), the expected return on hedging should be around zero. Furthermore, Dewally et 
al. (2013) find that hedgers’ profits are negative on average, due to the hedging pressure and risk 
premia in futures contracts. However, we find that firms gain from the use of derivatives on 
average, which contradicts the theoretical predictions. Possible reasons for the difference are that 
their sample period is from 1993 to 1997 and that the hedgers in their study include oil refiners, 
marketers, distributors, pipelines, and large consumers besides independent producers. In section 
3, we further investigate the sources of gains using regression analysis. 
 Other control variables 
The control variables include those identified by the literature as being determinants of 
hedging: Log Asset, Market to Book Ratio, Leverage Ratio, Cash,9 Dividend, and S&P Rating 
Dummy (e.g., Nance et al. 1993; Haushalter 2000; Stulz 1996; Adam and Fernando 2006). In 
addition, we include several other variables in Jin and Jorion (2006). We collect Lifting Cost per 
BOE (production cost per barrel of oil equivalent) and conjecture that the hedging demand is 
positively related to lifting cost. Similarly, the Cost of Goods Sold and Inventory are used as 
control variables. We also include Revenue (revenue from oil and gas production), which is a 
direct measure of the demand for hedging, and ROA (return on assets), which measures the 
performance of the firm. We assume that capable firms are more likely to hedge and gain from 
hedge. Lastly, we include the annual Oil Price Volatility, Gas Price Volatility, Oil Futures Risk 
Premia, and Gas Futures Risk Premia. Since Oil Price Volatility and Gas Price Volatility are 
highly correlated, we only use Oil Price Volatility in regressions. The more volatile the oil (or 
gas) prices, the higher the demand for hedging. Also, we expect that hedging demand relates 
                                                 
9 We use cash ratio instead of liquidity because we find cash has stronger effect. 
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positively to risk premia, which are the spreads between contracted futures prices and realized 
spot prices (e.g., Adam and Fernando 2006). 
The data on oil and gas production, lifting cost per barrel of oil equivalent, and total 
revenues from oil and gas production are collected from the Bloomberg Financial Market 
platform. We manually check and correct the values and complement the missing values 
whenever we can find them from 10-Ks. Companies’ fundamental data are collected from 
Compustat. We provide a list of variable definitions in Appendix A. 
Panel B of Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the control variables included in 
regressions. We winsorize the ratio variables at the 1% level. The Oil Futures Risk Premia is 
negative and Gas Futures Risk Premia is positive on average. The mean of annual Oil Price 
Volatility is 0.4153, which is high relative to the whole economy. Cash, Inventory, Cost of Goods 
Sold, ROA, Revenue, Dividend and Capital Expenditure are normalized by total assets. 
Panels C and D of Table 2 display the annual distribution of the hedge ratio and hedging 
profits respectively. U.S. oil and gas producers hedge a significant amount of their production, 
while the mean and median of hedge ratios vary a lot over years. The producers experience a loss 
in 2007 and make profits in all other years with the highest profit in 2008. The loss in 2007 is 
concentrated on the Reported Non-Hedge Profit. The mean and median of Reported Realized 
Hedge Profit are positive in 2007 and negative in 2008. The volatility of oil price during the 
period may contribute to the variation of hedging performance. The standard deviation of profits 
on the non-hedge account is larger (hence more volatile) than that on the hedge account, 
indicating that the profits on non-hedge account are more closely related to market timing than 
do those on hedge account. 
16 
Panel E presents the annual distribution of Oil Futures Risk Premia and Gas Futures Risk 
Premia. Since most of the hedging positions cover the production throughout the year, we 
calculate the risk premia for each business day every year and then use the annual mean in the 
regressions. The risk premia are lagged values. For example, the mean of Oil Futures Risk 
Premia in 2009 is $38.871, which means the average difference between the one-year contracted 
oil futures price in 2008 and the realized oil spot price in 2009 is $38.871. We use this mean risk 
premia in the regression of the hedging profits in 2009. The average of Oil Futures Risk Premia 
is negative in all years except in 2009 while the average of Gas Futures Risk Premia is positive 
in all years but 2008. One argument for finding the overall positive profits in hedge is that the 
producers happen to earn profits on hedging due to the positive risk premia during the short 
sample period. However, this is not necessarily true given the negative risk premia for oil futures 
in most of the years. Also, the standard deviations of both oil and gas risk premia each year are 
very large relative to the mean and median. Furthermore, around 25 percent of firms actually 
earn negative profits each year, which cannot be fully explained by the positive risk premia 
argument. 
Table 3 presents Pearson correlations of our key and control variables. Our two proxies 
for hedge ratio (Relative Delta Production and Relative Notional Production) are positively 
correlated with firms’ Leverage Ratio and negatively correlated with firms’ financial strength 
(Cash and S&P Rating Dummy). They are also positively correlated with Lag Oil Price 
Volatility. This reflects that firms hedge according to hedging demand. However, the hedge 
ratios are also positively correlated to the Oil and Gas Futures Risk Premia. The three measures 
of hedging profits are highly and positively correlated to the hedge ratios. The Reported Total 
Profit is slightly positively correlated to the Oil and Gas Futures Risk Premia. However, the 
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Reported Realized Hedge Profit is strongly and positively correlated with the risk premia, while 
the Reported Non-Hedge Profit is negatively correlated with the risk premia. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 Empirical design and results 
We focus on the U.S. oil and gas producers for several reasons. First, studies show that 
the industry is exposed to oil and gas price risks and extensively uses financial derivatives to 
hedge risks. Second, firms in this industry have their business concentrated and are not 
diversified. Therefore, we do not need to consider the effect of diversification and the natural 
hedge it provides. Third, the products are quite homogeneous and hence are exposed to the same 
market price risks.10 
Being able to observe both hedging activities and actual profits allows us to examine the 
relationship between hedging and the monetary outcome and investigate the extent of market 
timing hedging (or selective hedging) and its consequence. The challenge lies in separating 
market timing hedging from pure hedging. The following subsections discuss empirical methods 
designed to address this issue and empirical findings. 
 Hedging profits and hedge ratio 
We first study how hedging profits are related to the hedging activities. We employ the 
following regression model. 
(1) 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 × 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾 × 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑎𝑡 + 𝛿 × 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑖,𝑡 
                                                 
10 Some recent papers studying this industry include Bakke et al. (2016), Kumar and Rabinnovitch (2013), 
Manchiraju et al. (2013), Mnasri et al. 92013), and Ranasinghe et al. (2013). 
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where subscript i refers to the firm, subscript t refers to the time in years, ηt refers to year 
fixed effects, and µi refers to firm fixed effects. 
Besides Reported Total Profit, we also use Reported Realized Hedge Profit and Reported 
Non-Hedge Profit as dependent variables. Reported Realized Hedge Profit represents the 
outcome of the use of derivatives that a firm designates as the hedge account. Generally, this 
item should relate closely to the pure hedging. One concern is that, with hedge accounting, the 
profits from a derivative position designated as a cash flow hedge are recognized in earnings 
when the transaction being hedged is realized, not necessarily at the time when the profits from 
the derivative position are realized.11 Thus, one could argue that the association between a firm’s 
derivatives positions and profits from derivatives is hard to interpret, due to the delay in 
recognizing profits from derivatives in earnings.  To address such concern, we use Reported 
Non-Hedge Profit as dependent variable which should help alleviate the timing problem and also 
reflect the outcome of market timing transactions more closely. 
The main measure for hedge ratio is Relative Delta Production, which follows Jin and 
Jorion (2006), and is the portfolio delta in year t divided by total production for the year. As a 
robustness check, we also use a second measure: Relative Notional Production, which is the total 
notional amount of outstanding derivatives positions in year t divided by total production for the 
year. 12 
                                                 
11 If, however, the derivative position is classified as a fair value hedge, profits will be recognized in 
earnings when the profits occur. Since fair value hedges are typically applied to commodity inventories 
and are rare in the energy industry, we find that almost all hedges in our sample are cash flow hedges. 
12 The results of this test and other related tests using Relative Notional Production are all similar to the 
results using Relative Delta Production.   
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If firms hedge according to the exact amount and date of future production without 
market timing, then profits generated from hedging should be around zero or even slightly 
negative on average. Keynes (1930) and Hicks (1939) argue that the hedgers should not generate 
profit because of the benefit of risk reduction while the speculators acting on the other side of the 
trades should be compensated for taking that risk. Hence, we should not expect any significant 
relationship between hedge ratio and hedging profits and the coefficient 𝛽 for Hedge Ratio 
should not differ significantly from zero. However, if the oil and gas producers indeed possess 
superior information in hedging (e.g., Stulz 1996), firms can generate positive profits from 
hedging. Then we will observe a positive relationship between hedging and profits. 
Adam and Fernando (2006) show that the persistent positive risk premia in the gold 
market help gold mining firms who are short hedgers to generate profits. Similarly, hedging 
profits in the oil and gas industry could also be driven by the positive risk premia, instead of 
firms’ efforts at market timing. To account for this possibility, we include the annual mean oil 
and gas futures risk premia in regressions. If the hedging profits are caused by positive risk 
premia, then these two variables should have positive coefficients. We also include Log Asset, 
Leverage ratio, ROA and Revenue to control for the time varying firm characteristics which may 
contribute to a firm’s capacity of generating hedging profits. 
Table 4 presents the estimation results. The dependent variable in columns 1, 2, and 3 is 
the Reported Total Profit. We use the Reported Realized Hedge Profit for columns 4, 5, and 6 
and the Reported Non-Hedge Profit for columns 7, 8, and 9. To control for unobserved market 
factors that might drive firms’ hedging profits in a specific year, we add year fixed effects in 
columns 2, 5, and 8. We add both year and firm fixed effects in columns 3, 6, and 9 to further 
control for unobserved firm-level characteristics that may affect firms’ hedging profits. 
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Thompson (2011) argues that the time effect may be heterogeneous across firms at a given year 
and the firm effect may follow autoregressive process. In such cases, the standard errors may still 
be biased even if both firm and year dummies are included. Petersen (2009) suggests that if we 
don’t know the specific form of dependence of the time or firm effect, we can cluster the 
standard errors on two dimensions simultaneously. Hence, we cluster the standard errors at both 
year and firm levels following the approach in Petersen (2009), Thompson (2011) and Cameron 
et al. (2011).13  
We find a positive and significant relationship between profits and hedging in some 
regressions. The regression coefficients of Relative Delta Production are positive for all 
regressions. It is significant in column 1 and then loses significance in column 2 with year fixed 
effects. It then becomes 0.015 and significant at 5% level in column 3 when we add both year 
and firm fixed effects. So, one standard deviation increase (0.7711) in Relative Delta Production 
would yield a 0.0116 increase in total hedging profit, which is about 65% of the mean of 
Reported Total Profit. Turning to the realized hedging profits, it appears that the hedging 
activities have no impact on Reported Realized Hedge Profit as the coefficients are not 
significant. When we test the effect of hedging on Reported Non-Hedge Profit, the coefficients 
are larger than those on Reported Realized Hedge Profit. The coefficient is 0.015 and significant 
at 5% level when we add both year and firm fixed effects in column 9. The differences between 
the impact of Relative Delta Production on Realized Hedge Profit and on Reported Non-Hedge 
Profit indicate that the positive relationship between hedging and hedging profit is more likely to 
be driven by the market timing activities. 
                                                 
13 Abadie, Athey, Imbens and Wooldridge (2017) shed some insights on this issue. They conclude that “if 
there is no heterogeneity in the treatment effects, one need not adjust standard errors for clustering once 
fixed effects are included”. Hence, our use of two-way clustering is on the conservative side.  
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[Insert Table 4 here] 
The coefficients of Oil Futures Risk Premia are significant in most regressions. As in 
Adam and Fernando (2006), we also find that the hedging outcome relates positively to Oil 
Futures Risk Premia. Thus, a fraction of hedging profits is likely driven by the risk premia in the 
futures market. Gas Futures Risk Premia appears to have a negative sign, but this is due to the 
high collinearity with Oil Futures Risk Premia (with the correlation coefficient of 0.99 as shown 
in Table 3). If we drop Oil Futures Risk Premia, the signs for Gas Futures Risk Premia are all 
positive and significant. Also, if we only use Gas Futures Risk Premia in the regressions for the 
other tables, the results are virtually the same. Gas Futures Risk Premia is dropped automatically 
from the regressions once we include the year fixed effects.  
 Hedging profits and decomposition of hedge ratio 
While the model above examines the relationship between hedging and the outcome of 
hedging, another issue remains to be addressed: do profits come from pure hedging or market 
timing? We adopt two approaches to decompose the hedge ratio and obtain the component that is 
likely related to market timing. 
Haushalter (2000) and Adam and Fernando (2006) use a model of two-stage decisional 
process whereby firms firstly decide whether to hedge or not, and secondly how much to hedge. 
To deal with a potential sample selection bias, we employ the classic Heckman (1970) selection 
model. Specifically, we estimate the model using two-step procedure with the first stage Probit 
selection model as follows: 
(2) 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑡 = Φ(γ × 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡) 
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where Hedge is a dummy variable which equals to 1 if the firm hedges the production 
with derivatives and 0 otherwise. Zi,t include variables which determine the propensity of a firm 
to hedge. We include Log Asset, Leverage Ratio, Cash, Dividend, and S&P Rating Dummy (e.g., 
Nance et al. 1993; Haushalter 2000; Stulz 1996; Adam and Fernando 2006). We also include 
variables such as Oil and Gas Future Risk Premia and Lag Oil Price Volatility (Froot et al. 
1993), which measure the market condition. We further include Revenue and Capital 
Expenditure. All these variables predict higher likelihood of hedging except that Cash and S&P 
Rating Dummy predict lower likelihood of hedging. The challenge is that those variables are also 
used to determine the intensity of hedging and have same signs of predictions. To find an 
exogenous variable, we examine the annual reports and find that some firms also use long term 
physical delivery contracts or derivatives to hedge interest rate risk and foreign exchange risk 
when they hedge the commodity risk. Hence, we create a dummy variable Other Hedge which 
equals to 1 if a firm either uses long term physical contract or hedges interest rate or foreign 
exchange risks and 0 otherwise. Since the variable Other Hedge only shows a firm’s intention to 
manage risk, it may predict that the firm will also hedge commodity risk but it should not affect 
the magnitude of hedge. Thus, Other Hedge can be a good candidate of exogenous variable in 
the selection model. We then calculate the inverse mills ratio λ𝑖,𝑡 and include it in the second step 
We estimate the following models with and without firm fixed effects in the second step: 
(3a) 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 × 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + λ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡 
(3b) 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 × 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + λ𝑖,𝑡 +𝜇𝑖+ 𝑖,𝑡 
Xi,t are the independent variables including the variables in equation (2) except Other 
Hedge. Furthermore, we add Lifting Cost per BOE (Haushalter 2000), Market to Book Ratio 
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(Adam and Fernando 2006), ROA, Inventory, and Cost of Goods Sold, which are expected to be 
positively related to Hedge Ratio. 
Because the above firm specific variables and the market variables are considered to 
determine the magnitude of firms’ hedging demand (Haushalter 2000, Jin and Jorion 2006), we 
regard the regression predicted value as firms’ pure hedging component. Similarly, Disatnik et 
al. (2013) use predicted hedge ratio as “the hedge propensity” instrumental variable in their 
analysis. The regression residual will then likely capture firms’ market timing derivative 
transactions which deviate from normal hedging demand. 
The first approach in model 3a does not include firm fixed effects. The second approach 
employs a stricter examination by including firm fixed effects in the regression model 3b. The 
firm fixed effects take into account any unobserved time invariance effect which may affect 
firms’ hedging ratio. On the other hand, it may also absorb part of individual firm’s market 
timing effect if a firm conducts persistent market timing activities. For example, if a firm hedges 
more than normal hedging demand each year during the entire sample period, then this will show 
up in the term 𝜇𝑖 of the regression and be recognized as pure hedging. Similarly, this applies to a 
firm which hedges less than normal hedging demand. Therefore, including firm fixed effects is a 
more stringent rule, which keeps only the time varying speculation in the residual and may 
underestimate the market timing activities. The true market timing level should lie between the 
residuals of model 3a and 3b. 
The first column in Table 5 reports the results of first stage regression. The sample 
contains oil and gas producers with assets greater than $100 million including firms which do not 
hedge. As expected, the coefficient for Other Hedge is positive and significant at 1% level. 
When a firm has other hedging programs, it is also more likely to use derivatives to hedge 
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commodity risk. Hence, Other Hedge indeed can serve as an exogenous variable. The signs of 
other control variables are generally in accordance with the literature. Lag Oil Price Volatility is 
positively related with a firm’s propensity to hedge. Firms with more Capital Expenditure are 
more likely to hedge while firms with more Cash (proxy for liquidity) and more Revenue are less 
likely to hedge. The firm size variable Log Asset is not significant possibly due to the fact that 
we exclude small producers which are not required to report their hedging transactions. 
Columns 2 and 3 in Table 5 report the second stage regressions using Relative Delta 
Production as hedge ratio. As a robustness check, we use Relative Notional Production as hedge 
ratio in columns 4 and 5. We estimate model 3a without firm fixed effects in the regressions in 
columns 2 and 4. We add firm fixed effects as in model 3b in columns 3 and 5. The coefficients 
of the Inverse Mills Ratio variable are significant in all regressions except in column 5, 
validating the need to control for the potential selection bias. The signs of the coefficients of the 
control variables are mostly consistent with the prior empirical studies. Firms will hedge more 
when the oil price volatility is higher and when they have higher leverage as found in Haushalter 
(2000). Firms will hedge less when they have more cash or have S&P credit rating. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
We then estimate the two hedging components using the coefficients from the above 
regressions. Panel A in Table 2 provides the summary statistics. Residual Delta and Predicted 
Delta are estimated from model 3a without firm fixed effects. Residual Delta Fixed Effects and 
Predicted Delta Fixed Effects are estimated from model 3b with firm fixed effects. The means of 
Predicted Delta and Predicted Delta Fixed Effects are close to (a little smaller than) the mean of 
Relative Delta Production. However, they have much smaller standard deviations than that of 
Relative Delta Production, validating that our predicted values of hedge ratio reflect the 
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persistent part of hedging demand. The means of Residual Delta and Residual Delta Fixed 
Effects are about zero since they are the regressions residuals. Interestingly, the standard 
deviation of Residual Delta is much bigger than that of Predicted Delta while the standard 
deviation of Residual Delta Fixed Effects is smaller than that of Predicted Delta Fixed Effects. 
Also, the standard deviation of Residual Delta Fixed Effects is much smaller than that of 
Residual Delta while the standard deviation of Predicted Delta Fixed Effects is much larger than 
that of Predicted Delta. These differences indicate that a large part of the variations among 
hedge ratio are due to the cross-sectional difference in the use of derivatives among firms. 
Adding the firm fixed effects moves the variation from the residuals to the predicted values. Not 
surprisingly, the mean and median of absolute value of Residual Delta Fixed Effects are 0.2357 
and 0.1764 respectively, which are smaller than those of Residual Delta (0.4051 and 0.3121 
respectively) as we anticipate above. So, the true mean of absolute value of the market timing 
component should be between 0.2357 and 0.4051, which is a sizable portion of Relative Delta 
Production. 
We then use the two hedging components as the main independent variables in the 
following regression model: 
(4) 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 × 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 × 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 
                                            + 𝛾 × 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑎𝑡 + 𝛿 × 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑖,𝑡  
Similarly, we use the three measures of hedging profits in our estimation, starting with 
raw model and then models with year fixed effects and models with both year and firm fixed 
effects.  We also cluster the standard errors at both year and firm levels as in Table 4. 
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The results of the regressions using Residual Delta and Predicted Delta are reported in 
Table 6. The market timing component plays an important role in determining hedging profits. It 
is positive and significant in most of the regressions. For example, in column 1, the coefficient of 
Residual Delta is 0.024 and significant at 1% level. The coefficient remains significantly strong 
at 0.019 even after we add year and firm fixed effects in column 3. The magnitude implies a 
large economic significance. Evaluating at the means, a one standard deviation (0.5485) increase 
in Residual Delta will increase hedging profit by 0.0104, which is 58% change from the sample 
mean of Reported Total Profit. When using Reported Realized Hedge Profit as the dependent 
variable in columns 4 through 6, the market timing component is positive but not significant 
when adding the year fixed effects. This indicates that firms’ profits on hedge-designated 
derivatives positions are mostly not associated with the market timing effect. In contrast, the 
market timing component strongly predicts Reported Non-Hedge Profit. Even after adding both 
year and firm fixed effects, the coefficient of Residual Delta, 0.016, is still significant at 10% 
level. The results using Reported Non-Hedge Profit provide further evidence that the market 
timing component of hedging contributes to the hedging profits significantly. 
In general, Predicted Delta (pure hedging component) does not affect hedging profits 
except for the results in columns 4 and 5. However, once we include both year and firm fixed 
effects in column 6, it is no longer significant. It is also possible that the firm fixed effects absorb 
the effect of predicted hedge ratio when some firms persistently generate profits. 
Table 7 shows the results using Residual Delta Fixed Effects and Predicted Delta Fixed 
Effects. The market timing effects are again positive and significant in the regressions with 
Reported Total Profit. The coefficient of Residual Delta Fixed Effects is 0.021 and significant at 
5% level in column 3 with both year and firm fixed effects. Similarly, we find positive effect of 
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market timing hedging on Reported non-Hedge Profit at 1% significance level in column 7 and 
with year fixed effects in column 8. The coefficient is still strong and significant at 10% level in 
column 9 even with both year and firm fixed effects. The market timing component has no 
significant effect on Reported Realized Hedge Profit. The coefficient of Predicted Delta Fixed 
Effects (pure hedging component) is positive and significant in column 1 and 2, possibly because 
now the pure hedging component contains some persistent market timing efforts for each firm. 
However, once we add the year and firm fixed effects, the coefficient becomes insignificant. 
Similarly, Predicted Delta Fixed Effects shows some positive effects on the Reported Realized 
Profit. Once we add the year and firm fixed effects, the positive effect disappears. In sum, results 
in Table 6 and Table 7 indicate that market timing activities contribute to the hedging profits 
significantly.  
[Insert Table 6 and Table 7 here] 
 Additional analyses 
 Comparison of firm characteristics based on hedging outcomes and activities 
We investigate whether there are some firms that can consistently generate profits on 
their hedging activities. If a firm can make positive profits in at least four years across the sample 
period, we call it a good hedger. Otherwise, we call it a mediocre hedger. To study the 
consistency of hedging and hedging profit, we remove firms with less than four years’ 
observations to avoid sampling bias. We find 27 good hedgers with 133 firm-year observations, 
and 38 mediocre hedgers with 174 firm-year observations. We then run a t-test to compare hedge 
profits, hedge ratios, and other firm characteristics between these two groups and report the 
results in Table 8 Panel A. Good hedgers can deliver five times profits as many as mediocre 
hedgers do, while the hedge ratios for both groups do not differ much. This indicates that some 
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oil and gas producers are better in their use of derivatives and that the profits are likely to be 
more related to how they hedge, rather than simply to the extent of hedging. 
Following Brown et al. (2006), we also separate firms into active hedgers and inactive 
hedgers. Active hedgers are firms whose standard deviation of hedge ratio are above the industry 
median of standard deviation, and inactive hedgers are firms whose standard deviation of hedge 
ratio are below the industry median. We identify 33 active hedgers with 157 firm-year 
observations and 32 inactive hedgers with 150 firm-year observations. Table 8 Panel B reports 
the results of the comparison. While there is no significant difference in their total profits 
between the two groups, active hedgers have larger non-hedge profits than inactive hedgers. 
Also, active hedgers tend to hedge more and vary more than inactive hedgers. Interestingly, we 
find that active hedgers are significantly smaller than inactive hedgers, which indicates that their 
hedging activities may be driven by asset substitution motivation (Adam et al. 2017). 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
We further compare good versus mediocre hedgers among the active hedgers. As 
expected, not all active hedgers are able to consistently earn a profit. Out of 35 active hedgers, 
only 14 firms are good hedgers, and the rest 21 firms are mediocre hedgers. In Table 8 Panel C, 
we find that good & active hedgers have significantly larger total profit (2.6% for Reported Total 
Profit), larger non-hedge profit (2.4% for Reported non-Hedge Profit) than that of mediocre & 
active hedgers, while we do not find significant difference in realized hedge profit between these 
two groups. These findings are consistent with the assumption that firms actively change their 
derivative position to mark the market, and the result from these active changes are then mostly 
reflected in firms’ non-hedge profit. Among active hedgers, we also do not find a significant 
difference in hedge ratios between good and mediocre hedgers. We then find that good & active 
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hedgers are significantly larger than mediocre & active hedgers. Hence, active hedgers who are 
able to consistently earn profit from hedging activities are larger firms, who tend to possess 
information advantage. 
Within the inactive hedger group, there are 13 good hedgers, and the rest 17 firms are 
mediocre hedgers. We also run a t-test between good & inactive hedgers and mediocre & 
inactive hedgers. Results are reported in Table 8 Panel D. Good & inactive hedgers have 
significantly larger total profit (3.0% for Reported Total Profit), larger non-hedge profit (1.4% 
for Reported non-Hedge Profit), and also significantly larger hedge profit (3.2% for Reported 
Realized Hedge Profit) than that of mediocre & inactive hedgers. Good & inactive hedgers also 
have significantly larger total derivatives ratios (0.186 for Relative Delta Production, and 0.176 
for Relative Notional Production). After decomposing derivative ratios, we find that good & 
inactive hedgers have larger pure hedging component (predicted delta ratios) than that of 
mediocre & inactive hedgers, while we do not find any significant difference in market timing 
activities (residual ratios and absolute value of residual ratios) between these two groups. These 
findings are consistent with the idea that inactive hedgers do not actively change their derivative 
positions, and therefore tend to have no difference in their market timing activities. The major 
difference between their derivative profits comes from the difference in their pure hedge 
activities, which are then mostly reflected in firms’ hedge profit. 
To conclude, Table 8 compares the derivative profit, derivative ratios, and firm 
characteristics among different groups of firms. Consistent with the information advantage 
assumption, we find that among firms who actively change their derivative positions, larger 
firms are able to consistently earn positive profit from their derivative activities. Thus, only those 
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firms who tend to have information advantage (larger firms) are able to consistently earn profit 
from their market timing activities. 
 Comparison with profits from interest rate and foreign exchange derivatives 
U.S. oil and gas producers may generate profits from hedging because of superior trading 
skill, instead of an information advantage. If so, they should be able to succeed in the interest 
rate and foreign exchange derivative markets as well. Many firms in our sample are exposed to 
interest rate risk and use interest rate derivatives (mainly swaps) to manage this risk. Some large 
firms in our sample with overseas subsidiaries and international transactions are also exposed to 
foreign exchange risk and use foreign exchange derivatives to hedge the risk. Since all firms in 
our sample are oil and gas producers, they may have an information advantage on oil and gas 
prices and are able to profit from commodity derivative transactions. In contrast, since they are 
not financial institutions, they may not have the expertise to predict changes in interest rates and 
foreign exchange rates and are not able to consistently profit from interest rate and foreign 
exchange derivative transactions. Hence, we hypothesize that commodity derivative profits 
should be positive while interest rate and foreign exchange derivative profits should not be 
positive. 
To test our hypothesis, we also hand-collect data for the gains and losses of interest rate 
and foreign exchange derivative transactions. Again, for derivative transactions in each market, 
we have Reported Realized Hedge Profit for realized gains or losses of cash flow hedges, 
Reported Non-Hedge Profit for total gains or losses of non-cash flow hedges, and Reported 
Ineffective Hedge Profit for total gains or losses of the ineffective portion of cash flow hedges. 
The sum of these three parts is the Reported Total Profit. We then run the univariate t-test on the 
total reported derivative profits in each market. Results are reported in Table 9. Panel A lists the 
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t-test results of derivative profits in the commodity market. The mean of Reported Total Profit is 
1.78% and is significantly larger than zero. The major components of derivative profits are also 
significantly larger than zero. Reported Realized Hedge Profit and Reported Non-Hedge Profit 
have means of 1.53% and 1.34%, respectively, and are both significant at 1% level. Results for 
interest rate derivative profits are reported in Panel B. Reported Total Profit as well as Reported 
Realized Hedge Profit and Reported Non-Hedge Profit are all negative and significant. Panel C 
reports results for foreign exchange derivatives. Reported Total Profit does not differ 
significantly from zero. With respect to each component of derivative profits, Reported Realized 
Hedge Profit is significantly negative, with a mean of -0.03%, and significant at 10% level, 
while Reported Non-Hedge Profit has a mean of 0.03% but is not differ significantly from zero. 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
Overall, our comparison of derivative profits across the three types of derivatives is 
consistent with our hypothesis. The fact that firms do not generate profits in interest rate and 
foreign exchange derivative markets indicates that they do not have superior trading skill. Hence, 
the commodity derivative profits are most likely driven by some producers’ capacity to process 
information in the oil and gas markets and form more precise predictions. They can employ 
strategies based on their expectations and generate positive profits.  
 Hedging and firm risk 
Given that the producers use derivatives not only for pure hedging but also for market 
timing to achieve higher profits, one question arises: do such transactions and outcome increase 
firm’s risk instead of reducing risk? If they increase firm’s risk, then such activities may reduce 
firm value. One possible explanation of some firms’ positive hedging profits is that these firms 
take extra risk in their derivative positions. 
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To address this issue, we test the relationship between firms’ risk and their hedging 
activities. The results are reported in Table 10. The dependent variable Beta measures the 
systematic risk. Beta in each year is estimated by regressing firm’s daily returns on the daily 
returns of the market index. Our major concern is whether derivative activities, especially the 
market timing component of derivative activities, are associated with higher risk. In the first 
three columns, we use the Reported Total Profit, Residual Delta and Predicted Delta as 
independent variables. We add year fixed effects in column 2 and both year and firm fixed 
effects in column 3. We replace the two hedging components with Residual Delta Fixed Effects 
and Predicted Delta Fixed Effects in columns 4 through 6. The coefficients of Reported Total 
Profit are not significant in any regression. Therefore, the market does not perceive higher risk 
from higher hedging profit. The coefficients of the market timing component are negative in all 
regressions and are significant in columns 1 and 2. The coefficients of the pure hedging 
component are negative and significant at 1% or 5% level, which is in line with the prediction of 
hedging theories. However, they become insignificant after including both firm and year fixed 
effects in regressions. Neither hedging profit nor hedge ratio increase firms’ systematic risk.  
[Insert Table 10 here] 
Overall, we do not find any evidence that the derivative profits and hedging activities 
increase firm’s equity beta and hence they should not reduce firm value. 
 Robustness tests  
 Upstream oil and gas producers 
To identify firms in the upstream oil and gas sector and avoid midstream and downstream 
oil and gas firms, Doshi et al. (2014) use four different industry classification codes from 
Compustat. Similarly, we require that each firm included in our regression samples must fulfill 
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the following standards: SIC equals 1311 (crude petroleum and natural gas), NAICS equals 
211111 (crude petroleum and natural gas extraction), SPCINDCD equals 380 (oil and gas 
exploration and production), and GSUBIND equals 10102020 (oil and gas exploration and 
production). Since there are many missing values for SPCINDCD, to avoid accidentally 
excluding qualified oil and gas producers, we also allow SPCINDCD to be null if a firm meets 
the other three criteria. By applying these criteria, 20 firms are excluded from our original 
samples, and the filtered samples include 85 unique firms with both hedging and profit data. We 
then rerun the regressions in tables 6 and 7 in section 3 and find consistent results on the market 
timing effects.  
 Contracts matured in the succeeding year 
In this test, we only consider firms’ derivatives contracts scheduled for the following one 
year. To get firms’ hedge ratio, we then aggregate the delta (or notional amount) of these 
outstanding contracts and normalize it by annual production for the following year. The results 
are similar to those in section 3. The coefficients of hedge ratio and market timing component 
are still positively correlated with Reported Total Profit and economically significant.  
 Heckman selection model test 
We exclude the firms without hedging from our analyses because our focus is on the 
outcome of hedging. One may argue that the sample may be biased because firms who hedge 
may be more capable of earning profits. Hence, we run the Heckman selection model to control 
for potential selection bias and include the Inverse Mills Ratio variable as a control variable in 
the second-stage regression of Reported Total Profits. The coefficients of the key testing 
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variables are all consistent with the previous results. The Inverse Mills Ratio is not significant. 
Hence, our results are not likely driven by selection bias.14 
 Conclusion 
Recent literature studies how companies use market-timing in corporate financing and 
payout decisions (e.g., Bolton et al. 2013). However, the literature has debated whether managers 
should incorporate their views of the market in risk management. Hedging price exposure to 
product market risk is quite different from hedging interest rate risk or foreign exchange risk. 
Firms may possess an information advantage when hedging the market risk of their products 
(e.g., Stulz 1996). Also, Cheng and Xiong (2014b) find that commodity hedgers act like 
speculators and trade actively on derivatives markets. However, without empirically examining 
the monetary outcome of hedging, we cannot draw a clear relationship among hedging, selective 
hedging, and the hedging benefit. 
While the U.S. oil and gas producers have been extensively studied, we provide new 
evidence on hedging, selective hedging, and hedging outcome in the industry. Using a hand-
collected panel data of hedging positions and hedging profits, we show direct evidence of the 
extensive use of derivatives with large monetary outcome, and we find large variations in hedge 
ratios and hedging profits in the U.S. oil and gas producers. The profits relate positively to the 
hedge ratio, especially the market timing component of the hedge ratio. The results are robust to 
various specifications and selection model. We also identify a group of firms that can 
consistently generate profits from their hedging activities. Among firms who actively change 
                                                 
14 We also run the tests with non-hedging firms and our results are similar. We do not report the results 
because our main tests focus on the relationship between derivative profits and hedge ratio. Adding the 
non-hedging firms simply adds zeros to both sides of equation since zero hedge ratio immediately implies 
zero profit. Hence, we think it is inappropriate to add them in our sample.   
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their hedging positions, the winners tend to be larger firms. In addition, we find that the hedging 
outcome does not increase firms’ risk while the pure hedging component tends to decrease equity 
beta, adding to the firm value. Finally, the hedging profits are exclusively associated with firms’ 
commodity derivatives. The oil and gas producers do not profit from interest rate or foreign 
exchange derivative transactions. Overall, our findings show that the new data on hedging profits 
can help researchers better understand the relationship between the use of derivatives and the 
derivative profits, disentangle between pure hedging and market timing, and better assess the 
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 Tables and Figures 




Table 1 Summary statistics of natural gas and crude oil contracts 
The table presents the summary statistics of natural gas and crude oil contracts. Panel A gives the number 
and the notional amount of contracts. The notional amount is in Bcf (billion cubic feet) for natural gas 
contracts and in Mmbbl (million barrels) for crude oil contracts. Panel B summarizes the types of 
contracts, which include call options, put options, ceilings, floors, collars, three-way collars, forwards, 
and swaps. The notional amount is in Mmboe (million barrels of oil equivalent). Panels C and D provide 
contracts information for natural gas and crude oil, respectively. 
Panel A: Commodity Contracts 
    Gas Contracts   Oil Contracts 






2007  522 3201.59  474 386.43 
2008  659 5838.64  625 510.63 
2009  646 6405.47  516 440.46 
2010  714 7447.16  590 565.44 
2011   484 7226.55   652 648.74 
Panel B: Contract Types (notional amount in Mmboe) 
      






N  31 33 0 25 417 35 24 431 
Notional  4.54 49.30 0.00 16.45 280.84 116.65 5.72 446.54            
2008 
N  29 54 10 86 441 26 20 618 
Notional  90.20 74.38 2.42 38.83 397.45 171.38 19.89 689.19            
2009 
N  34 57 8 54 453 35 7 514 
Notional  130.43 96.03 1.94 24.92 418.99 129.58 4.13 702.02            
2010 
N  20 65 18 38 432 37 7 687 
Notional  187.39 56.39 26.00 49.46 368.17 278.09 1.98 839.17            
2011 
N  44 58 7 17 329 68 3 610 






Table 2 Summary statistics of key variables and control variables 
This table provides summary statistics of key variables and control variables. Panel A reports the summary statistics for key variables. 
The p-values of the t-test of means are reported in the last column. Panel B lists the summary statistics for major control variables. 
Panel C provides annual summary statistics of Relative Delta Production and Relative Notional Production during sample period from 
2007 to 2011. Panel D provides annual summary statistics of Reported Total Profit, Reported Realized Hedge Profit, and Reported 
Non-Hedge Profit during the sample period from 2007 to 2011. Panel E reports the annual mean of Oil and Gas Futures Risk Premia. 
Panel A: Key Variables 
  N Mean SD P25 Median P75 p-value 
Relative Delta Production 397 0.8448 0.7711 0.2915 0.6257 1.1370 0.0000 
Relative Notional Production 397 1.0412 0.9002 0.4094 0.7862 1.4235 0.0000 
Reported Total Profit 397 0.0178 0.0507 -0.0062 0.0063 0.0376 0.0000 
Reported Realized Hedge Profit 178 0.0153 0.0404 -0.0049 0.0014 0.0212 0.0000 
Reported Non-Hedge Profit 322 0.0134 0.0487 -0.0067 0.0046 0.0312 0.0000 
Reported Ineffective Hedge Profit 76 0.0000 0.0023 -0.0004 0.0000 0.0005 0.4270 
Reported Raw Profit ($Million) 397 74.8980 337.5571 -4.4000 5.9190 48.4250 0.0000 
Accumulate Raw Profit ($Million) 105 283.1857 1056.7660 0.0000 30.1820 171.0000 0.0036 
Predicted Delta 327 0.7530 0.3889 0.5044 0.7130 0.9592 0.0000 
Residual Delta 327 -0.0008 0.5485 -0.3430 -0.0758 0.2474 0.9783 
Residual Delta (Absolute Value) 327 0.4051 0.3691 0.1453 0.3121 0.5469 0.0000 
Predicted Delta Fixed Effects 327 0.7524 0.5880 0.3319 0.6437 0.9633 0.0000 
Residual Delta Fixed Effects 327 -0.0002 0.3275 -0.1797 0.0000 0.1762 0.9933 










Table 2 (Cont.) 
Panel B: Control Variables 
  N Mean SD P25 Median P75 
Oil Futures Risk Premia 397 -2.3005 22.2269 -10.3318 -8.8114 -1.3862 
Gas Futures Risk Premia 397 1.9426 1.8944 1.2635 1.7179 2.1531 
Lag Oil Price Volatility 397 0.4153 0.1154 0.2902 0.4281 0.4572 
Lifting Cost per Boe 366 14.1586 9.4407 9.0963 12.1416 16.9344 
Market to Book Ratio 381 2.0622 5.8924 1.0771 1.8270 2.7813 
Leverage Ratio 397 0.3578 0.2194 0.2226 0.3256 0.4551 
Log Asset 397 7.3188 1.5094 6.1880 7.2613 8.2405 
Cash 397 0.0354 0.0521 0.0030 0.0156 0.0460 
Inventory 374 0.0059 0.0107 0.0000 0.0010 0.0078 
Cost of Goods Sold 397 0.1810 0.2456 0.0600 0.0933 0.1674 
ROA 397 -0.0348 0.2423 -0.0544 0.0184 0.0604 
Revenue 397 0.2991 0.1707 0.1989 0.2680 0.3573 
Dividend 397 0.0123 0.0352 0.0000 0.0000 0.0048 
Capital Expenditure 397 0.2351 0.1418 0.1306 0.2188 0.3225 







Table 2 (Cont.) 
Panel C: Relative Delta Production and Relative Notional Production, 2007 to 2011 
    Relative Delta Production    Relative Notional Production 
Year N Mean SD P25 Median P75  N Mean SD P25 Median P75               
2007 70 0.6518 0.7537 0.1933 0.4388 0.8826  70 0.8490 0.9227 0.2656 0.6149 1.1771 
2008 87 0.8645 0.8621 0.2813 0.5098 1.1803  87 1.1020 1.0165 0.3930 0.7766 1.4399 
2009 79 0.9517 0.7835 0.3409 0.7683 1.3995  79 1.1161 0.9218 0.4241 0.8462 1.4918 
2010 83 0.9450 0.7371 0.3866 0.8410 1.3182  83 1.1521 0.8404 0.5048 0.9939 1.6656 
2011 78 0.7813 0.6763 0.2977 0.6132 1.0034  78 0.9519 0.7567 0.4249 0.7816 1.2593               
Total 397 0.8448 0.7711 0.2915 0.6257 1.1370  397 1.0412 0.9002 0.4094 0.7862 1.4235 
 
Panel D: Reported Total Profit, Reported Realized Hedge Profit, and Reported Non-Hedge Profit, 2007 to 2011 
    Reported Total Profit     Reported Realized Hedge Profit  
Year N Mean SD P25 Median P75  N Mean SD P25 Median P75               
2007 70 -0.0130 0.0358 -0.0219 -0.0045 0.0068  40 0.0066 0.0156 -0.0030 0.0016 0.0152 
2008 87 0.0316 0.0614 -0.0072 0.0119 0.0668  41 -0.0120 0.0168 -0.0221 -0.0091 -0.0005 
2009 79 0.0255 0.0599 -0.0155 0.0158 0.0556  36 0.0573 0.0551 0.0139 0.0463 0.0903 
2010 83 0.0229 0.0446 -0.0015 0.0103 0.0418  31 0.0181 0.0387 -0.0018 0.0057 0.0399 
2011 78 0.0169 0.0305 -0.0019 0.0074 0.0319  30 0.0106 0.0258 -0.0026 0.0014 0.0199               
Total 397 0.0178 0.0507 -0.0062 0.0063 0.0376  178 0.0153 0.0404 -0.0049 0.0014 0.0212 
              
    Reported non-Hedge Profit         
Year N Mean SD P25 Median P75                      
2007 45 -0.0259 0.0365 -0.0329 -0.0103 -0.0020        
2008 68 0.0463 0.0587 0.0017 0.0331 0.0807        
2009 66 0.0002 0.0487 -0.0250 -0.0011 0.0205        
2010 74 0.0177 0.0374 -0.0030 0.0051 0.0271        
2011 69 0.0145 0.0298 -0.0003 0.0074 0.0279                      







Table 2 (Cont.) 
Panel E: Oil and Gas Futures Risk Premia, 2007 to 2011 
  Oil Futures Risk Premia   Gas Futures Risk Premia 
Year N Mean SD P25 Median P75  N Mean SD P25 Median P75               
2007 257 -1.386 14.400 -14.710 5.280 9.160  249 2.153 1.161 1.320 1.840 2.790 
2008 253 -27.010 34.241 -50.530 -36.040 -21.220  254 -0.441 2.198 -2.138 0.049 1.247 
2009 253 38.871 29.656 25.900 48.020 59.190  253 5.287 1.668 4.081 5.676 6.395 
2010 252 -8.811 10.544 -19.250 -4.975 -0.310  252 1.718 0.613 1.208 1.613 2.085 
2011 252 -10.332 7.604 -17.080 -9.770 -5.130  252 1.264 0.611 0.793 1.022 1.816               







Table 3 Correlation matrix 
This table provides the correlation among key variables and control variables. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
                     
(1) Relative Delta Production 1                    
(2) Relative Notional Production 0.910 1                   
(3) Reported Total Profit 0.673 0.537 1                  
(4) Reported Realized Hedge Profit 0.422 0.317 0.571 1                 
(5) Reported non-Hedge Profit 0.416 0.349 0.613 -0.277 1                
(6) Oil Futures Risk Premia 0.060 0.016 0.143 0.509 -0.336 1               
(7) Gas Futures Risk Premia 0.065 0.031 0.147 0.522 -0.347 0.994 1              
(8) Lag Oil Price Volatility 0.152 0.206 0.242 0.224 0.069 0.111 0.15 1             
(9) Lifting Cost per Boe -0.117 -0.001 -0.205 -0.162 -0.075 -0.155 -0.149 -0.141 1            
(10) Market to Book Ratio 0.053 0.315 -0.149 0.059 -0.230 0.030 0.068 0.184 0.396 1           
(11) Leverage Ratio 0.294 0.355 0.290 0.047 0.311 -0.016 -0.031 0.070 0.053 -0.009 1          
(12) Log Asset -0.551 -0.484 -0.297 -0.313 -0.086 0.031 0.015 -0.033 -0.090 -0.137 -0.175 1         
(13) Cash -0.134 -0.149 -0.148 -0.154 -0.032 -0.050 -0.034 0.152 -0.135 -0.010 -0.275 -0.041 1        
(14) Inventory -0.293 -0.263 -0.128 -0.119 -0.037 -0.079 -0.090 0.012 -0.081 -0.065 -0.162 0.468 0.023 1       
(15) Cost of Goods Sold -0.076 0.039 -0.009 -0.010 -0.004 -0.046 -0.069 0.030 0.177 0.115 0.065 0.128 -0.102 0.665 1      
(16) ROA -0.183 -0.211 -0.260 0.082 -0.405 -0.195 -0.195 -0.192 0.085 0.157 -0.405 0.151 -0.003 0.135 -0.125 1     
(17) Revenue 0.009 0.025 0.016 0.145 -0.090 -0.182 -0.192 -0.024 0.187 0.158 -0.180 0.055 -0.137 0.662 0.796 0.227 1    
(18) Dividend 0.387 0.308 0.170 0.552 -0.260 0.025 0.026 0.015 0.114 0.175 -0.081 -0.361 -0.114 -0.012 0.050 0.411 0.363 1   
(19) Capital Expenditure -0.097 -0.064 -0.159 -0.229 0.007 -0.349 -0.358 -0.285 -0.273 -0.152 0.133 -0.206 0.110 -0.221 -0.076 -0.005 -0.197 -0.150 1  






Table 4 Hedging profits and hedging activities 
The dependent variables include Reported Total Profit, Reported Realized Hedge Profit, and Reported Non-Hedge Profit. The key independent variable is Relative Delta 
Production. Oil Futures Risk Premia and Gas Futures Risk Premia are also included. See Appendix A for detailed definition of the variables. We control for year fixed effects in 
columns 2, 5, and 8. We control for both year and firm fixed effects in columns 3, 6, and 9. We cluster the standard errors at firm and year levels and report the t-statistics in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 























          
Relative Delta Production 0.017** 0.015 0.015** 0.009 0.008 0.005 0.015** 0.014 0.015** 
 (2.07) (1.54) (2.15) (1.27) (1.10) (0.70) (1.97) (1.49) (2.15) 
          
Oil Futures Risk Premia 0.002 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.003 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (1.03) (9.92) (7.68) (0.14) (32.65) (20.15) (1.14) (5.48) (5.42) 
          
Gas Futures Risk Premia -0.028   0.011   -0.041   
 (-1.04)   (0.86)   (-1.42)   
          
Log Asset -0.000 -0.001 0.010 -0.003 -0.003 0.027 0.000 -0.000 -0.004 
 (-0.46) (-0.87) (1.17) (-1.02) (-1.17) (1.49) (0.13) (-0.10) (-0.37) 
          
Leverage Ratio 0.030 0.028 0.003 -0.021 -0.019 -0.005 0.046** 0.045** 0.008 
 (1.49) (1.35) (0.11) (-1.26) (-1.17) (-0.12) (2.33) (2.27) (0.21) 
          
ROA 0.033 0.039 0.059** 0.018 0.021 0.015 0.015 0.023 0.055 
 (0.95) (1.18) (2.07) (1.11) (1.28) (0.73) (0.38) (0.58) (1.57) 
          
Revenue 0.038** 0.033* 0.241*** 0.050 0.046 0.217* 0.006 0.001 0.155** 
 (1.99) (1.73) (3.24) (1.44) (1.36) (1.69) (0.48) (0.06) (2.22) 
          
Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 397 397 397 178 178 178 322 322 322 
R-squared 0.124 0.175 0.521 0.394 0.409 0.849 0.219 0.291 0.591 
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Table 5 Heckman selection on hedging and the determinants of hedge ratios 
The model predicts the use of derivatives in the first stage and adds the Inverse Mills Ratio in the 
second stage. The dependent variable in the first stage is the hedge dummy, which equals one if 
the firm uses oil or gas derivatives in the year and zero otherwise. The dependent variables in the 
second stage are Relative Delta Production and Relative Notional Production. See Appendix A 
for detailed definition of the variables. We report t-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
indicate significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  













Production       
Oil Futures Risk Premia 0.031 -0.001 0.009 -0.004 0.007 
 (1.14) (-0.08) (0.89) (-0.27) (0.63)      
Gas Futures Risk Premia -0.405 0.021 -0.092 0.043 -0.094 
 (-1.23) (0.12) (-0.77) (0.23) (-0.67)      
Lag Oil Price Volatility 1.336** 0.570* 0.648*** 0.781** 0.740*** 
 (2.28) (1.78) (3.04) (2.26) (2.93)       
Lifting Cost per Boe  0.003 0.001 0.006 0.000 
  (0.74) (0.23) (1.57) (0.03)     
Market to Book Ratio  -0.002 -0.000 0.002 0.006 
  (-0.24) (-0.06) (0.16) (0.68)     
Leverage Ratio -0.051 0.961*** 0.348 1.249*** 0.682** 
 (-0.17) (5.19) (1.27) (6.17) (2.04)       
Log Asset -0.107 -0.031 0.129 -0.017 0.131 
 (-1.60) (-0.97) (1.59) (-0.48) (1.31)      
Cash -3.180*** -1.348** -1.034* -1.788** -1.264* 
 (-3.75) (-2.03) (-1.76) (-2.44) (-1.76)      
Inventory  -1.512 -2.847 -4.042 -2.554 
  (-0.43) (-0.66) (-1.02) (-0.47)       
Cost of Goods Sold  -0.324 -0.192 -0.125 0.009 
  (-1.21) (-0.88) (-0.42) (0.03)     
ROA  -0.014 -0.032 0.192 0.291 
  (-0.04) (-0.12) (0.53) (0.90)     
Revenue -0.771*** -0.166 0.575* -0.424 0.357 
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Dividend -3.767** 5.698*** -7.501*** 7.843*** -8.011*** 
 (-2.12) (5.86) (-3.51) (7.46) (-3.07)       
Capital Expenditure 1.169** -0.303 -0.744*** -0.494* -0.960*** 
 (2.57) (-1.13) (-3.35) (-1.70) (-3.62)      
S&P Rating 0.698*** -0.186* 0.142 -0.146 0.137 
 (3.51) (-1.91) (1.36) (-1.40) (1.10)      
Other Hedge 1.585***     
 (8.05)           
Inverse Mills Ratio  -0.457*** -0.254** -0.377*** -0.172 
  (-4.01) (-2.56) (-3.06) (-1.44)     
Firm Fixed Effect No No Yes No Yes 







Table 6 Hedging profits, predicted hedging, and market timing (decomposition without fixed effects) 
The dependent variables include Reported Total Profit, Reported Realized Hedge Profit, and Reported Non-Hedge Profit. The key 
independent variables are regression residuals representing market timing and predicted values representing hedging. (We regress 
firm’s Relative Delta Production on risk premia, firm characteristics to get the residual and predicted value.) See Appendix A for 
detailed definition of the variables. We control for year fixed effects in columns 2, 5, and 8. We control for both year and firm fixed 
effects in columns 3, 6, and 9. We cluster the standard errors at firm and year levels and report the t-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * indicate significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 


































Profit           
Residual Delta  0.024*** 0.023*** 0.019** 0.013* 0.011 0.006 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.016* 
 (3.79) (3.15) (2.21) (1.65) (1.46) (0.50) (3.77) (2.99) (1.79)           
Predicted Delta  0.025 0.018 -0.024 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.018 0.009 -0.002 -0.031 
 (1.03) (0.72) (-0.62) (3.16) (2.75) (0.60) (0.32) (-0.06) (-0.69)           
Oil Futures Risk Premia 0.002 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.000 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002 0.000 0.001** 
 (1.06) (2.81) (2.97) (-0.47) (10.04) (3.36) (0.96) (1.29) (2.11)           
Gas Futures Risk Premia -0.018   0.016***   -0.031   
 (-1.05)   (2.86)   (-1.31)             
Log Asset -0.000 -0.001 0.010 -0.001 -0.001 0.031 0.001 -0.000 -0.007 
 (-0.03) (-0.41) (0.98) (-0.64) (-0.67) (1.48) (0.40) (-0.13) (-0.47)           
Leverage 0.036** 0.041** 0.092 -0.020 -0.020 -0.025 0.068*** 0.077*** 0.114 
 (2.39) (2.46) (1.46) (-0.95) (-0.90) (-0.26) (3.04) (3.31) (1.33)           
ROA 0.010 0.018 0.065 0.007 0.006 0.006 -0.003 0.012 0.063 
 (0.29) (0.58) (1.30) (0.41) (0.32) (0.21) (-0.07) (0.31) (0.99)           
Revenue 0.061** 0.054** 0.240*** 0.069* 0.068* 0.226 0.022 0.010 0.149* 
 (2.00) (2.00) (3.22) (1.91) (1.83) (1.11) (1.00) (0.63) (1.78)           
Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 327 327 327 139 139 139 256 256 256 






Table 7 Hedging profits, predicted hedging, and market timing (decomposition with fixed effects) 
The dependent variables include Reported Total Profit, Reported Realized Hedge Profit, and Reported Non-Hedge Profit. The key 
independent variables are regression residuals representing market timing and predicted values representing hedging. (We regress 
firm’s Relative Delta Production on risk premia, firm characteristics, and firm fixed effects to get the residual and predicted value.) 
See Appendix A for detailed definition of the variables. We control for year fixed effects in columns 2, 5, and 8. We control for both 
year and firm fixed effects in columns 3, 6, and 9. We cluster the standard errors at firm and year levels and report the t-statistics in 
parentheses.  ***, **, and * indicate significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 


































Profit           
Residual Delta Fixed Effects 0.022** 0.021** 0.021** 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.018* 
 (2.46) (2.37) (2.21) (1.04) (1.20) (0.60) (4.09) (2.68) (1.70)           
Predicted Delta Fixed Effects 0.026** 0.023* -0.012 0.023*** 0.022** -0.009 0.016 0.014 -0.032 
 (2.21) (1.86) (-0.31) (2.59) (2.31) (-0.35) (1.33) (1.09) (-0.70)           
Oil Futures Risk Premia 0.002 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.000 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002 0.000 0.001** 
 (1.06) (3.28) (2.75) (-0.06) (11.00) (3.33) (1.04) (0.71) (2.15)           
Gas Futures Risk Premia -0.018   0.014**   -0.031   
 (-1.06) 
  (2.44)   (-1.44)             
Log Asset -0.000 -0.000 0.018* -0.002 -0.003 0.035 0.001 0.001 0.004 
 (-0.01) (-0.18) (1.70) (-1.02) (-1.14) (1.48) (0.50) (0.34) (0.31)           
Leverage 0.036* 0.036* 0.055 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.075 
 (1.92) (1.83) (1.15) (0.28) (0.30) (0.04) (3.21) (3.08) (1.25)           
ROA 0.009 0.015 0.053 0.022 0.024 0.016 -0.007 0.001 0.049 
 (0.25) (0.41) (1.18) (1.09) (1.16) (0.72) (-0.15) (0.03) (0.88)           
Revenue 0.061* 0.056* 0.278*** 0.063 0.061 0.236 0.024 0.016 0.199** 
 (1.78) (1.75) (2.95) (1.56) (1.49) (1.20) (1.15) (0.98) (2.16)           
Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 327 327 327 139 139 139 256 256 256 






Table 8 Comparison among good hedgers, mediocre hedgers, active hedgers and inactive hedgers 
A firm is classified as Good Hedger if it earns positive hedging profits in at least four years during the sample period, and otherwise 
Mediocre Hedger. A firm is classified as Active Hedger if its standard deviation of hedge ratio during the sample period is greater than 
the industry median of standard deviation of hedge ratios, and otherwise Inactive Hedger. We compare and run t-tests of the means of 
variables among the groups. ***, **, and * indicate significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 Panel A: Mediocre Hedgers vs. Good Hedgers Panel B: Active Hedgers vs. Inactive Hedgers 
Variables 
Mediocre Hedgers Good Hedgers Difference of 
Mean 
Inactive Hedgers Active Hedgers Difference 
of Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean 
Reported Total Profit 174 0.006 133 0.034 -0.028*** 150 0.016 157 0.021 -0.005 
Reported Realized Hedge Profit 62 0.002 74 0.024 -0.021*** 79 0.017 57 0.01 0.008 
Reported non-Hedge Profit 141 0.006 114 0.024 -0.018*** 111 0.009 144 0.018 -0.010* 
Relative Delta Production 174 0.856 133 0.893 -0.038 150 0.52 157 1.209 -0.689*** 
Relative Notional Production 174 1.078 133 1.028 0.05 150 0.663 157 1.432 -0.769*** 
Predicted Delta Fixed Effects 146 0.79 105 0.788 0.002 131 0.515 120 1.089 -0.574*** 
Residual Delta Fixed Effects  
(Absolute Value) 146 0.268 105 0.229 0.039 131 0.148 120 0.365 -0.217*** 
Lifting Cost per Boe 158 15.179 129 10.97 4.209*** 137 11.168 150 15.223 -4.055*** 
Market to Book Ratio 170 1.907 124 1.82 0.088 149 2.05 145 1.686 0.365 
Leverage Ratio 174 0.381 133 0.362 0.019 150 0.362 157 0.383 -0.022 
Log Asset 174 7.349 133 7.559 -0.21 150 7.777 157 7.117 0.660*** 
Cash 174 0.037 133 0.022 0.014*** 150 0.038 157 0.023 0.015*** 
Inventory 166 0.006 118 0.005 0.001 145 0.007 139 0.004 0.003** 
Cost of Goods Sold 174 0.169 133 0.165 0.004 150 0.178 157 0.158 0.021 
ROA 174 -0.038 133 -0.033 -0.004 150 -0.025 157 -0.046 0.021 
Revenue 174 0.299 133 0.26 0.038** 150 0.308 157 0.257 0.050*** 
Dividend 174 0.009 133 0.008 0.001 150 0.005 157 0.013 -0.008*** 
Capital Expenditure 174 0.225 133 0.267 -0.042*** 150 0.258 157 0.229 0.029* 
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Panel C: Comparison among the Active 
Hedgers 
Panel D: Comparison among the Inactive 
Hedgers 
Variables 
Good Mediocre Difference 
of Mean 
Good Mediocre Difference of 
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean 
Reported Total Profit 64 0.036 93 0.01 0.026*** 69 0.032 81 0.002 0.030*** 
Reported Realized Hedge 
Profit 
36 0.013 21 0.004 0.009 38 0.034 41 0.002 0.032*** 
Reported non-Hedge Profit 57 0.033 87 0.009 0.024** 57 0.015 54 0.002 0.014** 
Relative Delta Production 64 1.188 93 1.223 -0.035 69 0.62 81 0.434 0.186*** 
Relative Notional Production 64 1.319 93 1.51 -0.191 69 0.758 81 0.583 0.176** 
Predicted Delta Fixed Effects 46 1.036 74 1.122 -0.086 59 0.595 72 0.449 0.146** 
Residual Delta Fixed Effects  
(Absolute Value) 
46 0.327 74 0.388 -0.06 59 0.152 72 0.144 0.008 
Lifting Cost per Boe 
64 11.73 86 
17.82
2 
-6.092*** 65 10.221 72 12.023 -1.801 
Market to Book Ratio 56 1.397 89 1.867 -0.47 68 2.168 81 1.952 0.216 
Leverage Ratio 64 0.382 93 0.384 -0.002 69 0.343 81 0.378 -0.035 
Log Asset 64 7.493 93 6.859 0.634*** 69 7.62 81 7.911 -0.291 
Cash 64 0.016 93 0.028 -0.012** 69 0.028 81 0.046 -0.018** 
Inventory 54 0.004 85 0.004 0 64 0.006 81 0.007 -0.001 
Cost of Goods Sold 64 0.195 93 0.132 0.062* 69 0.138 81 0.212 -0.074* 
ROA 64 -0.038 93 -0.052 0.014 69 -0.029 81 -0.022 -0.008 
Revenue 64 0.271 93 0.248 0.022 69 0.25 81 0.356 -0.106*** 
Dividend 64 0.016 93 0.011 0.005 69 0.001 81 0.007 -0.006*** 
Capital Expenditure 64 0.244 93 0.218 0.026 69 0.288 81 0.232 0.056*** 







Table 9 Commodity, interest rate, and foreign exchange profits 
This table provides the results of univariate t-test on the profits from oil and gas commodity, interest rate, and foreign exchange 
derivative transactions for the whole sample. The profits are raw profits divided by total assets. Panels A, B, and C contain the results 
of commodity, interest rate, and foreign exchange derivative profits, respectively. The number of observations and the p-values are 
reported.  
Panel A: Commodity Derivative Profits 





Ho: Mean = 
0 
T Statistic 
Ha: Mean < 0 
Pr (T < t) 
Ha: Mean != 0 
Pr (|T| > |t|) 
Ha: Mean > 0 
Pr (T > t) 
Reported Realized Hedge Profit 178 0.0153 0.0030 0.0404 5.0342 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Reported non-Hedge Profit 322 0.0134 0.0027 0.0487 4.9212 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Reported Total Profit  397 0.0178 0.0025 0.0507 7.0040 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
         
Panel B: Interest Rate Derivative Profits 





Ho: Mean = 
0 
T Statistic 
Ha: Mean < 0 
Pr (T < t) 
Ha: Mean != 0 
Pr (|T| > |t|) 
Ha: Mean > 0 
Pr (T > t) 
Reported Realized Hedge Profit 62 -0.0017 0.0004 0.0033 -4.1771 0.0000 0.0001 1.0000 
Reported non-Hedge Profit 116 -0.0040 0.0008 0.0081 -5.2585 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Reported Total Profit  354 -0.0015 0.0003 0.0051 -5.6831 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
         
Panel C: Foreign Exchange Derivative Profits 





Ho: Mean = 
0 
T Statistic 
Ha: Mean < 0 
Pr (T < t) 
Ha: Mean != 0 
Pr (|T| > |t|) 
Ha: Mean > 0 
Pr (T > t) 
Reported Realized Hedge Profit 8 -0.0003 0.0002 0.0005 -1.4839 0.0907 0.1814 0.9093 
Reported non-Hedge Profit 4 0.0003 0.0003 0.0007 1.0000 0.8045 0.3910 0.1955 
Reported Total Profit  342 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 -0.2625 0.3965 0.7931 0.6035 
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Table 10 Hedging and beta 
The dependent variable is the market beta computed from the daily stock returns in the year. The 
independent variables include Reported Total Profit, Residual Delta, Predicted Delta, Residual 
Delta Fixed Effects, Predicted Delta Fixed Effects (We regress a firm’s Relative Delta 
Production on risk premia, firm characteristics (, and firm fixed effects) to get the residual and 
predicted value.) See Appendix A for detailed definition of the variables. We control for year 
fixed effects in columns 2, and 4. We control for both year and firm fixed effects in columns 3, 
and 6. We cluster the standard errors at the year level and report the t-statistics in parentheses. 
***, **, and * indicate significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta        
Reported Total Profit 0.878 0.073 0.267 0.876 0.141 0.265 
 (0.80) (0.11) (0.96) (0.75) (0.16) (1.03) 
       
Residual Delta -0.153* -0.189*** -0.081    
 (-2.50) (-5.88) (-1.12)           
Predicted Delta -0.535*** -0.697*** -0.057    
 (-4.94) (-18.67) (-0.90)           
Residual Delta Fixed Effects    -0.016 -0.063 -0.083 
    (-0.19) (-0.99) (-1.12)        
Predicted Delta Fixed Effects    -0.329** -0.396*** -0.052 
    (-4.58) (-7.74) (-0.59) 
       
Log Asset -0.045 -0.062** -0.040 -0.034 -0.046 -0.047 
 (-1.78) (-2.88) (-0.41) (-1.24) (-1.75) (-0.52)        
ROA -0.120 0.186 0.066 -0.212 -0.001 0.069 
 (-0.32) (1.05) (0.26) (-0.66) (-0.01) (0.31)        
Leverage 0.732*** 0.875*** 0.059 0.503*** 0.536*** 0.071 
 (10.07) (18.41) (0.11) (5.76) (7.28) (0.16)        
Revenue -0.180 -0.226** 0.246 -0.105 -0.106 0.218 
 (-0.86) (-3.12) (1.05) (-0.56) (-1.13) (1.07) 
       
Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 312 312 312 312 312 312 





Appendix A: Definitions of Variables 
Name Definition 
Capital Expenditure 
Funds used for additions to property, plant, and 
equipment, excluding amounts arising from 
acquisitions. Value scaled by total assets. 
Cash 
A firm’s cash and cash equivalents. Value scaled by 
total assets. 
Cost of Goods Sold 
All costs directly allocated by the company to 
production, such as materials, labor, and overhead. 
Value scaled by total assets. 
Dividend 
Total amount of dividends (other than stock 
dividends) declared on the common/ordinary capital 
of the company, based on the current year’s net 
income. Value scaled by total assets. 
Gas Futures Risk Premia 
Spread between the one-year contracted gas futures 
price at year t-1, denoted by F(t-1), and the realized 
spot price at year t, denoted by S(t). We calculate the 
gas futures risk premia for every business day during 
the year t and then use the mean of each year in the 
regression. 
Inventory 
Merchandise bought for resale and materials and 
supplies purchased for use in production of revenue. 
Value scaled by total assets. 
Lag Gas Price Volatility 
Average of annualized volatility of past year’s gas 
futures prices. We use the daily settlement price for 
natural gas futures (NYMEX front-month contract) 
to calculate the volatility. 
Lag Oil Price Volatility 
Average of annualized volatility of past year’s oil 
futures prices. We use the daily settlement price for 
crude oil futures (NYMEX front-month contract) to 
calculate the volatility. 
Leverage Ratio 
A firm’s total debt (sum of total debt in current 
liabilities and total long-term debt) scaled by total 
assets. 
Lifting Cost per BOE 
Average cost to produce one barrel of oil equivalent 
(BOE). It is calculated as production costs divided by 
oil and gas production for the year. 





Appendix A (Cont.) 
Name Definition 
Market to Book Ratio 
A firm’s total market value (product of shares 
outstanding and fiscal year closing price) scaled by 
total common equity. 
Oil Futures Risk Premia 
Spread between the one-year contracted oil futures 
price at year t-1, denoted by F(t-1), and the realized 
spot price at year t, denoted by S(t). We calculate the 
oil futures risk premia for every business day during 
the year t and then use the mean of each year in the 
regression.  
Other Hedge 
A dummy variable equals to 1 if a firm either uses 
long term physical contract or hedges interest rate or 
foreign exchange risks with derivatives and 0 
otherwise. 
Predicted Delta 
Regression predicted value calculated by regressing 
a firm’s relative delta production on key control 
variables (see model 3a). 
 
Predicted Notional Fixed Effects 
Regression predicted value calculated by regressing 
a firm’s relative notional production on firm fixed 
effects and other key control variables. 
Relative Delta Production 
Total delta of derivatives scaled by annual 
production. 
Relative Notional Production 
Total notional amount of derivatives scaled by 
annual production. 
Reported Ineffective Hedge Profit 
Effectiveness is defined as the part of the gain (or 
loss) on the hedging instrument that offsets a loss (or 
gain) on the hedged item. For cash flow hedges, 
changes in the fair market value of a derivative are 
separated into an effective portion and an ineffective 
portion. The net gain or loss on the effective portion 
of the hedging instrument should be reported in OCI. 
The gain or loss on the ineffective portion is reported 
in current earnings. Value scaled by total assets. 
Reported Non-Hedge Profit 
The sum of realized and unrealized gain/loss of non-
hedge designated derivatives. Value scaled by total 
assets. 
Reported Realized Hedge Profit 
Realized gain/loss of cash flow hedge. Value scaled 
by total assets. 
Reported Realized Non-Hedge 
Profit 
Realized gain/loss of non-hedge designated 





Appendix A (Cont.) 
Name Definition 
Reported Total Profit 
The sum of realized gain/loss of cash flow hedge, 
realized and unrealized gain/loss of non-hedge 
designated derivatives and realized and unrealized 
gain/loss of ineffective portion of cash flow hedge. 
Value scaled by total assets. 
Residual Delta 
Regression residual value calculated by regressing a 
firm’s relative delta production on key control 
variables (see model 3a). 
Residual Delta Fixed Effects 
Regression residual value calculated by regressing a 
firm’s relative delta production on firm fixed effects 
and other key control variables (see model 3b). 
Residual Notional 
Regression residual value calculated by regressing a 
firm’s relative notional production on key control 
variables (see model 3a). 
Residual Notional Fixed Effects 
Regression residual value calculated by regressing a 
firm’s relative notional production on firm fixed 
effects and other key control variables (see model 
3b). 
Revenue 
Gross income received from all divisions of the 
company. Value scaled by total assets. 
ROA 
Return on assets. It is a firm’s net income scaled by 
total assets. 
S&P Rating Dummy 
A dummy variable indicating whether a firm has a 






Appendix B: Delta Calculation 
 
We find that U.S. oil and gas firms, on average, use a significant amount of derivatives. 
Our average hedge ratio is greater than that in prior research. To verify our calculation of delta, 
we use Jin and Jorion (2006)’s computation of delta as a benchmark and examine the accuracy of 
our delta.  
Appendix B of Jin and Jorion (2006) demonstrates the computation of delta for Devon, 
an oil producing firm. According to Devon’s 2001 annual report, the firm uses swaps, collars, 
and fixed-price contracts. The annual report also discloses the volume, exercise price, and 
maturity of each contract. As of December 2001, the firm has an outstanding swap contract of 
22,000 Bbls/day, a swap contract of 4,350 Bbls/day, a collar contract of 20,000 Bbls/day and a 
fixed-price contract of 10,032 Bbls/day.  
The swaps and fixed-price contracts exhibit a linear payoff so the delta per unit of 
volume is -1. We focus on the computation of delta of collar. Using the Black-Scholes option 
pricing model, we plug in the contract specific variables, the interest rate, and the historical 
volatility to solve for the delta of the put and call components of the collar. We then aggregate 
the two delta components to get the total delta of the collar contract.  
Our computation of delta for the collar contract is -0.81, which is almost the same as Jin 
and Jorion (2006)’s delta, -0.80. The small difference could be due to slight differences in 
interest rate and volatility used in the calculation. In addition, Jin and Jorion (2006) use 61 
million barrels as the production over the period of 2002 in the calculation of Relative Delta 
Production. We obtain the production data from Bloomberg and find a quite similar number of 
61.466 million barrels.  
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Overall, compared to the computation of Jin and Jorion (2006), our model generates 
almost the same delta and Relative Delta Production. The results verify the accuracy and quality 











The credit default swap (CDS) market has attracted the attention of many academic re- 
searchers due to its rapid rise and prominence in credit markets. As a tool that facilitates 
speculation and hedging of credit risk, the CDS has the potential to increase credit sup- ply and 
alleviate firms’ financial constraints. At the same time, the CDS can alter the incentives of 
creditors, potentially impeding creditor-borrower renegotiations and deterring creditors from 
expending resources to monitor shareholders’ activities. These complexities make it rather 
difficult to infer the ultimate impact of CDS on firms. For instance, while the CDS may cause an 
increase in firms’ credit supply (Saretto and Tookes (2013)), it is unclear whether firms’ demand 
for credit will increase, decrease, or stay the same. If the CDS works to impede successful debt 
renegotiations and in so doing increases the risk of inefficient bankruptcy or liquidation, then the 
equity price may become more sensitive to underlying cash flow risk, causing shareholders to 
actively reduce leverage and take actions that reduce cash flow volatility. In this paper, we 
explore the link between the trading of CDS contracts to equity risk and corporate risk-taking. 
Creditors who purchase default protection through a CDS contract retain their rights as 
creditors but shirk the credit risk, becoming so-called “empty creditors” (see Hu and Black 
(2006) and Bolton and Oehmke (2011)). The CDS seller of default protection, who assumes the 
credit risk, has an interest in seeing the company succeed but possesses no rights to renegotiate 
debt contracts if the firm becomes distressed. This separation of credit risk and creditor control 
rights leads to gridlock in debt renegotiations and severely reduces shareholders’ put option to 
strategically default. Therefore, commencement of CDS trading on a firm’s debt resembles a 
negative shock to the value of shareholders’ strategic default option, and firms naturally respond 
 
62 
by reducing corporate risk-taking as they adjust to a new environment with less sympathetic 
creditors. 
Prior studies have examined the benefits of allowing shareholders to strategically default 
even if the firm is not yet insolvent (Hart and Moore (1994)). In voluntarily triggering a debt 
renegotiation with creditors early, shareholders offer to exchange equity for a reduction in debt 
outstanding in hopes of staving off insolvency and a forced, more inefficient bankruptcy process 
later. This strategic default option lowers the sensitivity of the equity value to cash flow risk and 
promotes corporate risk-taking and investment (Favara et al. (2012)). Indeed, firms in countries 
with stronger creditor rights in which successful debt renegotiations are less likely exhibit higher 
equity beta and return volatility (Favara et al. (2012)) as well as a greater propensity to engage in 
(oftentimes value-destroying) activities with the purpose of reducing cash flow volatility (Acharya 
et al. (2011)). 
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the growing literature on the real effects of CDS on 
firms (Subrahmanyam et al. (2014), Danis and Gamba (2016)). We first theoretically establish a 
link between CDS trading and equity risk through shareholders’ strategic default option (Favara 
et al. (2012)). In the absence of strategic default, the equity value should become more sensitive 
to the firm’s cash flow risk and, consequently, general market conditions. Consistent with theory, 
we find that CDS trading leads to a significant increase in equity risk exposures, as measured by 
both equity market beta and total stock return volatility. In fact, on average, CDS trading is 
associated with an increase of 0.16 in the firm’s equity market beta. We further find that this 
impact is more pronounced among firms for which the strategic default option is particularly 




In light of this additional risk borne by shareholders, how might the firm adjust its risk- 
taking objectives change upon the commencement of CDS trading? We hypothesize that firms 
will take actions that reduce its cash flow risk. For instance, to reduce the risk of its portfolio of 
assets, a firm may reduce the risk of its individual assets or lower the correlation across portfolio 
assets. To investigate this, we examine the impact of CDS trading on inter- industry diversification, 
corporate investment decisions, and capital structure decisions. In this empirical analysis, we 
consider the timeline of events to reveal the dynamics associated with the introduction of a CDS 
contract. In doing this, we are able to differentiate between short-term and long-term outcomes, 
which is insightful because in many cases firms face barriers to change (see, for example, 
Hovakimian et al. (2001)). 
We first find that in the years following the commencement of CDS trading, firms reduce 
cash flow risk by gradually increasing diversification across industries (Hann et al. (2013), Lang 
and Stulz (1994)). In particular, we find that the firm’s industry-sales Herfindahl index 
dramatically falls, and within five years of the index falls 5 points out of 100 points, which 
represents nearly an entire standard deviation change in the average Herfindahl index change 
across firms. Furthermore, we also find that significantly more capital is directed toward capital 
expenditures outside of the primary industry. Investment in non-core industry segments is 
significantly higher among firms with an active CDS market than those without. By contrast, 
investment in core industry segments is not statistically different between CDS and non-CDS 
firms. 
We further investigate firms’ R&D investment policies because a number of studies have 
shown that R&D investment contributes to high future earnings variability (Kothari et al. (2002), 
Chan et al. (1990), Donelson and Resutek (2012), Alam et al. (2014), among others). We find 
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that, in an effort to further reduce cash flow risk, firms scale back investment in risky R&D 
activities after the CDS begins trading. By five years after the commencement of CDS trading, 
firms have reduced R&D investment by 1.7%, which represents a significant portion of the 
average 8.7% (median 4.6%) of assets invested in R&D across all firms in the sample. 
Collectively, our results on firms’ investment activities indicates how impactful the firm’s 
relationship with creditors can be on corporate decision-making processes. 
Lastly, we explore the impact of CDS trading on firms’ capital structure decisions, con- 
necting our ideas to recent evidence by Saretto and Tookes (2013). While the CDS may 
increase the supply of credit, the long-term outcome of firms’ use of leverage is uncertain since 
there is no guarantee that demand for credit will remain unchanged. In fact, with the lower 
likelihood of successful debt renegotiation, the firm’s demand for debt financing is likely to fall 
as managers rachet down financial leverage in an attempt to lessen the sensitivity be- tween equity 
value to the firm’s cash flow risk. To investigate this, we empirically investigate this by tracking 
firms’ use of leverage in the years following CDS introduction. Importantly, we find that the 
increase in leverage among CDS firms (see, for instance, Saretto and Tookes (2013)) is relatively 
short-lived. That is, in the first few years of CDS trading, leverage ratios among CDS firms are 
particularly high; however, over time leverage ratios fall and become statistically indifferent from 
non-CDS firms. We confirm this result for both market-based and book-based measures of 
leverage. 
Our study is complementary to the evidence of Subrahmanyam et al. (2017) that firms’ 
cash holdings rise in response to CDS trading. In fact, given the findings of Duchin (2010), 
corporate diversification may be a viable substitute to holding excess cash. We do not find that the 
decision to hold cash trumps actions to reduce cash flow volatility. Nor do we find that changes 
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in cash holdings are necessarily a result of the firm’s diversification. For example, when we 
simultaneously estimate firms’ cash holdings and inter-industry diversification decisions, we find 
that both cash holdings and diversification increase in response to CDS trading. Overall, our 
results contribute to existing evidence on how the relationship with creditors shapes firms’ 
investment and financial policies (e.g., Acharya et al. (2011)), extending well beyond firms’ cash 
management decisions. 
Of particular importance is how we address endogeneity and establish causality in our 
empirical tests. For instance, CDS trading could be related to equity risk and corporate risk-
taking through some unobserved or omitted variable. Alternatively, our results could be driven 
by a reverse causality scenario where investors’ expectations about future equity risk and corporate 
risk-taking contribute to the creation of a firm’s CDS market. To lessen these endogeneity 
concerns, we employ firm fixed effects, instrumental variables analysis, and propensity score 
matching techniques. Following Saretto and Tookes (2013) and Subrahmanyam et al. (2014), we 
use a firm’s lenders’ foreign exchange derivatives hedging position as an instrumental variable for 
CDS trading because it is positively related to lenders’ credit risk hedging activities with CDS 
contracts but is unrelated to the firm’s equity risk and investment and financing policies. 
The introduction of the CDS, however, does not exactly mimic a strengthening of creditor 
rights. As Parlour and Winton (2013) discuss, lenders seeking to exit their position choose 
between selling the asset and purchasing CDS protection, each having a different implication 
regarding which party gains or retains the asset’s control rights. When the lender chooses the 
CDS route, the CDS seller effectively becomes the monitor but acquires no control rights, thus 
making the task of guarding against risk-shifting behavior by shareholders relatively difficult. As 
a result, the initiation of CDS trading may give shareholders’ new freedoms to increase corporate 
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risk-taking by ramping up leverage or increasing the amount of risky investment. Nonetheless, 
shareholders’ desire to risk-shift and ramp up asset volatility is minimal if debt renegotiations are 
likely to fail and the value of the strategic default option is small. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines our motivation and 
hypotheses. Section 3 includes our data and empirical strategy. Section 4 presents our results.  
Section 5 concludes. 
 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
In this section, we discuss insights from existing literature and develop the hypotheses that 
drive our empirical tests. The objective of this paper is to explore how CDS trading might impact 
both equity risk and corporate risk-taking behavior through the deterioration of shareholders’ 
strategic default option. As motivation, we connect several streams of academic research that 
show (i ) the CDS strengthens creditors’ bargaining position, impedes successful debt 
renegotiation between borrowers and creditors, and weakens shareholders’ strategic default 
option, (ii ) loss of shareholders’ strategic default option leads to higher equity risk, and (iii ) 
more powerful creditors are associated with less risk-taking by managers in their financing and 
investment policies. 
 CDS, Empty Creditors, and Equity Risk 
Early research in the area began with concern over “empty creditors” as discussed by Hu and 
Black (2006) and formally developed in the theoretical model of Bolton and Oehmke (2011). The 
central insight of these two studies is that the CDS, in limiting the losses of creditors during 
bankruptcy, discourages bondholders from entertaining talks of debt renegotiation with shareholders 
when the firm falls into financial distress. In effect, shareholders forfeit bargaining power to creditors 
and become less able to strategically renegotiate down debt payments. As empirical evidence of this 
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empty creditor effect, Subrahmanyam et al. (2014) find that firms often experience a credit rating 
downgrade and appear to be more likely to file for bankruptcy after the onset of CDS trading. 
Similarly, Danis (2016) provides evidence that bondholders’ participation rates in distressed debt 
renegotiations involving equity exchange offers are significantly lower for firms with an active CDS 
market. 
What impact, if any, does losing the option to strategic default have on the riskiness of 
the shareholders’ position? In a recent study, Favara et al. (2012) exploit cross-country 
differences in creditors’ rights to explain variation in equity risk. Countries with bankruptcy 
codes favoring debt renegotiations tend to have both lower equity volatility and lower equity 
beta. The reason is that the prospect of undergoing a successful debt renegotiation versus a costly 
liquidation increases shareholders’ expected payoff during distress and ultimately lessens the 
equity’s sensitivity to the firm’s cash flow risk. More specifically, the shareholders’ valuable put 
option to strategically default supports the equity value as the firm approaches bankruptcy and 
therefore reduces the covariance between the equity value and the firm’s cash flow. 
Because it is critical for motivating this study, we review and discuss the theory developed by 
Favara et al. (2012) relating shareholders’ strategic default option to equity risk. In the model, 
shareholders hold the option to default and solicit renegotiation on the firm’s debt payment c if the 
firm’s cash flow X falls below an endogenous value XB. Shareholders optimally choose the point 
of strategic default XB that maximizes the value of equity E while taking into account the 
likelihood of a successful debt renegotiation. Shareholders benefit and equity risk is reduced 
when the value of the strategic default option is greater than zero (i.e., when XB > c). The total 
risk of the shareholders’ position can be expressed as a function of the volatility of the firm’s 
cash flow σX and the equity beta βE:  
 
68 






To illustrate the effect of the strategic default option, we follow Favara et al. (2012) and 




















where τ is the corporate tax rate, r is the risk-free rate, and (X/XB)
λ measures the risk- neutral 
probability of default and renegotiation.  The equity beta has three components. The first is cash 
flow risk, which in this case is normalized to one. The second is financial leverage, which is 
positively related to equity beta. The last is the effect from shareholders’ strategic default option.  
Because λ is negative, βE falls as XB rises.  In other words, the greater is the shareholders’ strategic 
default option value, the less sensitive their position is to the underlying cash flow of the firm. 
While this beta represents the equity security’s sensitivity to the firm’s cash flows, under the 
assumption that the firm’s cash flows follow a systematic-driven process, it can be interpreted as 
the equity market beta as well. 
Because the strategic default option value varies across firms, the loss of the option 
impacts some firms more than others. To understand how, it is helpful to follow Favara et al. 









where µ is the cash flow constant growth rate, q represents the probability of renegotiation failure, α 
is the firm’s liquidation cost in bankruptcy, and η and 1−η represent the bargaining power of 
shareholders and creditors, respectively. As seen in Equation 6, the point of strategic default is 
reached sooner (i.e., XB is higher) when liquidation costs α are high, renegotiation failure 
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probability q is low, and shareholders’ bargaining power η is high. For these firms, the impact on 
equity risk of losing the strategic default option is the greatest. 
What does this imply about how the CDS might impact the riskiness of the shareholders’ 
position? The CDS can impair the value of the strategic default option of shareholders by acting 
as a friction for debt renegotiation and weakening shareholders’ ability to strike a favorable deal 
with creditors (i.e., the CDS acts as a positive shock to q and a negative shock to η). The result is a 
higher cash flow beta for the equity and ultimately greater overall volatility of the shareholders’ 
position. Furthermore, the impact of the CDS on equity risk is greatest when the third term in 
Equation 2 is especially large, namely, firms near financial distress, firms with high liquidation 
costs, and firms with more active CDS markets. This leads to our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1 (Equity Risk): Due to the deterioration of shareholders’ strategic de- fault option 
and the resulting heightened sensitivity to cash flow risk, equity risk rises upon the commencement 
of CDS trading. Furthermore, the impact on equity risk is more pronounced among firms near 
distress, firms with high liquidation costs, and firms with a more liquid CDS market. 
How might the firm achieve a similar level of equity risk as before the CDS? As Equation 1 
shows, the firm has two options: (1) reduce overall cash flow volatility of the firm, σX , or (2) 
reduce the equity’s sensitivity, βE , to the underlying cash flow (and, as Equation 2 shows, 
financial leverage is key to this sensitivity). We posit that a firm will reduce risk in its financing 




 CDS and Corporate Investment Policy 
How might firms rethink their corporate investment policy in response to a loss of share- 
holders’ strategic default option? If creditors are unwilling to renegotiate the terms of debt, then 
shareholders’ face a far less attractive alternative: costly and inefficient liquidation. To avoid 
bearing these costs, managers may adopt a risk-reducing investment policy that lowers the cash flow 
risk of the firm and guards against triggering default. As evidence of this, Acharya et al. (2011) 
use cross-country variation in creditor rights to explain corporate in- vestment decisions and 
managerial risk-taking and find that firms in countries with stronger creditor rights are more 
likely to engage in risk-reducing activities. Strikingly, they find that firms appear to forego 
profitable investments or even make value-destroying inter-industry acquisitions in the hope of 
reducing cash flow volatility. 
Facing a heightened sensitivity to the firm’s cash flow risk, shareholders may respond to 
CDS trading by pursuing future corporate investment policy that engages in activities that reduce 
the firm’s cash flow volatility. As Equation 1 makes clear, a primary way the firm can offset an 
increase in equity volatility σE generated by an increase in equity market beta βE is to actively 
reduce the underlying cash flow volatility σX . Furthermore, in order to reduce the riskiness of the 
firm’s overall portfolio of assets, the firm can either reduce the standard deviation of the individual 
assets or reduce the correlation across assets. In other words, to reduce its cash flow volatility, a 
firm may cut back on investments that are particularly risky, such as research and development 
(Kothari et al. (2002), Chan et al. (1990), Donelson and Resutek (2012), among others), or push for 
more diversification across the industries in which it operates (Hann et al. (2013), Lang and Stulz 
(1994)). This leads to our third hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2 (Investment Policy): In order to lessen cash flow risk, firms will in- crease 
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corporate diversification across industries and reduce risky R&D investment in the years after CDS 
trading begins. 
 CDS and Corporate Financing Policy 
A key expected benefit of the CDS market is that it may reduce frictions on lenders’ supply 
of capital, allowing firms to borrow more at potentially lower rates and longer maturities. 
Assuming a stationary demand curve, an outward shift in the capital supply curve should be 
associated with a greater quantity demanded obtained at a lower rate. While Ashcraft and Santos 
(2009) do not find evidence that CDS leads to lower borrowing rates for firms, Saretto and Tookes 
(2013) find that firm leverage ratios rise and debt maturities lengthen as CDS begins trading. 
As a complement to existing studies, we consider the potential impact of CDS trading on 
firms’ demand for debt capital. In a recent international study, Acharya et al. (2011) show that 
corporate leverage is generally lower in countries with stronger creditor rights despite the greater 
supply of credit. This suggests that while the CDS may strengthen creditors’ disposition to lend, 
it may also discourage firms from borrowing. That is, with a diminished likelihood of successful 
debt renegotiation and shareholders’ position now more sensitive to underlying cash flow risk, a 
reasonable response by management might be to adopt a more conservative financing policy and 
reduce leverage in hopes of obtaining a similar equity beta as before the CDS.151 This presents a 
rather complex empirical problem to disentangle. Additionally, as evidenced by the vast iterature 
on firms’ capital structure and speed of adjustment (Hovakimian et al. (2001)), the impact of a 
revised target debt-equity ratio may not be observed immediately but rather over a period of 
time. This leads to our second hypothesis: 
                                                 
15 Similarly, Subrahmanyam et al. (2017) find that CDS trading causes firms to adopt more conservative 
corporate liquidity policies in anticipation of weak renegotiating power with creditors. 
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Hypothesis 3 (Financing Policy): In order to lessen shareholders’ sensitivity to cash flow risk, firms 
will reduce their demand for leverage, resulting in falling leverage ratios in the years after CDS 
trading is initiated. 
 Monitoring Incentives and Risk-Shifting by Shareholders 
An alternative story to the discussion above is that CDS-protected empty creditors, who 
have shirked the credit risk but retained their rights as bondholders, have little incentive to 
monitor the actions of managers and shareholders (Parlour and Winton (2013)) and therefore 
allow for the possibility of risk-shifting. In this case, shareholders may choose to ramp up the 
volatility of underlying assets in order to potentially extract wealth out of bondholders. On the 
other hand, shareholders may find it unattractive to increase risk at a time when the value of their 
position faces a heightened sensitivity to underlying cash flows due to the weakened strategic 
default option. If the risk-shifting story dominates, however, then our empirical tests might show 
results opposite to those implied by our second and third hypotheses regarding the relation 
between CDS trading and firms’ financing and investment policies. 
 Data and Empirical Strategy 
To compile our sample of U.S.-based non-financial publicly traded companies, we first 
acquire quarterly financial data from Compustat and equity data from CRSP. For each of these 
firms, we search for evidence of CDS contracts in the Markit, S&P Capital IQ (CMA), 
Bloomberg, and DTCC databases. We note the dates in which the CDS begins and ceases 
trading, which we use to construct the dummy variable CDS Trading. Markit additionally provides 
the market “depth” for each single-name CDS contract, which captures the number of dealers that 
report information about the contract. To construct our measures of diversification, we 
additionally acquire individual business segment information from Compustat. The final sample 
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consists of 321,374 firm-quarter observations ranging from 2000:Q1-2015:Q3. Overall, we 
locate 984 firms that have CDS contracts trading on their debt. 
Equity market beta is estimated using a regression of the firm’s stock return on the CRSP 
broad cap-weighted market return, implemented on a rolling basis using weekly returns over the 
past 26 weeks. Likewise, equity volatility is defined as the standard deviation of weekly returns 
using returns over the past 26 weeks. As seen in the summary statistics of Table 1, the average 
equity beta of our sample is 0.976, and the average annualized equity volatility of the sample is 
50.42%. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 Empirical Strategy and Endogeneity 
We study how the onset of CDS trading impacts the firm’s risk and policies using variants 
of the following model:  
(4) 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐷𝑆 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜈𝑡 
where subscript i refers to the firm, subscript t refers to time in quarters, µt refers to time fixed effects, 
and νi refers to firm fixed effects. 
There are two sets of dependent variables for y. The first set includes Equity Market Beta 
and Total Equity Volatility to measure a firm’s risks. The second set is to measure firm’s 
activities including Industry-Sales Herfindahl Index, Investment in Core Industries, Investment in 
Non-Core Industries, R&D Expenditure to Assets, Market Leverage, and Book Leverage. 
Our key test variable is a dummy variable CDS Trading which equals to 1 if the 
observation is in the quarters since the inception of CDS trading and 0 otherwise. To further 
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investigate the dynamic effect of CDS trading over time, we also create a set of CDS time 
dummy variables including CDS Elapsed Time equal to the time elapsed since the onset of CDS 
trading (i.e., 0.25 for the first quarter, 0.50 for the second quarter, and so on), CDS:0-8 quarters 
(short-term effects) equal to 1 for the first two years of CDS trading, CDS:9-20 (medium-term 
effects) equal to 1 for the third year to the fifth year, and CDS:21+ quarters (long-term effects) 
equal to 1 for all years after. This is illustrated by the following timeline: 
 
X refers to control variables. We first use the industry median of each dependent variable as 
our control variables. We also include Size, B/M, Lev (i.e. Leverage), ROA, PPE/Assets, 
Cash/Assets, Asset Growth, Rated, Junk for all test models. We add Amihud and Bid-Ask in our 
tests of firm risks to control the liquidity risk of stocks. We add Tobin’s Q and Equity Beta for the 
tests of firms’ activities to control for investment opportunities and equity risk. The standard errors 
in all the specifications are clustered at the level of one-digit SIC code industry and are robust to 
heteroscedasticity. 
A legitimate concern with our study is that some omitted variables may affect both CDS 
trading and firm risks and activities. Firms which are selected for CDS trading may be 
inherently different from the non-CDS trading firms. They may naturally have more risks and 
adopt different financing and investment policies from non-CDS firms. We employ the firm 
fixed effect in the regressions to control the unobserved time-invariant differences among the 
firms. Still, there may be unobserved time-varying factor such as a unknown risk which causes 
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the CDS trading. Hence, the timing of CDS trading itself may be just coincided with the 
following change of equity risk and firm’s risk-taking activities. To control this endogeneity 
issue, we use both instrumented variable and propensity score matching (PSM) approaches. 
Following Saretto and Tookes (2013) and Subrahmanyam et al. (2014), we employ an 
instrumental variables approach to tackle this potential endogeneity issue: Lender Foreign 
Exchange Derivatives, a variable measuring lenders’ foreign exchange derivatives hedging 
positions. As they argue, when a firm’s lenders have more hedging as shown in FX hedging, they 
also tend to hedge their credit risk and participate in CDS trading on the firm. Since this variable 
is only related to the lender’s incentive to hedge, it is unlikely to affect firms’ risks and policies. 
To construct the instrumental variable, we first identify firms’ lenders (from Dealscan syndicated 
loan database and focus on the lead syndicate member) and bond underwriters (from FISD data). 
We then link lenders’ and underwriters’ information to the Bank Regulatory Data in the WRDS 
(Wharton Research Data Services) where we find their foreign exchange derivative positions. For 
each firm in each quarter, Lender For- eign Exchange Derivatives is constructed as the average of 
the notional amount of foreign exchange derivatives hedging position, scaled by bank’s total 
assets, across all banks that have served either as the lender or as the bond underwriter during the 
past five years. The mean of our Lender Foreign Exchange Derivatives is 1.77%, which matches 
closely that of Saretto and Tookes (2013) (see page 1216). 
We run a two-stage IV model with a probit model in the first stage using the instrument 
Lender Foreign Exchange Derivatives to predict the CDS Trading as follows: 
(5) 𝐶𝐷𝑆 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝐹𝑋 𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜈𝑖 
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In the second stage regression, we use the instrumented CDS Trading to test the effect of 
CDS trading on firm risks and policies as specified in Equation 4. 
We also employ a propensity score matching (PSM) approach to address the endogeneity 
issue. We use the PSM approach to identify control firms that have a similar propensity for CDS 
trading but do not. We measure the impact of CDS trading on firm risk and activities between 
CDS firms and their matching non-CDS firms. We first run the probit model to estimate the 
propensity of each firm have CDS trading. Because the goal is to investigate the dynamic effect 
of CDS trading, we match firms for each CDS firm on the first quarter of CDS trading. This 
allows us to compare firm risks and policies between each CDS firm with its matched non-CDS 
firm in the time after CDS trading begins. We use two criteria and generate two matched 
samples: (1) for each CDS firm, we find a non-CDS firm with the nearest propensity score 
(within 1% of propensity score); (2) for each CDS firm, we find a non-CDS firm in the same 
industry with the nearest propensity score (within 5% of propensity score). Matching within 
industry addresses unobserved differences across industries. Because industry-matching reduces 
the possible number of matches, we expand the nearest neighbor match to be within 5%. 
 Credit Default Swaps and Equity Risk 
In this section, we empirically explore the impact of credit default swap trading on equity risk. 
As stated in Hypothesis 1, our expectation is that an active CDS market, by disrupting the debt 
renegotiation process and reducing the value of shareholders’ strategic default option, leads to both 
higher equity beta and higher total stock return volatility. 
We implement panel regression of three types: firm fixed effects, instrumental variables, and 
propensity score matching. Each regression uses standard error clustering by firm and includes a 
variety of control variables, including both firm and time fixed effects. The results are presented in 
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Table 2. First, in Panel A, we place the firm’s Equity Market Beta as the dependent variable. In 
our baseline “firm fixed effects” specification (column 1), we find that CDS Trading has a positive 
impact of 0.16 on equity market beta, a result that is statistically significant at the 1% level. By way 
of comparison, the standard deviation of equity beta in our sample is 0.80 (see Table 1), and the 
standard deviation of firm’s average quarter-to-quarter change in equity beta over time is 0.35. Thus, 
in terms of economic significance, CDS trading generates a change in the firm’s equity beta that 
is a little less than one half of one standard deviation of the typical change in beta that is observed 
among firms in our sample. We confirm this result in both the instrumental variables regression 
(column 2) and the propensity-score matching results (columns 3 and 4). Among CDS firms and 
their matches, CDS Trading increases beta by roughly 0.12 (using both matching methods). 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Next, in Panel B we observe the impact of CDS Trading on Total Equity Volatility. 
Column 1 shows that in our baseline “firm fixed effects” specification CDS Trading increases 
volatility by 4.87% (in annualized %).  For comparison, the standard deviation of equity volatility 
is 31.75%, and the standard deviation of the average quarter-to-quarter change in volatility is 
9.17%. Therefore, in terms of economic significance, CDS Trading leads to an increase in equity 
volatility that is slightly less than one half of one standard deviation of the typical change in volatility 
observed among firms. We confirm this result in the instrumental variables regression (column 
2) and the propensity-score matching results (columns 3 and 4). Among CDS firms and their 
matches, CDS Trading leads to an increase in equity volatility of roughly 2.9%. 
In Table 3 we examine cross-sectional variation in the impact of CDS Trading on both 
equity beta and volatility. First, because the shareholders’ option to strategically default option is 
more valuable among firms near financial distress, we should find that CDS trading has a greater 
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impact on equity risk. To examine this, we interact CDS Trading with the Junk grade dummy 
variable. The results are shown in column 1 for equity beta and column 4 for equity volatility. The 
interaction term is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level and suggests that, upon the 
introduction of the CDS, junk grade firms beta increases by 0.08 more than non-junk grade firms. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Next, the shareholders’ option to strategically default is higher when liquidation costs in 
bankruptcy are high. To measure liquidation costs, we follow Favara et al. (2012) and use the 
firm’s intangible assets as a fraction of total assets, called Intangibles. The CDS Trading × 
Intangibles interaction terms in columns 2 and 5 of Table 3 are statistically significant at the 1% 
level and suggest that the more intangible assets the firm has, the greater is the impact of CDS 
trading on equity beta and equity volatility, respectively. 
Lastly, we consider the role of CDS market liquidity. All else equal, a more liquid CDS 
market would suggest that a larger number of creditors are hedged in their position and, as a result, 
the frictions that impede strategic default are more severe and debt renegotiation failure 
probability is higher. If this is true, then we should observe that equity risk is higher when the CDS 
market is more liquid. We measure CDS liquidity as Markit-reported CDS market depth (Qui and 
Yu (2012), Kapadia and Pu (2012), Lee et al. (2017)), which captures the number of dealers that 
report on the firm’s CDS contract on a given date. In columns 3 and 6, CDS Market Depth has a 
positive and statistically significant impact on equity beta and equity volatility, respectively. In 
other words, when CDS liquidity is high and debt renegotiation frictions are more severe, 
shareholders’ strategic default option is weak and equity risk is higher as a result. 
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Put together, our results in Tables 2 and 3 provide compelling evidence that equity risk 
increases upon the existence of a CDS market. 
 Credit Default Swaps and Corporate Risk-Taking 
In this section, we explore the relation between CDS trading and corporate risk-taking. As 
shown in Section 4, equity risk rises upon the commencement of CDS trading. Theoretically, the rise 
in equity risk is justified by the reduced value of shareholders’ strategic default option and the 
resulting heightened sensitivity to the firm’s cash flow risk. We conjecture that shareholders’ 
response is to reduce corporate risk-taking by increasing inter-industry diversification, reducing 
risky investment, and scaling back their use of leverage. 
 Corporate Investment Policy 
As discussed in Section 2 and is evident in Equation 1, one method of reducing the overall 
equity volatility of a firm is to lessen the firm’s cash flow risk. In order to reduce the risk of a 
firm’s overall portfolio of assets, the firm can either lower the risk of the individual assets or 
lower the correlation across the assets (Hann et al. (2013)). This logic underlies our Hypothesis 
2. 
We first examine firms’ tendency to diversify in response to the initiation of a CDS market. If 
the firm can further diversify across industries, perhaps it can reduce the correlation in cash flows 
generated by the various business segments in which it operates. We measure diversification 
using a sales-based inter-industry Herfindahl index. Specifically, we implement the following 
computation for each firm date: 







for industry segment s and total number of segments n. The index value ranges from 0 to 1. Firms 
with sales that are more evenly distributed across a greater number of industries have a smaller 
Industry-Sales Herfindahl Index value. A purely focused one-industry firm has a value of 1. 
The results are presented in Table 4. First, in column 1, we use instrumental variables 
analysis to gauge the overall impact of CDS Trading on corporate diversification and find that its 
impact is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level, suggesting that CDS trading is 
associated with increased diversification. Next, for firm fixed effects (columns 2 and 3) and 
propensity-score matching (columns 4 to 7), we incorporate a dynamic component into our CDS 
trading analysis. We again find that corporate diversification increases upon CDS trading, and we 
further observe that this trend to diversify continues as time progresses. By five years into CDS 
trading, the Herfindahl index has fallen by nearly 5 points out of 100. For comparison, the typical 
within-firm standard deviation is about 6 points. Thus, CDS trading induces a significant change 
in corporate diversification behavior. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Given the observed relation between CDS and corporate cash holdings (Subrahmanyam et 
al. (2017)) and the relation between corporate diversification and cash holdings (Duchin (2010)), 
we consider the case that cash holdings and corporate cash holdings are deter- mined at the same 
time. To analyze this, we estimate two equations simultaneously, one for corporate cash holdings 
and another for diversification. We include a variety of control variable used in both regression. We 
additionally include Industry Median Cash/Assets, Interest Coverage, and Dividend Payer in the 
cash holdings regression, and Industry Median Industry-Sales Herfindahl Index and Tobin’s q in 
the corporate diversification regression. I.e., Interest Coverage and Dividend Payer may strongly 
contribute to firms’ cash holdings but not necessarily corporate diversification. Likewise, Tobin’s 
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q may indicate the quality of investment opportunities for the firm, affecting corporate 
diversification decisions but not necessarily cash holdings (Lang and Stulz (1994)). 
The results are found in Table 5. We find that the CDS impacts both corporate cash 
holdings and corporate diversification. The negative impact of CDS Trading on Industry- Sales 
Herfindahl Index is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. At the same time, the 
impact on the firm’s Cash/Assets is positive and statistically significant. Therefore, the existence of a 
CDS market appears to cause firms to both hold more cash and diversify its revenues across 
industries. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Next, we dig deeper into firms’ propensity to diversify by analyzing investment decisions. 
In particular, we analyze the extent to which capital expenditures are directed toward industry 
segments that are outside of its primary industry. To do this, we divide total capital expenditures 
(CAPX/Assets) into two components: capital expenditures to business segments outside of its core 
industry (Non-Core Investment) and those to its core industry segment (Core Investment). We 
hypothesize that, in an effort to diversify and reduce cash flow volatility, CDS firms will exhibit 
a tendency to increase the amount of investment directed to non-core industries. 
The results are presented in Table 6. First, we consider the impact of CDS trading on 
firms’ non-core investment decisions (Panel A). In our instrumental variables approach, we find 
that CDS Trading is associated with a positive and statistically significant impact on Investment 
in Non-Core Industries (% of Assets). Furthermore, in our dynamic CDS trading analysis with 
firm fixed effects and propensity-score matching, we can see that CDS firms rapidly increase their 
investment directed toward non-core industry segments. The CDS Elapsed Time variable is 
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positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. As seen in column 3, by five years into CDS 
trading, CDS firms’ non-core investment has increased by 1.2% of assets. For comparison the 
average with-firm standard deviation of non-core investment is roughly 1.1% of assets. Therefore, 
the impact is economically significant. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
In Panel B of Table 6 we place as the dependent variable firms’ Investment in Core 
Industries (% of Assets). In contrast to our findings for non-core investment. We do not find 
evidence that CDS firms’ core investment activities neither increase nor decrease in relation to 
non-CDS firms. For instance, CDS Trading in all columns 1 to 7 are statistically insignificant. 
Lastly, continuing with Hypothesis 2, we investigate the propensity to scale back on risky 
investments after the CDS begins trading. Existing studies have found that R&D investment is 
associated with heightened volatility of firm cash flows (Kothari et al. (2002), Chan et al. (1990), 
Donelson and Resutek (2012), among others). 
In Table 7 we place as the dependent variable firms’ R&D Expenditure to Assets (%). 
First, using instrumental variables analysis we find that CDS Trading leads to reduced R&D 
investment (statistically significant at the 1% level). In our firm fixed effects and propensity-
score matching tests, we find that this effect strengthens with the elapsed time of CDS trading.  By 
five years of CDS trading, firms’ R&D investment is lower by 1.7% of assets. Given that the 
average R&D investment is 8.7% (median 4.6%) of assets in our sample, the impact of CDS 
trading represents an economically significant decrease. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
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Taken together, our results in Tables 4, 5, 6, and 7 shed significant light how corporate 
investment policies change in the years after CDS trading. In particular, we provide compelling 
evidence that firms respond to the CDS by enacting risk-reducing policies. We argue that this is a 
reasonable reaction by firms given that the CDS effectively reduces the bargaining power of 
shareholders to renegotiate debt contracts in times of distress. These results are consistent with the 
international findings of Acharya et al. (2011) that corporate policies tend to be risk-reducing in 
countries with legal systems that allocate more power to creditors. 
 Corporate Financing Policy 
In this section, we study the dynamic effects of CDS trading on the firm’s leverage and 
present the results in Table 8. As Book Leverage may not reflect the current market value and 
information of the debt securities, we also use Market Leverage to measure the leverage level. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
Panel A in Table 8 reports the results using Market Leverage as dependent variable. In 
column 1, our instrumental variables analysis shows that firms’ leverage ratio rises by 9.9% (at 1% 
significance level) during the period of CDS trading. This effect is quite similar to that 
documented in Saretto and Tookes (2013) (see page 1218). As argued in section 2.3, the CDS 
market shifts the credit supply curve outward and may result in a greater quantity of borrowing if 
the demand curve doesn’t change. However, as the CDS firms gradually reduce risk-taking 
activities and have less financing demand, we expect that the leverage ratio will fall over time. 
Once we include firm fixed effects, we find that the leverage ratio is negatively related to the 
CDS Elapsed Time variable in column 2. Also, CDS firms only increases their borrowing in the 
first two years. The coefficients on CDS:9-20 quarters and CDS: 21+ quarters are very small and 
not statistically significant. Using propensity score matching approach produces very close 
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findings. While the coefficients on CDS Trading are positive in both matched samples, the 
coefficients on CDS Elapsed Time are negative as with firm fixed effects. Furthermore, the 
coefficient of CDS:0-8 quarters is not significant in the matching sample using all firms. 
Panel B in Table 8 repeats the same tests in Panel A with Book Leverage as dependant 
variable. While the CDS firms appear to still increase book leverage from year 3 to year 5, the 
effect is much smaller and less significant. The coefficients on other CDS related variables are similar 
to those in Panel A using Book Leverage. 
Hence, our regression results indicate that CDS firms may temporarily increases their 
borrowing after CDS inception potentially due to existing investment projects and more credit 
supply. However, this effect diminishes as time passes. The CDS firms scale back the leverage 
gradually to reduce the cash flow risk. Our analysis on financing policy generally supports our 
Hypothesis 3 while being able to reconcile with the finding in the existing literature from a 
dynamic perspective. 
 Conclusion 
This paper contributes to the growing literature on the real effects of CDS on firms 
(Subrahmanyam et al. (2014), Danis and Gamba (2016)). We theoretically establish a link between 
CDS trading and equity risk through shareholders’ strategic default option (Favara et al. (2012)). 
Because CDS inhibits debt renegotiation and harms shareholders’ strategic default option, the equity 
value should become more sensitive to the firm’s cash flow risk and, consequently, general market 
conditions. Consistent with theory, we find that CDS trading leads to a significant increase in 
equity risk exposures, as measured by both equity market beta and total stock return volatility. On 
average, CDS trading is associated with an increase of 0.16 in the firm’s equity market beta. We 
further find that this impact is more pronounced among firms for which the strategic default 
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option is particularly valuable, namely, low-grade entities, firms with high liquidation costs, and 
firms with high CDS liquidity. 
In light of this additional risk borne by shareholders, we find that firms adjust their isk-
taking objectives change upon the commencement of CDS trading and take actions that reduce cash 
flow risk. In particular, we find that the CDS leads firms to take on more inter-industry 
diversification, direct corporate investment toward non-core industries, scale back risky R&D 
investment, and weaken demand for leverage. In our empirical analysis, we examine the timeline of 
events to reveal the dynamics associated with the introduction of a CDS contract, taking into 
consideration both short-term and long-term effects. 
Our results contribute to existing evidence on how a firm’s relationship with its creditors 
shapes investment and financial policies, extending well beyond cash management decisions. In 
particular, we shed light on potential unforeseen consequences of a credit derivative market, like 
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 Tables and Figures 
Table 1.  Summary Statistics 
This table presents the summary statistics of our sample of firms. Data are quarterly from 2000-
2014. Stock market data is obtained from CRSP, firm financials are from Compustat, CDS data 
are from Markit, Capital IQ, Bloomberg, and DTCC. All variables are as reported in the Variable 
Descriptions table in the Appendix. 
 N Mean St. Dev. Min Med Max 
Equity Market Beta 314,132 0.956 0.802 -0.295 0.872 2.667 
Total Equity Volatility 314,132 50.42 31.75 11.56 42.14 128.6 
Industry-Sales Herfindahl 246,778 0.761 0.291 0.000 0.970 1.000 
Non-Core Investment (%) 222,506 1.918 3.635 0.000 0.145 16.99 
Core Investment (%) 222,506 3.460 5.685 0.000 1.100 26.60 
R&D Investment (%) 309,668 7.652 9.992 0.801 4.619 63.35 
Size 313.708 5.717 2.011 1.660 5.664 10.21 
B/M 273,321 0.642 0.509 0.058 0.514 2.620 
Leverage 312,182 0.412 0.270 0.000 0.394 1.075 
ROA 273,772 0.031 0.229 -0.836 0.084 0.364 
PPE/Assets 260,216 0.266 0.245 0.005 0.176 0.875 
Cash/Assets 269,860 0.217 0.240 0.001 0.118 0.901 
Asset Growth 309,731 0.022 0.128 -0.219 0.000 0.625 
Cash Flow Vol 262,627 0.043 0.052 0.003 0.022 0.231 
Stock Return 303,923 11.05 58.40 -83.68 4.450 220.6 
Rated 314,132 0.245 0.430 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Junk 314,132 0.123 0.329 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Amihud Liq 314,023 3.633 11.14 0.002 0.163 62.87 
Tobin’s q 259,842 1.962 1.566 0.478 1.437 8.413 
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Table 2.  CDS Trading and Equity Risk 
This table presents the results of quarterly panel regressions explaining Equity Market Beta 
(Panel A) and Total Equity Volatility (Panel B). The explanatory variable of interest is CDS 
Trading, which is equal to one in the quarters when the CDS is trading. Column 1 is a panel 
regression using firm fixed effects. Column 2 presents the second stage result of a two-stage 
instrumental variables analysis in which Lender Foreign Exchange Derivatives is used as an 
instrument for CDS Trading. Columns 3 and 4 present propensity-score matching results. “All 
Firms (<1%)” finds the nearest neighbor match within 1%. “Industry (<5%)” finds the nearest 
neighbor match in the same one-digit SIC industry and within 5%. Explanatory variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% marks. All regressions include firm fixed effects, time fixed 
effects, and standard error clustering at the firm level. The *, **, and *** represent statistical 




Table 2 (Cont.) 
Panel A. Dependent Variable: Equity Market Beta 
 






Propensity-Score Matching  
All Firms (<1%) Industry (<5%) 
(1)  (2)  (3) (4)  
CDS Trading 0.161∗∗∗  0.800∗∗∗  0.116∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗  
 (9.40)  (6.18)  (5.08) (5.38)  
Industry Beta 0.642∗∗∗  0.612∗∗∗  0.614∗∗∗ 0.656∗∗∗  
 (51.92)  (45.50)  (25.81) (31.07)  
Size 0.096∗∗∗  0.092∗∗∗  -0.054∗∗∗ -0.013  
 (15.73)  (14.61)  (-3.70) (-1.05)  
B/M 0.051∗∗∗  0.044∗∗∗  0.156∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗  
 (5.53)  (4.77)  (6.99) (5.66)  
Leverage 0.031∗  0.021  0.277∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗  
 (1.65)  (1.23)  (3.94) (3.09)  
ROA -0.102∗∗∗  -0.091∗∗∗  -0.311∗∗∗ -0.184∗∗  
 (-3.56)  (-3.23)  (-2.69) (-2.15)  
PPE/Assets 0.193∗∗∗  0.191∗∗∗  0.053 0.102  
 (3.85)  (3.71)  (0.53) (1.15)  
Cash/Assets 0.060∗  0.049  -0.188∗∗ -0.003  
 (1.76)  (1.47)  (-2.12) (-0.04)  
Asset Growth 0.072∗∗∗  0.078∗∗∗  0.073∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗  
 (5.51)  (6.05)  (2.01) (2.82)  
Cash Flow Vol 1.121∗∗∗  1.004∗∗∗  1.865∗∗∗ 1.438∗∗∗  
 (8.83)  (7.83)  (4.47) (4.58)  
Stock Return 0.001∗∗∗  0.001∗∗∗  0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗  
 (22.37)  (22.47)  (5.00) (7.25)  
Amihud Liq -0.002∗∗∗  -0.002∗∗∗  -0.007∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗  
 (-9.25)  (-9.71)  (-3.33) (-6.31)  
Rated -0.065∗∗∗  -0.089∗∗∗  0.062 -0.002  
 (-2.94)  (-3.66)  (1.52) (-0.05)  
Junk 0.193∗∗∗  0.195∗∗∗  0.068∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗  
 (9.51)  (8.99)  (2.67) (3.44)  
Constant -0.242∗∗∗  -0.154∗∗∗  0.586∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗  
 (-5.66)  (-3.34)  (4.18) (2.71)  
Firm Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  
Time Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  
S.E. Clustered by Firm Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  
Observations 234,902  234,902  34,893 36,837  
Adjusted R2 0.332  —  0.452 0.462  
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Table 2 (Cont.) 
Panel B. Dependent Variable: Total Equity Volatility (Annualized %) 




 Propensity-Score Matching  
All Firms (<1%) Industry (<5%) 
(1)  (2)  (3) (4)  
CDS Trading 4.872∗∗∗  21.682∗∗∗  2.878∗∗∗ 2.929∗∗∗  
 (8.52)  (5.30)  (4.48) (4.72)  
Industry Volatility 0.799∗∗∗  0.776∗∗∗  0.691∗∗∗ 0.749∗∗∗  
 (72.22)  (64.50)  (37.41) (45.18)  
Size -6.904∗∗∗  -7.038∗∗∗  -8.647∗∗∗ -8.081∗∗∗  
 (-26.37)  (-27.21)  (-17.58) (-20.08)  
B/M 5.774∗∗∗  5.630∗∗∗  7.946∗∗∗ 7.507∗∗∗  
 (15.93)  (15.69)  (9.51) (11.66)  
Leverage 5.440∗∗  5.185∗∗  8.053∗∗∗ 8.645∗∗∗  
 (2.29)  (2.32)  (4.13) (5.14)  
ROA -14.577∗∗∗  -14.254∗∗∗  -9.085∗∗∗ -11.723∗∗∗  
 (-14.61)  (-14.52)  (-2.68) (-4.84)  
PPE/Assets 2.931  2.905  -5.075 -4.721  
 (1.57)  (1.55)  (-1.35) (-1.55)  
Cash/Assets -9.440∗∗∗  -9.685∗∗∗  -4.042 -6.544∗∗∗  
 (-7.69)  (-8.02)  (-1.55) (-3.06)  
Asset Growth -1.125∗∗∗  -0.967∗∗  0.775 1.092  
 (-2.89)  (-2.50)  (0.82) (1.16)  
Cash Flow Vol 69.460∗∗∗  66.556∗∗∗  70.020∗∗∗ 73.517∗∗∗  
 (15.08)  (14.63)  (5.43) (7.27)  
Stock Return 0.038∗∗∗  0.037∗∗∗  -0.003 0.011∗∗∗  
 (23.50)  (23.56)  (-1.03) (3.65)  
Amihud Liq -0.025∗∗∗  -0.027∗∗∗  -0.188∗∗∗ -0.094∗∗∗  
 (-2.81)  (-3.16)  (-2.66) (-3.46)  
Rated 1.617∗∗  0.971  1.557 1.545∗  
 (2.34)  (1.34)  (1.52) (1.87)  
Junk -0.022  0.032  -1.494∗∗ -1.389∗  
 (-0.03)  (0.05)  (-2.10) (-1.86)  
Constant 48.271∗∗∗  51.654∗∗∗  63.928∗∗∗ 56.787∗∗∗  
 (19.25)  (20.00)  (12.82) (14.27)  
Firm Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  
Time Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  
S.E. Clustered by Firm Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  
Observations 234,902  234,902  34,893 36,837  







Table 3. CDS Trading and Equity Risk: The Role of Distress, Liquidation Costs, and CDS Market Depth 
This table presents the results of quarterly panel regressions explaining Equity Market Beta (columns 1, 2, and 3) and Total Equity 
Volatility (columns 4, 5, and 6). Intangibles is used as our proxy for firm liquidation cost. CDS Market Depth is the natural log of 
depth as reported by Markit. Columns 1, 2, 4, and 5 represent panel regressions using our entire sample. Columns 3 and 6 represent 
panel regressions using only the sample of CDS firms. Explanatory variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% marks. All regressions 
include firm fixed effects, time fixed effects, and standard error clustering at the firm level. The *, **, and *** represent statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Equity Market Beta Total Equity Volatility 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CDS Trading 0.114*** 0.106***  4.332*** 3.254***  
 (7.29) (5.38)  (12.18) (7.39)  
Junk 0.144*** 0.181*** 0.026 -1.087** -0.519 -1.213** 
 (6.71) (9.49) (0.80) (-2.25) (-1.21) (-2.16) 
CDS Trading × Junk 0.088***   1.247**   
 (3.13)   (2.03)   
Intangibles  -0.035 0.099  -2.887*** 8.184*** 
  (-1.05) (0.94)  (-3.23) (4.20) 
CDS Trading × Intangibles  0.198***   8.002***  
  (3.24)   (5.75)  
CDS Market Depth   0.029*   0.570** 
   (1.86)   (2.01) 
Control Variables 
Size, B/M, Leverage, ROA, PPE/Assets, Cash/Assets, Asset Growth, Cash Flow Vol, Stock Return, 
Amihud Liq, Rated, Industry Median (Beta or Volatility) 
Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
S.E. Clustered by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 216,395 216,395 20,257 216,395 216,395 20,257 





Table 4.  CDS Trading and Corporate Diversification Across Industries 
This table presents the results of panel regressions explaining Industry-Sales Herfindahl Index, 
which takes a higher value when the firm is more focused. The explanatory variable of interest is 
CDS Trading, which is equal to one in the quarters when the CDS is trading. CDS Elapsed Time 
is defined as 0.25 multiplied by the number of quarters the CDS has been traded. Column 1 
presents the second stage result of a two-stage instrumental variables regression in which Lender 
Foreign Exchange Derivatives is used as an instrument for CDS Trading. Columns 2 and 3 
include panel regressions using firm fixed effects. Columns 4 to 7 present propensity-score 
matching results. “All Firms (<1%)” finds the nearest neighbor match within 1%. “Industry 
(<5%)” finds the nearest neighbor match in the same one-digit SIC industry and within 5%. 
Explanatory variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% marks. All regressions include firm 
fixed effects, time fixed effects, and standard error clustering at the firm level. The *, **, and 
*** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 






Firm Fixed Effects 
Propensity-Score Matching 
All Firms (<1%) Industry (<5%) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
CDS Trading -0.119∗∗ -0.017∗∗  -0.015  -0.015∗  
 (-2.15) (-2.39)  (-1.54)  (-1.71)  
CDS Elapsed Time  -0.003∗∗∗  -0.004∗∗  -0.003∗∗  
  (-3.01)  (-2.03)  (-2.16)  
CDS:  0-8 quarters   -0.011∗  -0.011  -0.008 
   (-1.81)  (-1.33)  (-1.16) 
CDS:  9-20 quarters   -0.035∗∗∗  -0.040∗∗∗  -0.036∗∗∗ 
   (-4.52)  (-3.36)  (-3.77) 
CDS: 21+ quarters   -0.049∗∗∗  -0.052∗∗∗  -0.047∗∗∗ 
   (-4.89)  (-3.10)  (-3.81) 
Median Herfindahl 0.145∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.072 0.068 0.168∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗ 
 (3.73) (3.75) (3.79) (1.07) (1.01) (2.75) (2.74) 
Tobin’s q 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.005 0.005 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 
 (2.90) (3.08) (3.07) (1.27) (1.25) (2.30) (2.27) 
Size -0.010∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.009 -0.009 -0.010∗∗ -0.010∗∗ 
 (-4.39) (-4.75) (-4.77) (-1.54) (-1.55) (-2.34) (-2.41) 
B/M -0.012∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 
 (-4.41) (-4.68) (-4.67) (-0.77) (-0.75) (-1.07) (-1.08) 
Leverage -0.017 -0.018 -0.018 -0.034 -0.035 -0.037∗ -0.038∗ 
 (-1.37) (-1.44) (-1.46) (-1.12) (-1.16) (-1.75) (-1.79) 
ROA 0.058∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.016 0.015 0.045∗∗ 0.046∗∗ 
 (6.24) (6.48) (6.48) (0.48) (0.45) (2.32) (2.35) 
PPE/Assets 0.105∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗ 
 (5.16) (5.12) (5.13) (3.91) (3.90) (4.85) (4.83) 
Cash/Assets 0.058∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 
 (5.01) (4.91) (4.90) (3.85) (3.81) (5.24) (5.25) 
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Firm Fixed Effects 
Propensity-Score Matching  
 All Firms (<1%) Industry (<3%)  
         
Asset Growth 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.004  
 (0.47) (0.58) (0.56) (0.67) (0.60) (0.50) (0.47)  
Rated -0.016∗ -0.021∗∗ -0.021∗∗ -0.018 -0.017 -0.022∗ -0.023∗  
 (-1.71) (-2.30) (-2.31) (-0.97) (-0.96) (-1.86) (-1.92)  
Junk 0.011 0.012 0.013 0.018∗ 0.017 0.012 0.013  
 (1.30) (1.45) (1.48) (1.67) (1.63) (1.26) (1.30)  
Equity Beta 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002  
 (0.99) (0.25) (0.28) (0.74) (0.81) (0.92) (0.95)  
Constant 0.643∗∗∗ 0.648∗∗∗ 0.646∗∗∗ 0.584∗∗∗ 0.585∗∗∗ 0.544∗∗∗ 0.548∗∗∗  
 (16.90) (16.87) (16.83) (7.69) (7.69) (8.46) (8.53)  
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
S.E. Clustered by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Observations 219,669 219,669 219,669 30,046 30,046 31,175 31,175  
Adjusted R2 — 0.753 0.753 0.831 0.832 0.817 0.817  
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Table 5. CDS Trading and the Simultaneous Impact on Cash Holdings and Corporate 
Diversification 
This table presents the results of a panel regression that simultaneously explains Cash/Assets 
(column 1) and Industry-Sales Herfindahl Index (column 2). The explanatory variable of interest 
is CDS Trading, which is equal to one in the quarters when the CDS is trading. The regression 
includes firm fixed effects, time fixed effects, and standard error clustering at the firm level. The 
*, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Cash Holdings (=Cash/Assets) Industry-Sales Herfindahl Index  
(1) (2)  
CDS Trading 0.026*** -0.018***  
 (4.23) (-2.91)  
Median Cash/Assets 0.581***   
 (7.51)   
Interest Coverage 0.018***   
 (5.06)   
Dividend Payer 0.005***   
 (2.82)   
Median Herfindahl  0.259  
  (1.26)  
Tobin’s q  0.006***  
  (7.09)  
Size 0.004*** -0.003***  
 (4.13) (-2.66)  
B/M 0.008*** -0.008***  
 (2.73) (-2.75)  
Leverage -0.034*** 0.003  
 (-4.31) (0.41)  
ROA -0.039*** 0.027***  
 (-3.83) (3.30)  
Fixed Assets -0.048*** 0.031***  
 (-8.37) (6.85)  
Asset Growth 0.080*** -0.009  
 (12.46) (-1.60)  
Rated -0.009 0.007  
 (-1.44) (1.17)  
Junk 0.019*** -0.007  
 (3.25) (-1.22)  
Equity Beta 0.004** -0.000  
 (2.44) (-0.30)  
Constant -0.015 -0.003  
 (-1.50) (-0.39)  
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes  
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes  
S.E. Clustered by Firm Yes Yes  
Observations 156,748 156,748  
Adjusted R2 0.838 0.750  
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Table 6.  CDS Trading and the Direction of Corporate Investment 
This table presents the results of panel regressions explaining Non-Core Investment (Panel A) 
and Core Investment (Panel B). Non-Core Investment (Core Investment) is defined as capital 
expenditures, as a percentage of total assets, invested in industries outside (inside) of its primary 
industry. The explanatory variable of interest is CDS Trading, which is equal to one in the 
quarters when the CDS is trading. CDS Elapsed Time is defined as 0.25 multiplied by the 
number of quarters the CDS has been traded. Column 1 presents the second stage result of a two-
stage instrumental variables regression in which Lender Foreign Exchange Derivatives is used as 
an instrument for CDS Trading. Columns 2 and 3 include panel regressions using firm fixed 
effects. Columns 4 to 7 present propensity-score matching results. “All Firms (<1%)” finds the 
nearest neighbor match within 1%. “Industry (<5%)” finds the nearest neighbor match in the 
same one-digit SIC industry and within 5%. Explanatory variables are winsorized at the 1% and 
99% marks. All regressions include firm fixed effects, time fixed effects, and standard error 
clustering at the firm level. The *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 




Table 6 (Cont.) 





Firm Fixed Effects 
Propensity-Score Matching 
All Firms (<1%) Industry (<5%) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 




















































Median Non-Core Inv. 0.499∗∗∗ 0.413∗∗∗ 0.415∗∗∗ 0.378∗ 0.380∗ 0.405∗∗ 0.408∗∗ 
 (3.11) (2.68) (2.70) (1.84) (1.85) (2.15) (2.16) 
Tobin’s q -0.007 -0.017 -0.016 -0.036 -0.033 -0.040 -0.039 
 (-0.49) (-1.10) (-1.09) (-0.51) (-0.48) (-1.11) (-1.07) 
Size 0.141∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.311∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗ 0.273∗∗∗ 
 (4.13) (5.33) (5.35) (2.66) (2.68) (3.36) (3.37) 
B/M -0.192∗∗∗ -0.151∗∗∗ -0.151∗∗∗ 0.061 0.061 -0.070 -0.070 
 (-4.65) (-3.81) (-3.82) (0.59) (0.59) (-0.92) (-0.91) 
Leverage -0.821∗∗∗ -0.786∗∗∗ -0.782∗∗∗ -0.549 -0.536 -0.749∗∗∗ -0.740∗∗∗ 
 (-4.63) (-4.47) (-4.44) (-1.29) (-1.26) (-2.71) (-2.67) 
ROA -0.183 -0.293∗∗ -0.294∗∗ 1.642∗∗ 1.644∗∗ 0.644∗∗ 0.642∗∗ 
 (-1.32) (-2.09) (-2.09) (2.47) (2.48) (2.00) (2.00) 
PPE/Assets 5.566∗∗∗ 5.564∗∗∗ 5.563∗∗∗ 3.829∗∗∗ 3.858∗∗∗ 4.406∗∗∗ 4.426∗∗∗ 
 (13.33) (13.10) (13.10) (3.42) (3.46) (5.45) (5.48) 
Cash/Assets 0.334∗∗ 0.399∗∗∗ 0.402∗∗∗ 0.208 0.237 0.308 0.307 
 (2.24) (2.73) (2.75) (0.33) (0.37) (0.81) (0.81) 
Asset Growth 0.138∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.171 0.184 0.231∗ 0.238∗∗ 
 (3.82) (3.55) (3.58) (1.08) (1.16) (1.92) (1.97) 
Rated 0.036 0.200 0.205 0.247 0.246 0.192 0.195 
 (0.22) (1.40) (1.44) (0.96) (0.96) (0.97) (1.00) 
Junk -0.310∗∗ -0.314∗∗ -0.320∗∗ -0.160 -0.157 -0.266∗ -0.272∗ 
 (-2.04) (-2.43) (-2.48) (-0.91) (-0.90) (-1.65) (-1.68) 
Equity Beta -0.012 0.025∗∗ 0.025∗∗ 0.038 0.036 0.048 0.047 
 (-0.82) (2.04) (2.03) (0.95) (0.90) (1.61) (1.60) 
Constant 0.336 -0.025 -0.032 -0.977 -0.949 -0.643 -0.661 
 (1.30) (-0.10) (-0.13) (-0.93) (-0.91) (-0.95) (-0.98) 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
S.E. Clustered by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 197,568 197,568 197,568 26,371 26,371 26,423 26,423 
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Table 6 (Cont.) 
Panel B. Investment in Core Industry (% of Assets) 
 Instrumental 
Variable 
Firm Fixed Effects 
Propensity-Score Matching 
All Firms (<1%) Industry (<5%) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
CDS Trading 0.537 -0.098  -0.021  -0.040  
 (0.51) (-0.63)  (-0.12)  (-0.21)  
CDS Elapsed Time  0.015  -0.069∗∗  0.001  
  (0.74)  (-2.10)  (0.03)  
CDS:  0-8 quarters   -0.042  -0.081  -0.032 
   (-0.29)  (-0.55)  (-0.20) 
CDS:  9-20 quarters   -0.091  -0.274  -0.091 
   (-0.55)  (-1.33)  (-0.46) 
CDS: 21+ quarters   -0.008  -0.517∗∗  -0.096 
   (-0.05)  (-2.01)  (-0.44) 
Median Core Inv. 0.513∗∗∗ 0.520∗∗∗ 0.522∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗ 0.169∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗ 0.343∗∗∗ 
 (8.38) (8.70) (8.74) (2.11) (2.12) (4.22) (4.23) 
Tobin’s q 0.026 0.025 0.025 0.233∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 
 (1.43) (1.35) (1.36) (2.71) (2.66) (2.82) (2.82) 
Size 0.246∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗ 0.047 0.057 0.127 0.124 
 (5.76) (5.86) (5.84) (0.51) (0.61) (1.57) (1.53) 
B/M -0.399∗∗∗ -0.393∗∗∗ -0.394∗∗∗ -0.058 -0.054 -0.238∗∗ -0.239∗∗ 
 (-7.45) (-7.30) (-7.30) (-0.36) (-0.33) (-2.23) (-2.23) 
Leverage -1.644∗∗∗ -1.638∗∗∗ -1.639∗∗∗ -1.497∗∗∗ -1.479∗∗∗ -1.624∗∗∗ -1.627∗∗∗ 
 (-7.07) (-6.93) (-6.93) (-2.76) (-2.71) (-3.60) (-3.60) 
ROA 0.043 0.029 0.028 2.737∗∗∗ 2.699∗∗∗ 1.959∗∗∗ 1.964∗∗∗ 
 (0.26) (0.18) (0.17) (3.38) (3.33) (4.07) (4.08) 
PPE/Assets 8.358∗∗∗ 8.355∗∗∗ 8.357∗∗∗ 6.566∗∗∗ 6.581∗∗∗ 7.537∗∗∗ 7.536∗∗∗ 
 (16.92) (16.58) (16.59) (5.65) (5.70) (8.91) (8.91) 
Cash/Assets -0.334∗∗ -0.329∗ -0.324∗ -1.169∗ -1.178∗ -0.197 -0.193 
 (-2.00) (-1.95) (-1.92) (-1.93) (-1.95) (-0.42) (-0.41) 
Asset Growth 0.327∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗ 0.192 0.190 0.360∗ 0.360∗ 
 (5.82) (5.69) (5.69) (0.78) (0.77) (1.72) (1.73) 
Rated 0.158 0.181 0.176 0.315 0.328 0.220 0.212 
 (0.84) (0.96) (0.93) (0.78) (0.81) (0.78) (0.75) 
Junk -0.034 -0.037 -0.033 -0.097 -0.114 -0.142 -0.139 
 (-0.23) (-0.25) (-0.22) (-0.65) (-0.76) (-0.89) (-0.87) 
Equity Beta 0.025 0.029∗ 0.030∗ 0.068 0.071 0.068 0.068 
 (1.38) (1.78) (1.80) (1.32) (1.39) (1.62) (1.62) 
Constant 0.291 0.231 0.230 0.371 0.344 0.082 0.105 
 (0.80) (0.67) (0.67) (0.36) (0.33) (0.10) (0.13) 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
S.E. Clustered by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 197,568 197,568 197,568 26,371 26,371 26,423 26,423 
Adjusted R2 — 0.722 0.722 0.810 0.810 0.779 0.779 
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Table 7.  CDS Trading and Corporate Investment in Risky Projects 
This table presents the results of panel regressions explaining R&D Expenditure to Assets (%). 
The explanatory variable of interest is CDS Trading, which is equal to one in the quarters when 
the CDS is trading.  CDS Elapsed Time is defined as 0.25 multiplied by the number of quarters 
the CDS has been traded. Column 1 presents the second stage result of a two-stage instrumental 
variables regression in which Lender Foreign Exchange Derivatives is used as an instrument for 
CDS Trading. Columns 2 and 3 include panel regressions using firm fixed effects. Columns 4 to 
7 present propensity-score matching results. “All Firms (<1%)” finds the nearest neighbor match 
within 1%. “Industry (<5%)” finds the nearest neighbor match in the same one-digit SIC industry 
and within 5%. Explanatory variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% marks. All regressions 
include firm fixed effects, time fixed effects, and standard error clustering at the firm level. The 
*, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 





Firm Fixed Effects 
Propensity-Score Matching 
 All Firms (<1%) Industry (5%) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
CDS Trading -8.782∗∗∗ -0.490∗∗∗  -0.733∗∗∗  -0.520∗∗∗  
 (-3.56) (-3.38)  (-5.87)  (-2.98)  
CDS Elapsed Time  -0.121∗∗∗  -0.179∗∗∗  -0.107∗∗∗  
  (-5.11)  (-7.73)  (-2.98)  
CDS: 0-8 quarters   -0.316∗∗  -0.576∗∗∗  -0.381∗∗∗ 
   (-2.39)  (-5.31)  (-2.62) 
CDS: 9-20 quarters   -0.974∗∗∗  -1.417∗∗∗  -0.994∗∗∗ 
   (-4.98)  (-7.89)  (-4.25) 
CDS: 21+ quarters   -1.692∗∗∗  -2.358∗∗∗  -1.618∗∗∗ 
   (-5.71)  (-8.47)  (-4.17) 
Median R&D Exp. -0.029 -0.290 -0.273 0.139 0.102 -0.025 -0.011 
 (-0.15) (-1.52) (-1.43) (0.92) (0.68) (-0.11) (-0.05) 
Tobin’s q 0.703∗∗∗ 0.724∗∗∗ 0.724∗∗∗ 0.451∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗∗ 0.562∗∗∗ 0.560∗∗∗ 
 (11.74) (12.08) (12.07) (3.09) (3.06) (5.42) (5.38) 
Size -1.191∗∗∗ -1.267∗∗∗ -1.269∗∗∗ -0.645∗∗ -0.650∗∗ -1.191∗∗∗ -1.198∗∗∗ 
 (-7.77) (-8.15) (-8.16) (-2.01) (-2.03) (-3.64) (-3.65) 
B/M -0.911∗∗∗ -0.977∗∗∗ -0.977∗∗∗ -0.645∗∗ -0.644∗∗ -0.775∗∗∗ -0.778∗∗∗ 
 (-8.53) (-9.23) (-9.22) (-2.11) (-2.10) (-3.59) (-3.61) 
Leverage -1.450∗∗∗ -1.544∗∗∗ -1.558∗∗∗ -0.560∗∗ -0.601∗∗ -1.098∗∗ -1.134∗∗ 
 (-2.58) (-2.74) (-2.77) (-2.12) (-2.26) (-2.08) (-2.14) 
ROA -3.948∗∗∗ -3.692∗∗∗ -3.695∗∗∗ -0.786 -0.852 -1.469∗ -1.480∗∗ 
 (-9.28) (-8.36) (-8.36) (-0.85) (-0.93) (-1.94) (-1.96) 
PPE/Assets -0.432 -0.439 -0.427 0.330 0.329 -0.623 -0.610 
 (-0.52) (-0.53) (-0.52) (0.41) (0.41) (-0.74) (-0.73) 
Cash/Assets 0.237 0.078 0.084 -1.175∗∗ -1.153∗∗ -0.164 -0.127 
 (0.40) (0.13) (0.14) (-2.04) (-2.01) (-0.20) (-0.15) 
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Table 7. (Cont.) 
 Instrumental 
Variable 
Firm Fixed Effects 
Propensity-Score Matching 
 All Firms (<1%) Industry (5%) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Asset Growth -1.713∗∗∗ -1.684∗∗∗ -1.685∗∗∗ -0.082 -0.099 -0.377∗∗ -0.384∗∗ 
 (-15.51) (-15.06) (-15.05) (-0.46) (-0.55) (-2.43) (-2.48) 
Rated 0.227 -0.174 -0.179 -1.262 -1.260 -0.872 -0.892 
 (0.58) (-0.46) (-0.47) (-1.24) (-1.24) (-1.42) (-1.45) 
Junk -0.597∗∗ -0.508∗ -0.503∗ -0.119 -0.140 -0.446 -0.439 
 (-1.98) (-1.89) (-1.88) (-0.34) (-0.39) (-1.38) (-1.35) 
Equity Beta -0.060∗ -0.126∗∗∗ -0.125∗∗∗ -0.014 -0.010 -0.090∗∗ -0.088∗∗ 
 (-1.93) (-5.25) (-5.21) (-0.42) (-0.30) (-2.09) (-2.06) 
Constant 15.607∗∗∗ 17.785∗∗∗ 17.698∗∗∗ 10.742∗∗∗ 10.831∗∗∗ 16.374∗∗∗ 16.367∗∗∗ 
 (9.96) (11.74) (11.65) (3.71) (3.74) (5.82) (5.80) 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
S.E. Clustered by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 243,571 243,571 243,571 35,357 35,357 37,473 37,473 





Table 8.  CDS Trading and Corporate Leverage over   Time 
This table presents the results of panel regressions explaining Market Leverage (Panel A) and 
Book Leverage (Panel B). The market value of assets is estimated by the market value of equity 
plus the book value of debt. The explanatory variable of interest is CDS Trading, which is equal 
to one in the quarters when the CDS is trading.  CDS Elapsed Time is defined as 0.25 multiplied 
by the number of quarters the CDS has been traded. Column 1 presents the second stage result of 
a two-stage instrumental variables regression in which Lender Foreign Exchange Derivatives is 
used as an instrument for CDS Trading. Columns 2 and 3 include panel regressions using firm 
fixed effects. Columns 4 to 7 present propensity-score matching results. “All Firms (<1%)” finds 
the nearest neighbor match within 1%. “Industry (<5%)” finds the nearest neighbor match in the 
same one-digit SIC industry and within 5%. Explanatory variables are winsorized at the 1% and 
99% marks. All regressions include firm fixed effects, time fixed effects, and standard error 
clustering at the firm level. The *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
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Panel A. Dependent Variable: Market Leverage (Long-term Debt over Market Assets) 
   
 Instrumental 
Variable 
Firm Fixed Effects 
Propensity-Score Matching 
 All Firms (<1%) Industry (5%) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
CDS Trading 0.095∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗  0.009∗∗  0.013∗∗∗  
 (3.41) (2.81)  (1.97)  (2.98)  
CDS Elapsed Time  -0.001∗  -0.002∗  -0.002∗∗∗  
  (-1.92)  (-1.96)  (-2.98)  
CDS: 0-8 quarters   0.008∗∗  0.006  0.008∗∗ 
   (2.52)  (1.52)  (2.31) 
CDS: 9-20 quarters   0.005  0.003  0.007 
   (1.16)  (0.62)  (1.43) 
CDS: 21+ quarters   0.003  -0.004  -0.003 
   (0.58)  (-0.52)  (-0.53) 
Industry Market Lev 0.348∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗ 0.308∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗ 
 (13.58) (13.88) (13.87) (5.63) (5.67) (8.59) (8.64) 
Size -0.035∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗ 
 (-27.48) (-27.62) (-27.59) (-17.00) (-16.93) (-20.49) (-20.39) 
B/M 0.019∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 
 (11.29) (11.78) (11.80) (5.26) (5.27) (7.53) (7.53) 
ROA -0.013∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗∗ -0.116∗∗∗ -0.074∗∗∗ -0.075∗∗∗ 
 (-3.35) (-4.04) (-4.05) (-6.55) (-6.58) (-6.13) (-6.17) 
PPE/Assets 0.064∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ -0.024 -0.023 0.002 0.002 
 (5.24) (5.34) (5.33) (-0.92) (-0.90) (0.10) (0.11) 
Cash/Assets -0.106∗∗∗ -0.103∗∗∗ -0.104∗∗∗ -0.079∗∗∗ -0.079∗∗∗ -0.117∗∗∗ -0.118∗∗∗ 
 (-17.62) (-17.22) (-17.28) (-4.44) (-4.43) (-8.57) (-8.59) 
Asset Growth 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 
 (11.93) (11.79) (11.77) (6.10) (6.15) (6.52) (6.53) 
Tobin’s q -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ 
 (-3.37) (-3.75) (-3.79) (-7.51) (-7.52) (-8.70) (-8.75) 
Abnormal Earnings -0.011∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ 0.012∗ 0.012∗ 0.010 0.010 
 (-4.99) (-4.87) (-4.85) (1.92) (1.96) (1.51) (1.52) 
Loss Carry Forward 0.020∗∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 
 (2.31) (2.37) (2.38) (4.73) (4.73) (4.63) (4.62) 
Tax Credit/Asset 0.821 0.264 0.135 -4.125 -3.644 -3.767 -3.696 
 (0.25) (0.08) (0.04) (-0.94) (-0.82) (-0.69) (-0.67) 
Rated 0.058∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 
 (11.11) (12.38) (12.47) (3.92) (3.95) (8.55) (8.68) 
Junk 0.036∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 
 (8.37) (8.64) (8.57) (2.39) (2.28) (4.77) (4.66) 
Equity Beta 0.003∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 
 (7.10) (9.92) (9.91) (4.83) (4.90) (4.92) (4.96) 
Constant 0.306∗∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗ 0.622∗∗∗ 0.623∗∗∗ 0.505∗∗∗ 0.503∗∗∗ 
 (31.80) (32.17) (32.13) (21.96) (21.97) (23.96) (23.85) 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
S.E. Clustered by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 244,818 244,818 244,818 35,422 35,422 37,623 37,623 




Panel B. Dependent Variable: Book Leverage (Long-term Debt over Total Assets) 
 Instrumental 
Variable 
Firm Fixed Effects 
Propensity-Score Matching 
 All Firms (<1%) All Firms (<1%) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
CDS Trading 0.197∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗  0.021∗∗∗  0.023∗∗∗  
 (4.58) (4.33)  (3.20)  (3.74)  
CDS Elapsed Time  -0.002∗∗  -0.002  -0.003∗∗∗  
  (-2.20)  (-1.43)  (-2.98)  
CDS: 0-8 quarters   0.023∗∗∗  0.018∗∗∗  0.020∗∗∗ 
   (4.98)  (3.30)  (3.84) 
CDS: 9-20 quarters   0.012∗∗  0.013∗  0.011 
   (2.05)  (1.70)  (1.64) 
CDS: 21+ quarters   0.007  0.004  -0.001 
   (0.91)  (0.40)  (-0.13) 
Industry Book Lev 0.477∗∗∗ 0.368∗∗∗ 0.368∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗∗ 0.328∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗ 0.304∗∗∗ 
 (9.42) (8.31) (8.30) (4.08) (4.13) (4.66) (4.77) 
Size -0.071∗∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗ -0.074∗∗∗ -0.074∗∗∗ -0.077∗∗∗ -0.077∗∗∗ 
 (-32.18) (-32.13) (-32.11) (-15.49) (-15.43) (-21.07) (-20.97) 
B/M -0.055∗∗∗ -0.054∗∗∗ -0.054∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗ 
 (-24.85) (-24.44) (-24.40) (-8.89) (-8.86) (-12.39) (-12.33) 
ROA -0.034∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗ -0.100∗∗∗ -0.101∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗ -0.083∗∗∗ 
 (-3.89) (-4.54) (-4.55) (-2.90) (-2.93) (-3.69) (-3.73) 
PPE/Assets 0.021 0.022 0.022 -0.059∗ -0.058∗ -0.042 -0.042 
 (1.16) (1.19) (1.19) (-1.80) (-1.76) (-1.61) (-1.60) 
Cash/Assets -0.255∗∗∗ -0.250∗∗∗ -0.250∗∗∗ -0.147∗∗∗ -0.147∗∗∗ -0.207∗∗∗ -0.207∗∗∗ 
 (-23.77) (-23.08) (-23.11) (-4.59) (-4.58) (-9.20) (-9.22) 
Asset Growth 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.005 0.005 
 (6.22) (6.12) (6.12) (3.15) (3.24) (0.87) (0.89) 
Tobin’s q 0.022∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 
 (19.12) (18.83) (18.82) (8.34) (8.33) (9.63) (9.62) 
Abnormal Earnings 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.013 -0.013 -0.007 -0.006 
 (0.27) (0.37) (0.38) (-1.54) (-1.52) (-0.77) (-0.75) 
Loss Carry Forward 0.116∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗ 0.111∗∗ 0.066 0.067 
 (6.68) (6.62) (6.63) (2.44) (2.47) (1.60) (1.62) 
Tax Credit/Asset 5.722 4.163 4.072 0.863 1.483 -6.905 -6.770 
 (1.50) (1.05) (1.01) (0.26) (0.45) (-1.30) (-1.24) 
Rated 0.064∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 
 (7.81) (9.38) (9.44) (2.82) (2.85) (6.95) (7.06) 
Junk 0.044∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 
 (5.83) (6.34) (6.29) (3.82) (3.73) (4.19) (4.09) 
Equity Beta 0.000 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 
 (0.58) (2.80) (2.82) (3.79) (3.83) (2.95) (2.99) 
Constant 0.598∗∗∗ 0.635∗∗∗ 0.634∗∗∗ 0.907∗∗∗ 0.907∗∗∗ 0.839∗∗∗ 0.832∗∗∗ 
 (22.57) (25.38) (25.37) (16.47) (16.45) (19.61) (19.38) 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
S.E. Clustered by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 244,772 244,772 244,772 35,440 35,440 37,661 37,661 




Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
Variable Name Description Source 
Size 
Log of equity market capitalization, defined as 
the number of common shares outstanding 
multiplied by the price of the firm's stock at the 
time of portfolio formation. (USD, $ Billions) 
CRSP 
B/M 
The holding period percentage return of the 
firm's stock over the course of the month. 
CRSP, Compustat 
Leverage (Book) Credit default swap (CDS) spreads Compustat 
ROA 
The holding period percentage return of the 
firm's CDS to the protection seller over the 
course of the month. Computed as the marked-
to-market dollar change in value of CDS contract 
divided by notional value. 
Compustat 
PPE/Assets 




Cash and Marketable Securities divided by Total 
Assets. 
Compustat 
Asset Growth One-year percentage change in assets. Compustat 
Tobin's q 
Market value of assets divided by book value of 
assets. Market value of assets is defined as 
market value of equity plus book value of 
liabilities. 
Compustat 
Cash Flow Vol 
Standard deviation of operating profits over the 
last eight quarters, scaled by total assets. 
Compustat 
Stock Return Past 12-month stock return. CRSP 
Amihud Liq Stock liquidity as measured by Amihud (2002). Compustat 
Rated Rated by Standard and Poor's. Standard & Poor's 
Junk 
Speculative grade based on Standard and Poor's 
credit rating for the company. 
Standard & Poor's 
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Appendix B: Probit Model to Predict CDS Trading 
This table presents the results of probit models to estimate the probability of CDS trading. 
Definitions of control variables are located in Appendix A. Lender Size is the aggregate size of 
the firm’s lenders and underwriters. Lender Credit Derivatives measures the total position of 
credit derivatives of lending banks and underwriters. Lender FX Usage captures the amount of 
hedging activities of the lending banks and underwriters. Lender Tier 1 Capital Ratio is the 
capital ratio of the firm’s lenders. Sample period covers 2000-2015. Standard error clustering at 
the firm level. The *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
Dependent Variable: CDS Trading 













ROA 0.382* 0.362 





Cash/Assets 0.273 0.280 
 (1.23) (1.26) 
















Amihud Liq 0.004 0.004 





























Lender Tier 1 Capital  -0.043 





S.E. Clustered by Firm 
Observations 










Before the 1970s, the U.S. was under a highly localized and fragmented banking system. 
States prohibited the operation within their border by an out-of-state bank, and also had strict 
restrictions on the operation of branches by an in-state bank. Since the mid-1970s, most states 
allowed statewide branching by an in-state bank (i.e. intrastate branching). Since the late 1970s, 
states started to allow an out-of-state bank/BHC to operate a subsidiary within their border via 
the acquisition and conversion of an in-state bank (i.e. interstate banking), either on a regional or 
national reciprocal basis or nonreciprocal. Then from the early 1990s, states gradually allowed 
an out-of-state bank/BHC to operate branches within their border (i.e. interstate branching), with 
different state-specific restrictions. A milestone of the banking deregulation is the passage of the 
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficient Act of 1994 (IBBEA). This act permits nationwide 
interstate banking. It also permits interstate branching, but allows states to apply their own 
restrictions or even completely “opt-out” of the interstate branching. After IBBEA, states have 
their own progress with regard to the alleviation of the state-specific restrictions on interstate 
branching.  
Previous studies have examined the economic impact of removing the restrictions on U.S. 
banks’ geographical expansion. We would expect that the gradual lifting of this regulation would 
lead to considerable welfare gains through the formation of bigger banks and a more efficient 
intra- and interstate operation. Indeed, Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) showed that federal states 
that deregulated their banking markets earlier eventually did grow faster. They ascribed much of 
this growth gain to better access by small businesses to credit. Morgan, Rime, and Stranhan 
(2004) found that deregulation has lowered the volatility of U.S. state business cycles. 
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Some studies looked at the impact of banking deregulation on interstate risk sharing. 
Hoffmann and Shcherbakova-Stewen (2011) studied the relation between the intrastate 
branching deregulation and the dependence of interstate risk sharing on business cycles. They 
found that banking deregulation alleviated the dependence of interstate risk sharing on the 
business cycle, i.e. stabilizes the fluctuation of interstate risk sharing on the business cycle. This 
stabilization was mainly reflected in those states where small businesses were more important, 
and therefore they argue that banking deregulation had generally improved credit market access 
for small businesses, especially in recessions. Demyanky, Ostergaard, and Sorensen (2007) 
studied from the residential perspective and looked at the impact of banking deregulation 
(intrastate branching deregulation and interstate banking deregulation) on personal income 
smoothing. They found that personal income smoothing was improved after deregulation. The 
improvement was more significant in those states where small businesses were more important. 
They argued that small firms depended heavily on intermediated finance, and the financial 
position of business owners closely intertwined with that of their businesses. 
While providing some evidence of the impact of banking deregulation on interstate risk 
sharing, the measure of banking deregulation are incomplete in these studies. None of them 
looked at the impact of interstate branching deregulation, which plays an important role in 
banking deregulation since the 1990s. IBBEA allows interstate branching, but gives states 
considerable leeway on choosing to “opt-out” or “opt-in” early of interstate branching and on 
applying their own restrictions. The time when states initially “opt-in” interstate branching and 
their follow-up alleviation on the state-specific restrictions are different from each other. 
Although some other studies had looked at the interstate branching deregulation, their studies 
were only about the initial “opt-in” time. No studies have looked at the impact of the follow-up 
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changes in state-specific restrictions. Johnson and Rice (2008) is the first paper that tried to 
collect each state’s follow-up laws that amended state-specific restrictions on interstate 
branching, until 2005. Based on their study, our paper completes the tracking of each state’s 
changes in their interstate branching restrictions until 2018. With this hand-collected data, we are 
able to study the impact of both the interstate banking deregulation and the interstate branching 
deregulation on interstate risk sharing. 
In addition, no paper studies the impact of banking deregulation on residential 
consumption behavior. Our paper attempts to fill in this gap by examining the impact of banking 
deregulation on the sensitivity of personal consumption to state’s macroeconomic risk. Generally 
speaking, our paper studies from the residential perspective and decomposes interstate risk 
sharing into two channels: personal income smoothing and personal consumption smoothing.  
We first focus on the impact of banking deregulation on personal income smoothing, 
which refers to the situation when the personal income reacts less than one-by-one to the shock 
of state output. Demyanky et al. (2007) had well documented that personal income smoothing 
could be improved after banking deregulation, especially for those states with a large number of 
small businesses. We follow the conventional test in the risk sharing literature to examine the 
impact of banking deregulation on personal income smoothing. In measuring the degree of 
intestate banking deregulation, we first employ a simple dummy variable, which equals one 
when a state allows interstate banking. We then generate the time-varying state-level measures of 
interstate banking deregulation as in Jiang et al. (2016). Their approach allows us to capture the 
dynamics in the interstate banking deregulation because different states lifted the restriction on 
interstate banking in different years, and states might have their own regional or national 
reciprocal condition during the process of interstate banking deregulation from the 1970s to 
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1990s. In measuring the degree of interstate branching deregulation, we also first employ a 
simple dummy variable, which equals one when a state allows interstate branching. We generate 
time-varying state-level measures of interstate branching deregulation, based on our hand-
collected data on each state’s laws. These measures reflect not only the initial “opt-in” of 
interstate branching, but also reflect each state’s follow-up amendment on different aspects of 
state-level restrictions on interstate branching. Our results provide evidence that interstate 
banking deregulation plays an important role in improving personal income smoothing. Both the 
initial permission of interstate banking and the follow-up alleviation contribute to the 
improvement in personal income smoothing. The initial “opt-in” of interstate branching does not 
have a significant impact on personal income smoothing, while the state-level restrictions have 
mixed impact on personal income smoothing. 
We next examine the impact of banking deregulation on personal consumption 
smoothing, which refers to the situation that personal consumption reacts less than one-by-one to 
the change in personal income. The extant literature had suggested that increased access to credit 
contributes to consumption smoothing by allowing consumers to resume their patterns of savings 
and consumptions after experiencing economic output shocks, and hence may prevent sudden 
drops in consumptions (Asdrubali et al. 1996). If banking deregulation would lead to an 
expanded credit supply to consumers or small businesses, we would expect an improved 
smoothing of personal consumption from economic shocks. However, the possible mechanisms 
theoretically suggested are not supported by the empirical results. Studies about the relation of 
banking deregulation and credit creation found that regulatory-induced competition reduced 
liquidity creation both by squeezing profit margins and by impeding relationship lending (Jiang, 
Levine, and Lin, 2016, 2018). The liquidity-destroying effects of competition were mitigated 
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among more profitable banks and heightened among smaller banks. Our results show that 
interstate banking deregulation hinders personal consumption smoothing. On the contrary, 
interstate branching deregulation improves personal consumption smoothing. Both the initial 
permission of interstate branching and the follow-up changes in state-specific restrictions 
contribute to the improvement in personal consumption smoothing. 
Our paper contributes greatly to the traditional literature on interstate risk sharing as very 
few papers have empirically estimated the real effect of banking deregulation from a residential 
perspective. Our paper also complements previous studies in the research of each state’s follow-
up changes in state-level restrictions on interstate branching deregulation. Our findings that 
interstate banking deregulation and interstate branching deregulation have a different impact on 
interstate risk sharing extend the relatively scarce literature on aggregate risk sharing.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the empirical 
methodology. Section 3 describes our data. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 
concludes. 
 Empirical Methodology 
 Interstate Banking Deregulation 
2.1.1 The process of interstate banking and branching deregulation 
Before the 1970s, the U.S. was under an extremely localized and fragmented banking 
system. Most states prohibited out-of-state banks from establishing and maintaining banks or 
branches within the state border (i.e. prohibited both interstate banking and interstate branching), 
and also strictly limited in-state banks from operating more than one branch within the state (i.e. 
limited intrastate branching). The banking deregulation of most states started in the 1970s, when 
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the individual state removed restrictions on intrastate branching. An in-state bank/BHC can 
expand geographically within the state border by acquiring another bank and converting the 
acquired bank into its branches (i.e. intrastate branching via M&A). Some states then started to 
permit intrastate de novo branching, in other words, an in-state bank/BHC could establish and 
maintain new branches anywhere within the state border. Since the late 1970s, states started to 
remove restrictions on interstate banking. A state could allow an out-of-state bank/BHC to 
expand into its state border by acquiring an in-state bank and converting the in-state bank to a 
subsidiary of the out-of-state bank/BHC (i.e. interstate banking via M&A). Most states started 
their interstate banking deregulation only on a regional or national reciprocal basis, and gradually 
loosened this restriction. For example, in 1987, Alabama allowed interstate banking via M&A on 
a regional reciprocal basis. In 1995, Alabama allowed interstate banking via M&A national 
nonreciprocal. Later, some states started to allow an out-of-state bank/BHC to charter a new 
bank as its subsidiary in their state border (i.e. interstate de novo banking). Prior to the passage 
of IBBEA in 1994, all states except Hawaii allowed interstate banking to some extent. In the 
meantime, most states still strictly prohibited interstate branching. Only eight states permitted 
interstate branching, six of which only permitted on a reciprocal basis.  
IBBEA Section 101 expressly permits the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System to approve interstate bank acquisitions, after September 29, 1995, regardless of whether 
such acquisitions would have been permitted under "the law of any State" (Johnson and Rice, 
2007). The states were not permitted to opt out of the interstate banking rules. IBBEA eliminates 
the last piece of obstacle on interstate banking via M&A across the U.S. 
A more important part of IBBEA is its Section 102 and 103, which allows the interstate 
branching. For most states, only since the passage of IBBEA have banks been able to engage in 
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interstate branching, albeit still subject to significant state restrictions. IBBEA permits a national 
or state bank to engage in interstate branching, since June 1, 1997, subject to certain limitations. 
IBBEA did permit a state to “opt-out” of interstate branching or to “opt-in” early any time 
between the passage of IBBEA (September 1994) and the trigger date of the interstate branching 
provision (June 1, 1997). Texas and Montana are the only two states that initially elected to opt-
out of interstate branching, and both states later opted back in. After “opt-in”, an out-of-state 
bank/BHC may enter this state by purchasing an in-state bank and converting that in-state bank 
into its branches (i.e. interstate branching via M&A). IBBEA gives states considerable leeway in 
applying their own restrictions on interstate branching. There are four major aspects of 
restrictions states have discretion on.  
(1) Minimum age requirement: states are allowed to set their own minimum age 
requirement of their in-state bank which is to be purchased by an out-of-state bank/BHC, 
provided that the age requirement is not more than five years. Initially many states set their age 
requirement at five years. Then states gradually lower their requirement to three years or 
completely remove this restriction. For example, Colorado had a five-year minimum age 
requirement in 1997, and eliminated this requirement in 2013. Tennessee had a five-year 
minimum age requirement in 1997, and decreased it to three years in 2003. 
(2) De novo interstate branching: de novo interstate branching refers to an out-of-state 
bank/BHC entering a host state via establishing a new branch. Each state can choose whether to 
allow de novo branching or not. For example, Alabama did not allow de novo branching in 1997, 
but removed this restriction in 2007.  
(3) Acquisition of single branch/branches: an out-of-state bank/BHC may enter a host 
state via the acquisition of a single branch or some branches of an in-state bank, without the 
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acquisition of the entire in-state bank. States can decide whether to allow branch acquisition. For 
example, Arizona did not allow branch acquisition in 1992, and eliminated this restriction in 
2001. 
(4) Statewide deposit cap: each state can impose its own limit on the statewide deposit 
cap. Most states have a typical 30% deposit cap. Some states set their own deposit cap. For 
example, Alaska has a 50% deposit cap, while Colorado has a 25% deposit cap. 
When loosening their restrictions on minimum age requirement, de novo branching, and 
branch acquisition, many states loosened it with a reciprocal condition. If a state allows branch 
acquisition with a reciprocal condition, it means this state allows an out-of-state bank/BHC to 
acquire a branch or some branches of its in-state bank, provided that the home state of the out-of-
state bank/BHC would allow the branch acquisition by its in-state bank. For example, New 
Hampshire had the reciprocity condition for branch acquisition, and only eliminated it until 
2015. Some states also have a general reciprocity condition for all interstate branching 
transactions. Under this condition, an out-of-state bank can only involve into an interstate 
branching transaction, no matter in which format, if the host state of the out-of-state bank allows 
interstate branching transaction. 
2.1.2 The measure of interstate banking and branching deregulation 
In the literature examining the effect of interstate banking and branching deregulation, 
early studies mainly treat the deregulation in a state as a single, discrete event, and use a dummy 
variable, Inter-Bank/Inter-Branch, that takes a value of zero when a state prohibits interstate 
banking/branching, and a value of 1 when a state allows the interstate banking/branching. This 
cutting-off approach, while has its advantage in its simplicity, fails to describe the dynamic 
process of interstate banking/branching deregulation. Some states might only allow interstate 
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banking on a regional reciprocal basis, and then gradually expand to national nonreciprocal. 
Some states might only allow interstate branching via M&A, and then start to alleviate the 
restrictions on de novo branching and branch acquisition. 
Realizing the drawback of this approach in recognizing the large scale of state-time 
variation, some recent studies have attempted to develop some identification strategies that 
capture the dynamic process of interstate banking deregulation. For example, Goetz et al., (2013) 
propose some dynamic deregulation measures, at both state-level and bank-level, in their 
investigation on the relationship between banks’ valuation performance and their geographical 
diversity as a result of interstate banking deregulation. Later studies adopt a similar identification 
strategy in their examinations on banks’ lending activities, risk and stability, and information 
environment (Jiang et al., 2016; 2018; Goetz, 2017). Based on previous studies, we employ four 
dynamic measures for interstate banking deregulation. Index-Bankit equals to 0 if state i prohibits 
interstate banking in year t, equals to 0.5 if state i in year t allows interstate banking on a regional 
reciprocal basis, equals to 0.75 if state i in year t allows interstate banking on a national 
reciprocal basis, and equals to 1 if state i in year t allows nonreciprocal national interstate 
banking. Ln(# of States)it is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of states whose 
banks/BHCs can enter into state i in year t. Ln(# of States-Distance Weighted)it is the natural 
logarithm of one plus the number of other states whose banks/BHCs can enter state i in period t, 
where each of those states is weighted by the inverse of its distance to state i. Ln(# of BHCs from 
Other States) is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of BHCs from other states that can 
enter the state i in period t. 
According to our hand-collected interstate branching deregulation data, we generate 
state-level time-varying measures reflecting each state’s specific progress on the alleviation of its 
 
116 
resections on interstate branching. We first assign an index to each of those four discretion 
aspects. Index-MinAgeit equals to 0 if state i has a five-year minimum age restriction in year t, 
equals to 0.5 if state i has a three-year minimum age restriction in year t, and equals to 1 if state i 
does not have minimum age restriction in year t. Index-DeNovoBranchit equals to 0 if state i does 
not allow de novo branching in year t, and equals to 1 if state i does allow de novo branching in 
year t. Index-BranchAcquiit equals to 0 if state i does not allow branch acquisition in year t, and 
equals to 1 if state i does allow branch acquisition in year t. Index-DepoCapit equals to 0 if state i 
has a deposit cap equal to or lower than 30% in year t, and equals to 1 if state i has a deposit cap 
higher than 30% in year t. Then Index-Branchit is the sum of Inter-Branchit and the above four 
indexes for state-specific restrictions. We also try to take the reciprocal condition into 
consideration. The reciprocal condition could be applied to the general interstate branching 
transaction, or to the state-specific restrictions on minimum age, de novo branching, and branch 
acquisition. Therefore, for Inter-Branchit, Index-MinAgeit, Index-DeNovoBranchit, and Index-
BranchAcquiit, we generate Inter-Branch-Reciit, Index-MinAge-Reciit, Index-DeNovoBranch-
Reciit, and Index-BranchAcqui-Reciit, which equals to 0.5 times the original index if there is an 
associated reciprocal condition, and equals to the original index if there is no reciprocal 
condition. Then, Index-Branch-Reciit is the sum of the above four reciprocal indexes and Index-
DepoCapit. 
 The impact of deregulation on interstate risk sharing from residential perspective 
Based on previous studies (Asdrubali et al. 1996; Demyanky et al., 2007), we look from 
residential perspective and disentangle state output shock into three components: personal 









Where gsp is the gross state product, spi is the state personal income, and spc is the state 
personal consumption. All three variables are per capita in 1977 dollar.  
Take log difference of both sides: 






+ ∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑠𝑝𝑐 
Then multiply both sides by ∆ log 𝑔𝑠𝑝 and take expectation: 
Var[∆ log 𝑔𝑠𝑝]
= Cov[∆ log 𝑔𝑠𝑝 , ∆ log 𝑔𝑠𝑝 − ∆ log 𝑠𝑝𝑖] + Cov[∆ log 𝑔𝑠𝑝 , ∆ log 𝑠𝑝𝑖 − ∆ log 𝑠𝑝𝑐]
+ Cov[∆ log 𝑔𝑠𝑝 , ∆ log 𝑠𝑝𝑐] 
Then divide both sides by Var[∆ log 𝑔𝑠𝑝]: 
1 = βPIS + βPCS + βUS 
Where personal income smoothing, βPIS, is the slope in the regression of ∆ log 𝑔𝑠𝑝 −
∆ log 𝑠𝑝𝑖 on ∆ log 𝑔𝑠𝑝, personal consumption smoothing, βPCS, is the slope in the regression of 
∆ log 𝑠𝑝𝑖 − ∆ log 𝑠𝑝𝑐 on ∆ log 𝑔𝑠𝑝, and unsmoothed shock, βUS, is the slope in the regression of 
∆ log 𝑠𝑝𝑐 on ∆ log 𝑔𝑠𝑝. 
2.2.1 Impact of interstate banking/branching deregulation on personal income smoothing 
In testing the relation between personal income smoothing and interstate 
banking/branching deregulation, we start from the baseline model developed above: 
(1) ∆ log 𝑔𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡 − ∆ log 𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑃𝐼𝑆∆ log 𝑔𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 
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where ∆ log 𝑔𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡 is the state-level growth rates of real gross state product per capita for 
state i in year t, i.e. the state output shock, and ∆ log 𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑡 is the state-level growth rates of real 
state personal income per capita for state i in year t. The growth rates are calculated as the 
difference of the natural log of per capita-level variables.    
In this baseline model, the coefficient 𝛽𝑃𝐼𝑆 in equation (1) measures the degree of 
personal income smoothing. If personal income is fully sheltered from state output shock, the 
growth rates of personal income should not co-move with the output shock. Thus 𝛽𝑃𝐼𝑆 = 1 
indicates perfect personal income smoothing. On the contrary, none personal income smoothing 
will be reflected in a one-to-one co-movement between income and output, as represented by 
𝛽𝑃𝐼𝑆 = 0.  
Because our goal is to examine whether personal income smoothing improves with 
increased interstate banking/branching deregulation, we thus augment the baseline model by 
including those measures of interstate banking/branching deregulation we discuss previously. 
For example,  
(2) ∆ log 𝑔𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡 − ∆ log 𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1∆ log 𝑔𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡 ×
∆ log 𝑔𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 
where 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡 is one of the measures of interstate banking deregulation for state i in 
year t. 𝛿𝑖 and 𝜏𝑡 are state and time fixed effects, respectively. We cluster standard errors on state 
level.  
In this regression, the key variable of interest is 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡 × ∆ log 𝑔𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡, the 
interaction term between interstate banking deregulation and growth rate of gross state product. 
The regression coefficient, 𝛽1, measures the average degree of personal income smoothing 
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before banking deregulation. The regression coefficient, 𝛽3, measures the increase in personal 
income smoothing associated with a one-unit increase in interstate banking deregulation. 
2.2.2 Impact of interstate banking/branching deregulation on personal consumption 
smoothing 
To test the relation between personal consumption smoothing and interstate 
banking/branching deregulation, we start from the baseline model developed above: 
(3) ∆ log 𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑡 − ∆ log 𝑠𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑃𝐶𝑆∆ log 𝑔𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 
where ∆ log 𝑔𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡 is the state-level growth rates of real gross state product per capita for 
state i in year t, i.e. the state output shock, ∆ log 𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑡 is the state-level growth rates of real state 
personal income per capita for state i in year t, and ∆ log 𝑠𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡 is the state-level growth rates of 
real state personal consumption per capita for state i in year t. 
In this baseline model, the coefficient 𝛽𝑃𝐶𝑆 in equation (3) measures the degree of 
personal consumption smoothing. If the state output shock is fully eliminated via personal 
consumption smoothing, the state personal income would co-move perfectly with the state 
output, while the state personal consumption should not co-move with the state output, therefore, 
𝛽𝑃𝐶𝑆 = 1 indicates perfect personal consumption smoothing. A lower 𝛽𝑃𝐶𝑆 indicates less the 
personal consumption smoothing. 
To examine whether personal consumption smoothing improves with increased interstate 
banking/branching deregulation, we augment the baseline model by including those measures of 
interstate banking/branching. For example,  
(4) ∆ log 𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑡 − ∆ log 𝑠𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1∆ log 𝑔𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡 ×
∆ log 𝑔𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 
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where 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡 is one of the measures of interstate banking deregulation for state i in 
year t. 𝛿𝑖 and 𝜏𝑡 are state and time fixed effects, respectively. We cluster standard errors on state 
level.  
In this regression, the key variable of interest is 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡 × ∆ log 𝑔𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡, the 
interaction term between interstate banking deregulation and growth rate of gross state product. 
The regression coefficient, 𝛽1, measures the average degree of personal consumption smoothing 
before banking deregulation. The regression coefficient, 𝛽3, measures the increase in personal 
consumption smoothing associated with a one-unit increase in interstate banking deregulation. 
2.2.3 Impact of interstate banking/branching deregulation on unsmoothed shock 
Finally, we test the relation between unsmoothed shock and interstate banking/branching 
deregulation. The baseline model developed above is: 
(5) ∆ log 𝑠𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑈𝑆∆ log 𝑔𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 
where ∆ log 𝑔𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡 is the state-level growth rates of real gross state product per capita for 
state i in year t, i.e. the state output shock, and ∆ log 𝑠𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡 is the state-level growth rates of real 
state personal consumption per capita for state i in year t, i.e. the unsmoothed shock. 
In this baseline model, the coefficient 𝛽𝑈𝑆 in equation (5) measures the degree of 
unsmoothed shock. If the state output shock is fully eliminated via personal income smoothing 
and personal consumption smoothing, the state personal consumption would not co-move with 
the state output, and therefore, 𝛽𝑈𝑆 = 0 indicates perfectly smoothed output shock. A higher 𝛽𝑈𝑆 
indicates more unsmoothed shock. 
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To examine whether unsmoothed shock improves associated with increased interstate 
banking/branching deregulation, we augment the baseline model by including those measures of 
interstate banking/branching. For example,  
(6) ∆ log 𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑡 − ∆ log 𝑠𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1∆ log 𝑔𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡 ×
∆ log 𝑔𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 
where 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡 is one of the measures of interstate banking deregulation of state i in 
year t. 𝛿𝑖 and 𝜏𝑡 are state and time fixed effects, respectively. We cluster standard errors on state 
level.  
In this regression, the key variable of interest is 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡 × ∆ log 𝑔𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡, the 
interaction term between interstate banking deregulation and growth rate of gross state product. 
The regression coefficient, 𝛽1, measures the average degree of unsmoothed shock before banking 
deregulation. The regression coefficient, 𝛽3, measures the increase in unsmoothed shock 
associated with a one-unit increase in interstate banking deregulation. 
 Data 
Our panel data for the 50 U.S. states and Washington D.C. range from 1978 to 2015. The 
data for gross state product (gsp) and state personal income (spi) come from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA). Data on state personal consumption (spc) is not directly available. 
We thus compute state personal consumption using state-level retail sales data, which are 
rescaled by the ratio of nationwide private consumption to nationwide retail sales. All variables 
are deflated by consumer price index based on 1977 to obtain real per capita value. There are 
1,938 state-year observations. 
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The interstate banking deregulation data is generated according to Demyanyk et al. 
(2007) and Jiang et al. (2016). Demyanyk et al. (2007) and Jiang et al. (2016) also provides the 
time when each state initially “opt-in” interstate branching. Table 1 presents the year when each 
state started allowing interstate banking and interstate branching. Interstate banking deregulation 
happened between 1978 and 1996, while the initial permission of interstate branching happened 
between 1992 and 1997. We then peruse each state’s statutes and hand-collected each state’s acts 
or session laws that amended its restrictions on interstate branching. For those states with 
ambiguous statutes, we contact the state department of banking for their interpretation of 
interstate branching statutes.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
An example of interstate branching deregulation can be found in Table 2. Georgia 
allowed interstate branching on June 1, 1997, but with the most strict restriction. Georgia applied 
a five-year minimum age requirement, did not allow de novo branching nor branch acquisition, 
and had 30% statewide deposit cap. Therefore, starting from 1998, the Index-Branch equals to 1. 
Georgia did not require any reciprocal condition, so Index-Branch-Reci also equals to 1. On May 
10, 2002, Georgia decreased the minimum age requirement to three years, which increased 
Index-MinAge (and Index-MinAge-Reci) from 0 to 0.5 and increased Index-Branch (and Index-
Branch-Reci) from 1 to 1.5. Then on April 26, 2016, Georgia passed an act that allowed 
interstate de novo branching and branch acquisition. Therefore, since 2017, Index-
DeNovoBranch and Index-BranchAcqui (and their corresponding reciprocal index) will be 1 and 
Index-Branch (and Index-Branch-Reci) will be 3.5. Illinois is a state that initially had a same 
interstate deregulation degree with Georgia, allowing interstate branching on June 1, 1997, but 
with the most strict restriction. On August 20, 2004, Illinois eliminated the minimum age 
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requirement, with a reciprocal condition, and allowed de novo branching and branch acquisition, 
both with a reciprocal condition. Therefore, the Index-MinAge increased from 0 to 1, and the 
Index-MinAge-Reci increased from 0 to 0.5. The Index-DeNovoBranch and Index-Branch 
changed from 0 to 1, while the Index-DeNovoBranch-Reci and Index-Branch-Reci changed from 
0 to 0.5. Index-Branch increased from 1 to 4, while Index-Branch-Reci only increased from 1 to 
2.5 to reflect the reciprocal condition. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 Empirical Results 
 Summary statistics 
 Table 3 reports the summary statistics of our key variables. The average state output 
shock is 1.32%, with a 3.52% standard deviation. While the average personal income smoothing 
is almost zero, there is a huge variation of personal income smoothing. The standard deviation of 
personal income smoothing is 2.69%, twice of the average state output shock. As for the personal 
consumption smoothing, the average is also approximately zero, with a standard deviation of 
2.98%. The average unsmoothed shock is 1.57%, with a 3.28% standard deviation. These 
summary statistics indicate that while some states at some years are able to smooth a large 
amount of output shock via personal income smoothing and/or personal consumption smoothing, 
there are also situations when states almost cannot smoothing their output shocks. The dummy 
variable for interstate banking deregulation, Inter-Bank, has a mean of 0.75, while Index-Bank, 
which takes the reciprocal condition into consideration, has a mean of 0.68. Ln(# of States) and 
Ln(# of States-Distance Weighted) has a mean of 2.81 and 1.70, respectively. These two 
measures reflect the actual number of states that can enter into the host state, and therefore have 
larger variations comparing with Inter-Bank and Index-Bank. The average Index-MinAge is 0.22, 
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which indicate that most states have a five-year minimum age requirement. The average Index-
DenoBranch and Index-BranchAcqui is 0.25 and 0.27, respectively. It is consistent with the fact 
that most states did not allow de novo branching and branch acquisition initially, and only 
deregulated gradually over time. The average Index-Branch is 1.28, with a 1.56 standard 
deviation, and the Index-Branch-Reci is 1.05, with a 1.26 standard deviation. States differ with 
each other a lot in their progress on interstate branching deregulation. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 Impact of interstate banking and branching deregulation on personal income 
smoothing  
In Table 4 we present the results of regressions based on equation (2), examining the 
impact of interstate banking and branching deregulation on personal income smoothing. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Panel A employs the simply dummy variable to measure interstate banking and interstate 
branching deregulation. Column (1) to (3) use the full sample, and Column (4) to (5) use sample 
from 1978 to 1997. All regressions include both state and year fixed effects. Standard errors are 
clustered at the state level. Results of Panel A show that interstate banking deregulation 
improves personal income smoothing. The interstate banking deregulation took place between 
the late 1970s and 1997. When we focus on the time period until 1997, we find an 11.7% 
increase in personal income smoothing after the initial permission of interstate banking. This 
increase is more than four times of the standard deviation of personal income smoothing, and is 
about ten times of the average state output shock. The impact of interstate banking deregulation 
will not be dominated by the interstate branching deregulation, which starts from 1992. The 
impact of the interstate branching deregulation on personal income smoothing tends to be 
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negative, but not significant. We will later further look into this question by employing time-
varying measures of interstate branching deregulation. 
Panel B focuses on the impact of interstate banking deregulation and employs four time-
varying state-level measures: Index-Bank, Ln(# of States), Ln(# of States-Distance Weighted), 
and Ln(# of BHCs from Other States). Column (1) to (5) uses the full sample, and Column (6) to 
(10) use sample from 1978 to 1997 when interstate banking deregulation took places. Compared 
with the dummy variable used in Panel A, these measures are better reflecting states’ regional or 
national reciprocal condition on interstate banking deregulation and their gradual process of 
deregulation over time. The results of this panel show a significantly positive coefficient of the 
interaction term between each measure of interstate banking deregulation and state output shock, 
especially for the period between 1978 and 1997. These coefficients provide sound evidence that 
both the initial permission of interstate banking and the follow-up deregulation significantly 
contribute to the improvement of personal income smoothing. The improvement are both 
economically and statistically significant. 
Panel C focuses on the impact of interstate branching deregulation on personal income 
smoothing. In addition to the simple dummy variable, Inter-Branch, in Column (1) and (7), we 
employ Index-Branch in Column (2) and (8), which can better reflect states’ follow-up changes 
on different aspects of restrictions. We also use Inter-Branch-Reci (Column (3) and (9)) and 
Index-Branch-Reci (Column (4) and (10)) as the measure of interstate branching deregulation, 
which take states’ reciprocal condition into consideration. Finally, we try to look at the impact of 
each restriction on personal income smoothing. Column (5) and (11) employ the restriction 
measure without reciprocal condition, while Column (6) and (12) employ the restriction measure 
with the reciprocal condition. Column (1) to (6) uses the full sample, and Column (7) to (12) use 
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sample since 1992, when states started interstate branching deregulation. The results of this panel 
show that the permission of interstate branching itself does not have a significant impact on 
personal income smoothing. However, different aspects of states’ restriction play different roles 
in personal income smoothing. The statewide deposit cap can improve personal income 
smoothing. One standard deviation (0.20) increase in statewide deposit cap can increase personal 
income smoothing by 0.20 * 0.225 = 4.5%. On the contrary, the permission of de novo branching 
has a significantly negative impact on personal income smoothing. 
In total, our results indicate that interstate banking deregulation improves personal 
income smoothing. The impact of interstate branching deregulation is mixed and not dominant. 
 Impact of interstate banking and branching deregulation on personal consumption 
smoothing  
We then study the impact of interstate banking and branching deregulation on personal 
consumption smoothing. Regressions are based on equation (4). Table 5 presents the results of 
these regressions. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Similar to Table 4, we have three panels in Table 5. Panel A employs the simply dummy 
variable to measure interstate banking and interstate branching deregulation. According to results 
in Panel A, the impact of interstate banking and branching deregulation on personal consumption 
smoothing has the opposite direction with their impact on personal income smoothing. The initial 
permission of interstate banking deregulation hinders the personal consumption smoothing, 




Panel B focuses on the impact of interstate banking deregulation and employs four time-
varying state-level measures: Index-Bank, Ln(# of States), Ln(# of States-Distance Weighted), 
and Ln(# of BHCs from Other States). Column (1) to (5) uses the full sample, and Column (6) to 
(10) use sample from 1978 to 1997 when interstate banking deregulation took places. The results 
of this panel show a slightly negative impact of interstate banking deregulation on personal 
consumption smoothing, for the period between 1978 and 1997. 
Panel C focuses on the impact of interstate branching deregulation on personal 
consumption smoothing. Same with Table 4, we use Inter-Branch, Index-Branch, Inter-Branch-
Reci, and Index-Branch-Reci as the measure of interstate branching deregulation. We also try to 
look at the impact of each restriction on personal consumption smoothing. Column (1) to (6) uses 
the full sample, and Column (7) to (12) use sample since 1992, when states started interstate 
branching deregulation. The results of this panel show that the permission of interstate branching 
itself significantly improves personal consumption smoothing. However, the changes in different 
aspects of states’ restriction do not have an important impact on personal consumption 
smoothing. Only the alleviation on minimum age requirement slightly improves the personal 
consumption smoothing.  
In total, our results indicate that interstate banking deregulation hinders the personal 
consumption smoothing, while interstate branching deregulation improves the personal 
consumption smoothing. 
 Impact of interstate banking and branching deregulation on unsmoothed shock  
We then study the impact of interstate banking and branching deregulation on 




[Insert Table 6 here] 
Similar with the previous two tables, we have three panels in Table 6. Panel A employs 
the simply dummy variable to measure interstate banking and interstate branching deregulation. 
Panel A does not provide sound evidence of the relation between the initial permission of 
interstate banking and unsmoothed shock, and the initial permission of interstate branching 
contributes slightly to the decrease of unsmoothed shock.  
Panel B focuses on the impact of interstate banking deregulation and employs four time-
varying state-level measures. The results of panel B show a negative impact of interstate banking 
deregulation on unsmoothed shock. Instead of the initial permission of interstate banking, the 
actual number of states and number of BHCs that are able to expand into each state plays a more 
important role in reducing the unsmoothed part of output shock.  
Panel C focuses on the impact of interstate branching deregulation on unsmoothed shock. 
Again, we use Inter-Branch, Index-Branch, Inter-Branch-Reci, and Index-Branch-Reci as the 
measure of interstate branching deregulation. We also look at the impact of each restriction on 
unsmoothed shock. Column (1) to (6) uses the full sample, and Column (7) to (12) use sample 
since 1992, when states started interstate branching deregulation. The results of this panel show 
that the permission of interstate branching itself and the aggregate level of follow-up 
deregulation significantly decrease the unsmoothed shock. However, the changes in each 
different aspect of state-level restrictions do not have an important impact in unsmoothed shock. 
The alleviation on minimum age requirement and statewide deposit cap slightly improve the 
unsmoothed shock. 
In total, our results indicate that both interstate banking and branching deregulation 




In this paper, we examine the impact of banking deregulation on interstate risk sharing. 
We focus on two types of deregulation: interstate banking deregulation and interstate branching 
deregulation. For both types of deregulation, we use dummy variables which simply reflect the 
initial permission of interstate banking and interstate branching. We also employ time-varying 
measures that can reflect changes in different state-level restrictions on deregulation. We study 
the impact of different types of deregulation on interstate risk sharing from the residential 
perspective. Therefore, we decompose state output shock into three components: personal 
income smoothing, personal consumption smoothing, and unsmoothed shock. 
Our results provide evidence that interstate banking deregulation plays a more important 
role in improving personal income smoothing. Both the initial permission of interstate banking 
and the follow-up alleviation contribute to the improvement in personal income smoothing. 
However, interstate banking deregulation hinders personal consumption smoothing. Finally, the 
follow-up deregulation on interstate banking leads to a decrease in unsmoothed shock.  
We also look at the impact of interstate branching deregulation. The initial “opt-in” of 
interstate branching does not have a significant impact on personal income smoothing. While the 
statewide deposit cap improves personal income smoothing, the permission of de novo branching 
has a negative effect. On the contrary, interstate branching deregulation improves personal 
consumption smoothing. Both the initial permission of interstate branching and the follow-up 
changes in the state-specific restrictions contribute to the improvement in personal consumption 
smoothing. Finally, interstate branching deregulation leads to a decrease in unsmoothed shock. 
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Our further study would be whether the impact of banking deregulation on interstate risk 
sharing are different in states where small businesses play different role in the state economy. 
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Table 1: Time when each state allows interstate banking and interstate branching 
This table presents the year when a state first allows interstate banking and interstate branching, 
which is the year when the related state law was passed by the state legislature.  
 
 
State Interstate Banking Interstate Branching State Interstate Banking Interstate Branching
AL 1987 1997 MT 1993 1997
AK 1982 1994 NE 1990 1997
AZ 1986 1992 NV 1985 1995
AR 1989 1997 NH 1987 1997
CA 1987 1995 NJ 1986 1996
CO 1988 1997 NM 1989 1996
CT 1983 1995 NY 1982 1992
DE 1988 1995 NC 1985 1993
DC 1985 1996 ND 1991 1997
FL 1985 1997 OH 1985 1997
GA 1985 1997 OK 1987 1997
HI 1996 1997 OR 1986 1993
ID 1985 1995 PA 1986 1995
IL 1986 1997 RI 1984 1995
IN 1986 1996 SC 1986 1996
IA 1991 1997 SD 1988 1996
KS 1992 1997 TN 1985 1997
KY 1984 1997 TX 1987 1995
LA 1987 1997 UT 1984 1995
ME 1978 1997 VT 1988 1996
MD 1985 1995 VA 1985 1995
MA 1983 1996 WA 1987 1996
MI 1986 1995 WV 1988 1997
MN 1986 1997 WI 1987 1997








Table 2: Interstate Branching Deregulation 
This table lists the interstate branching deregulation process of two states, Georgia and Illinois, as an example. 
State Session Law 
Effective 
Date 
Minimum Age De Novo Branching Branch Acquisition Statewide Deposit Cap 
Georgia 
Georgia Laws 1996, p. 
279, § 2 
6/1/1997 
5 years; 
GA. CODE ANN. § 7-1-
628.3(b). 
No; 
GA. CODE ANN. § 7-1-
628.8. 
No; 
GA. CODE ANN. § 7-1-
628.9. 
30%; 
GA. CODE ANN. § 7-1-
628.3(a)(2). 
Georgia 
Georgia Laws 2002, p. 
670, § 1, § 3 
5/10/2002 
3 years; 
GA. CODE ANN. § 7-1-
628.3(b). 
No; 
GA. CODE ANN. § 7-1-
628.8. 
No; 
GA. CODE ANN. § 7-1-
628.9. 
30%; 
GA. CODE ANN. § 7-1-
628.3(a)(2). 
Georgia 
Georgia Laws 2016, p. 
390, § 2-25, § 2-26. 
4/26/2016 
3 years; 
GA. CODE ANN. § 7-1-
628.3(b). 
Yes; 
GA. CODE ANN. § 7-1-
628.8(b). 
Yes; 
GA. CODE ANN. § 7-1-
628.9(a). 
30%; 
GA. CODE ANN. § 7-1-
628.3(a)(2). 
Illinois 
1995 Illinois Laws 89-
208. 




205 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
5/21.2. 
No; 
205 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
5/21.1. 
No; 
205 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
5/21.1. 
30%; 
205 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
5/21.3. 
Illinois 
2004 Illinois Laws 93-
965. 
8/20/2004 
No age requirement if 
reciprocity; 
5 years if no reciprocity; 








205 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
5/21.4. 
30%; 










Table 3: Summary Statistics 
This table presents the summary statistics. Data are from 1978 to 2015. The definition of variables can be found in the Appendix. 
Variables N mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max 
State Output Shock 1887 0.0132 0.0352 -0.3500 -0.0030 0.0142 0.0324 0.2326 
Personal Income Smoothing 1887 -0.0017 0.0269 -0.3185 -0.0143 -0.0003 0.0118 0.2277 
Personal Consumption Smoothing 1887 -0.0009 0.0298 -0.2309 -0.0163 -0.0006 0.0140 0.4613 
Unsmoothed Shock 1887 0.0157 0.0328 -0.4109 -0.0012 0.0163 0.0330 0.2964 
Inter-Bank 1938 0.7503 0.4330 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Index-Bank 1938 0.6812 0.4216 0.0000 0.5000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Ln(# of States) 1938 2.8071 1.6900 0.0000 1.6094 3.9512 3.9512 3.9512 
Ln(# of States-Distance Weighted) 1938 1.7047 1.0622 0.0000 0.8205 2.1806 2.5854 2.8800 
Ln(# of BHCs from Other States) 1530 7.7992 2.1174 0.0000 8.4538 8.5258 8.5601 8.6881 
Inter-Branch 1938 0.4990 0.5001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Index-MinAge 1938 0.2221 0.3979 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5000 1.0000 
Index-DeNovoBranch 1938 0.2544 0.4356 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Index-BranchAcqui 1938 0.2673 0.4427 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Index-DepoCap 1938 0.0413 0.1990 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Index-Branch 1938 1.2841 1.5607 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 3.0000 5.0000 
Inter-Branch-Reci 1938 0.4559 0.4761 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Index-MinAge-Reci 1938 0.1943 0.3579 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5000 1.0000 
Index-DeNovoBranch-Reci 1938 0.1649 0.3049 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5000 1.0000 
Index-BranchAcqui-Reci 1938 0.1950 0.3478 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5000 1.0000 










Table 4: Impact of interstate banking and branching deregulation on personal income smoothing 
Panel A: This panel employs the simply dummy variable to measure interstate banking and interstate branching deregulation. Column (1) to (3) use the full sample, and Column 
(4) to (5) use sample from 1978 to 1997. All regressions include both state and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level, and reported in parentheses. *, **, 
and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
Dependent Variable: Personal Income Smoothing 
 Full Sample Year <= 1997 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
State Output Shock 0.627*** 0.666*** 0.627*** 0.626*** 0.626*** 
 (7.40) (6.90) (7.44) (8.11) (8.10) 
 
     
Inter-Bank -0.004**  -0.005*** -0.005* -0.005* 
 (-2.41) 
 (-2.96) (-1.91) (-1.90) 
 
     
Inter-Branch  0.001 0.002  0.001 
 
 (0.57) (0.92)  (0.29) 
 
     
Inter-Bank * GSP 0.037  0.091** 0.117** 0.118** 
 (1.60) 
 (2.49) (2.18) (2.13) 
 
     
Inter-Branch * GSP  -0.039 -0.090  -0.026 
 
 (-0.66) (-1.43)  (-0.30) 
 
     
Constant 0.003 -0.025*** 0.016*** -0.015*** -0.015*** 
 (1.10) (-6.08) (4.78) (-3.91) (-4.08) 
 
     
N 1887 1887 1887 969 969 
R-sq 0.725 0.724 0.726 0.745 0.745 







Table 4 (Cont.) 
Panel B: this panel focuses on the impact of interstate banking deregulation and employs four time-varying state-level measures: Index-Bank, Ln(# of States), Ln(# of States-
Distance Weighted), and Ln(# of BHCs from Other States). Column (1) to (5) uses the full sample, and Column (6) to (10) use sample from 1978 to 1997 when interstate banking 
deregulation took places. All regressions include both state and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level, and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
indicate significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Dependent Variable: Personal Income Smoothing 
 Full Sample Year <= 1997 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
State Output Shock 0.627*** 0.609*** 0.612*** 0.598*** 0.494*** 0.626*** 0.601*** 0.607*** 0.600*** 0.510*** 
 (7.40) (7.55) (7.41) (7.78) (7.66) (8.11) (8.33) (8.19) (8.27) (7.31)            
Inter-Bank -0.004**     -0.005*     
 (-2.41)     (-1.91)                
Index-Bank  -0.004*     -0.008***    
  (-2.00)     (-2.74)               
Ln(# of States)   -0.001**     -0.002**   
   (-2.12)     (-2.47)              
Ln(# of States-Distance 
Weighted) 
   -0.002***     -0.003***  
    (-2.91)     (-2.78)             
Ln(# of BHCs from Other 
States) 
    -0.001***     -0.001** 
     (-3.35)     (-2.34)            
Inter-Bank * Shock 0.037     0.117**     
 (1.60)     (2.18)                
Index-Bank * Shock  0.067***     0.198***    








Table 4 (Cont.) 
Panel B (Cont.) 
 Full Sample Year <= 1997 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Ln(# of States) * Shock   0.016***     0.044***   
   (2.78)     (3.58)              
Ln(# of States-Distance 
Weighted) * Shock 
   0.034***     0.074***  
    (3.83)     (4.24)  
Ln(# of BHCs from Other 
States) * Shock 
    0.021*     0.029* 
     (1.97)     (1.97) 
           
N 1887 1887 1887 1887 1530 969 969 969 969 612 
R-sq 0.725 0.725 0.725 0.726 0.738 0.745 0.751 0.749 0.751 0.781 









Table 4 (Cont.) 
Panel C: this panel focuses on the impact of interstate branching deregulation on personal income smoothing. In addition to the simple dummy variable, Inter-Branch,  in Column 
(1) and (7), we employs Index-Branch in Column (2) and (8), Inter-Branch-Reci in Columne (3) and (9), and Index-Branch-Reci in Columne (4) and (10) as the measure of 
interstate branching deregulation. Column (5) and (11) employ the measure of each restriction without reciprocal condition, while Column (6) and (12) employ the restriction 
measure with reciprocal condition. Column (1) to (6) uses the full sample, and Column (7) to (12) use sample since 1992, when states started interstate branching deregulation. All 
regressions include both state and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level, and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5%, and 
1%, respectively. 
Dependent Variable: Personal Income Smoothing 
 Full Sample Year >= 1992 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
State Output Shock 0.666*** 0.667*** 0.663*** 0.656*** 0.667*** 0.664*** 0.589*** 0.644*** 0.583*** 0.597*** 0.585*** 0.583*** 
 (6.90) (8.28) (6.99) (8.02) (6.79) (6.88) (6.49) (12.49) (7.96) (9.01) (6.33) (7.58)              
Inter-Branch 0.001    0.001  -0.001    -0.002  
 (0.57)    (0.35)  (-0.59)    (-0.67)               
Index-Branch  0.001      0.000     
  (1.33)      (0.51)                  
Inter-Branch-Reci   -0.000   0.000   -0.000   -0.000 
   (-0.01)   (0.06)   (-0.27)   (-0.18)              
Index-Branch-Reci    0.000      -0.000   
    (0.25)      (-0.18)                
Index-MinAge     -0.000      0.001  
     (-0.01)      (0.44)               
Index-DeNovoBranch     0.003      0.000  
     (1.24)      (0.27)               
Index-BranchAcqui     0.000      0.002  








Table 4 (Cont.) 
Panel C (Cont.) 
 Full Sample Year >= 1992 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Index-DepoCap     -0.005 -0.004     0.000 0.000 
     (-1.11) (-1.11)     (0.02) (0.11)              
Index-MinAge-Reci      0.001      0.000 
      (0.53)      (0.03)              
Index-DeNovoBranch-Reci      0.005      0.003 
      (1.61)      (1.04)              
Index-BranchAcqui-Reci      -0.002      -0.000 
      (-0.78)      (-0.12)              
Inter-Branch * Shock -0.039    -0.037  0.044    0.052  
 (-0.66)    (-0.34)  (0.57)    (0.61)               
Index-Branch * Shock  -0.017      -0.008     
  (-1.64)      (-0.33)                  
Inter-Branch-Reci * Shock   -0.033   -0.049   0.053   0.038 
   (-0.58)   (-0.49)   (0.81)   (0.67)              
Index-Branch-Reci * Shock    -0.007      0.016   
    (-0.63)      (0.47)                
Index-MinAge * Shock     -0.001      0.006  
     (-0.01)      (0.09)               
Index-DeNovoBranch * Shock     -0.139**      -0.137**  








Table 4 (Cont.) 
Panel C (Cont.) 
 Full Sample Year >= 1992 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Index-BranchAcqui * Shock     0.012      0.006  
     (0.19)      (0.10)               
Index-DepoCap * Shock     0.225*** 0.179***     0.222*** 0.186*** 
     (3.46) (3.06)     (3.42) (3.19) 
Index-MinAge-Reci * Shock      -0.002      0.006 
      (-0.03)      (0.10)              
Index-DeNovoBranch-Reci * Shock      -0.245***      -0.227*** 
      (-2.86)      (-2.80)              
Index-BranchAcqui-Reci * Shock      0.095      0.077 
      (1.64)      (1.58)              
N 1887 1887 1887 1887 1887 1887 1224 1224 1224 1224 1224 1224 
R-sq 0.724 0.725 0.724 0.724 0.733 0.732 0.711 0.711 0.711 0.711 0.726 0.726 









Table 5: Impact of interstate banking and branching deregulation on personal consumption smoothing 
Panel A: This panel employs the simply dummy variable to measure interstate banking and interstate branching deregulation. Column (1) to (3) use the full sample, and Column 
(4) to (5) use sample from 1978 to 1997. All regressions include both state and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level, and reported in parentheses. *, **, 
and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
Dependent Variable: Personal Consumption Smoothing 
 Full Sample Year <= 1997 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
State Output Shock -0.003 -0.051 -0.004 0.012 0.012 
 (-0.04) (-0.85) (-0.06) (0.15) (0.15) 
 
     
Inter-Bank -0.002  0.001 0.002 0.002 
 (-0.41) 
 (0.46) (0.44) (0.44) 
 
     
Inter-Branch  -0.006 -0.007*  0.001 
 
 (-1.51) (-1.93)  (0.09) 
 
     
Inter-Bank * Shock 0.044  -0.108* -0.141** -0.140** 
 (0.63) 
 (-1.96) (-2.33) (-2.29) 
 
     
Inter-Branch * Shock  0.193*** 0.253***  -0.022 
 
 (2.74) (4.36)  (-0.12) 
 
     
 
     
N 1887 1887 1887 969 969 
R-sq 0.169 0.177 0.179 0.227 0.227 









Table 5 (Cont.) 
Panel B: this panel focuses on the impact of interstate banking deregulation and employs four time-varying state-level measures: Index-Bank, Ln(# of States), Ln(# of States-
Distance Weighted), and Ln(# of BHCs from Other States). Column (1) to (5) uses the full sample, and Column (6) to (10) use sample from 1978 to 1997 when interstate banking 
deregulation took places. All regressions include both state and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level, and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
indicate significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Dependent Variable: Personal Consumption Smoothing 
 Full Sample Year <= 1997 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
State Output Shock -0.003 -0.028 -0.021 -0.017 -0.110 0.012 -0.004 -0.003 -0.008 -0.139 
 (-0.04) (-0.37) (-0.29) (-0.23) (-0.84) (0.15) (-0.05) (-0.03) (-0.10) (-1.00)            
Inter-Bank -0.002     0.002     
 (-0.41) 
    (0.44)                
Index-Bank  -0.004     -0.001    
 
 (-0.85)     (-0.17)               
Ln(# of States)   0.000     0.001   
 
  (0.04)     (0.50)              
Ln(# of States-Distance Weighted)    -0.001     -0.001  
 
   (-0.84)     (-0.60)             
Ln(# of BHCs from Other States)     -0.000     -0.000 
 
    (-0.05)     (-0.36)            
Inter-Bank * Shock 0.044     -0.141**     
 (0.63) 
    (-2.33)                
Index-Bank * Shock  0.086     -0.118*    
 
 (1.15)     (-1.78)               
Ln(# of States) * Shock   0.019     -0.029*   
 








Table 5 (Cont.) 
Panel B (Cont.) 
 Full Sample Year <= 1997 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Ln(# of States-Distance Weighted) * 
Shock 
   0.027      -0.040  
 
   (0.95)      (-1.60)  
 
           
Ln(# of BHCs from Other States) * Shock     0.018     0.001 
 
    (1.25)     (0.07) 
 
           
N 1887 1887 1887 1887 1530 969 969 969 969 612 
R-sq 0.169 0.170 0.169 0.169 0.157 0.227 0.224 0.224 0.224 0.217 








Table 5. (Cont.) 
Panel C: this panel focuses on the impact of interstate branching deregulation on personal consumption smoothing. In addition to the simple dummy variable, Inter-Branch,  in 
Column (1) and (7), we employ Index-Branch in Column (2) and (8), Inter-Branch-Reci in Column (3) and (9), and Index-Branch-Reci in Column (4) and (10) as the measure of 
interstate branching deregulation. Column (5) and (11) employ the measure of each restriction without reciprocal condition, while Column (6) and (12) employ the restriction 
measure with the reciprocal condition. Column (1) to (6) uses the full sample, and Column (7) to (12) use sample since 1992, when states started interstate branching deregulation. 
All regressions include both state and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level, and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5%, 
and 1%, respectively. 
Dependent Variable: Personal Consumption Smoothing 
 Full Sample Year >= 1992 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
State Output Shock -0.051 -0.048 -0.054 -0.052 -0.051 -0.058 0.122 0.029 0.058 0.018 0.129 0.040 
 (-0.85) (-0.86) (-0.92) (-0.91) (-0.85) (-0.98) (0.98) (0.28) (0.49) (0.16) (1.00) (0.31)              
Inter-Branch -0.006    -0.005  -0.002    0.000  
 (-1.51) 
   (-1.06)  (-0.48)    (0.06)               
Index-Branch  -0.001      -0.002     
 
 (-1.23)      (-1.20)                  
Inter-Branch-Reci   -0.004   -0.002   -0.003   -0.001 
 
  (-1.47)   (-0.67)   (-0.87)   (-0.30)              
Index-Branch-Reci    -0.001*      -0.003**   
 
   (-1.84)      (-2.32)                
Index-MinAge     0.001      -0.000  
 
    (0.34)      (-0.05)               
Index-DeNovoBranch     -0.001      0.001  
 
    (-0.22)      (0.26)               
Index-BranchAcqui     -0.003      -0.007  
 








Table 5 (Cont.) 
Panel C (Cont.) 
 Full Sample Year >= 1992 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
             
Index-DepoCap     0.000 0.000     -0.003 -0.003 
 
    (0.01) (0.01)     (-0.48) (-0.39)              
Index-MinAge-Reci      -0.001      -0.003 
 
     (-0.41)      (-0.84)              
Index-DeNovoBranch-Reci      -0.000      0.002 
 
     (-0.02)      (0.34)              
Index-BranchAcqui-Reci      -0.004      -0.010 
 
     (-0.90)      (-1.49)              
Inter-Branch * Shock 0.193***    0.070  0.020    -0.108  
 (2.74) 
   (0.62)  (0.17)    (-0.70)               
Index-Branch * Shock  0.075***      0.052     
 
 (3.47)      (1.57)                  
Inter-Branch-Reci * Shock   0.211***   0.107   0.099   0.017 
 
  (3.00)   (1.08)   (0.85)   (0.13)              
Index-Branch-Reci * Shock    0.092***      0.068   
 
   (3.23)      (1.40)                
Index-MinAge * Shock     0.251*      0.255*  
 
    (1.88)      (1.88)               
Index-DeNovoBranch * Shock     0.077      0.066  
 








Table 5 (Cont.) 
Panel C (Cont.) 
 Full Sample Year >= 1992 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Index-BranchAcqui * Shock     -0.050      -0.045  
 
    (-0.36)      (-0.32)               
Index-DepoCap * Shock     0.033 0.042     0.027 0.027 
 
    (0.31) (0.35)     (0.24) (0.22)              
Index-MinAge-Reci * Shock      0.244*      0.237 
 
     (1.77)      (1.67)              
Index-DeNovoBranch-Reci * Shock      0.206      0.181 
 
     (0.92)      (0.78)              
Index-BranchAcqui-Reci * Shock      -0.104      -0.090 
 
     (-0.66)      (-0.55)              
N 1887 1887 1887 1887 1887 1887 1224 1224 1224 1224 1224 1224 
R-sq 0.177 0.181 0.179 0.182 0.186 0.187 0.176 0.180 0.176 0.181 0.187 0.189 








Table 6: Impact of interstate banking and branching deregulation on unsmoothed shock 
Panel A: This panel employs the simply dummy variable to measure interstate banking and interstate branching deregulation. Column (1) to (3) use the full sample, and Column 
(4) to (5) use sample from 1978 to 1997. All regressions include both state and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level, and reported in parentheses. *, **, 
and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
Dependent Variable: Unsmoothed Shock 
 Full Sample Year <= 1997 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
State Output Shock 0.376*** 0.385*** 0.377*** 0.362*** 0.362*** 
 (5.55) (5.08) (5.45) (5.27) (5.27) 
 
     
Inter-Bank 0.006  0.004 0.003 0.003 
 (1.22) 
 (0.95) (0.57) (0.57) 
 
     
Inter-Branch  0.004 0.005  -0.002 
 
 (1.37) (1.50)  (-0.26) 
 
     
Inter-Bank * Shock -0.081  0.017 0.024 0.022 
 (-1.32) 
 (0.32) (0.42) (0.37) 
 
     
Inter-Branch * Shock  -0.154* -0.164*  0.049 
 
 (-1.97) (-1.94)  (0.25) 
 
     
 
     
N 1887 1887 1887 969 969 
R-sq 0.329 0.332 0.332 0.497 0.497 









Table 6 (Cont.) 
Panel B: this panel focuses on the impact of interstate banking deregulation and employs four time-varying state-level measures: Index-Bank, Ln(# of States), Ln(# of States-
Distance Weighted), and Ln(# of BHCs from Other States). Column (1) to (5) uses the full sample, and Column (6) to (10) use sample from 1978 to 1997 when interstate banking 
deregulation took places. All regressions include both state and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level, and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
indicate significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Dependent Variable: Unsmoothed Shock 
 Full Sample Year <= 1997 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
State Output Shock 0.376*** 0.419*** 0.410*** 0.419*** 0.616*** 0.362*** 0.403*** 0.395*** 0.408*** 0.629*** 
 (5.55) (6.00) (5.83) (6.27) (6.56) (5.27) (6.05) (5.73) (6.08) (6.00)            
Inter-Bank 0.006     0.003     
 (1.22) 
    (0.57)                
Index-Bank  0.009     0.009    
 
 (1.52)     (1.43)               
Ln(# of States)   0.001     0.001   
 
  (0.87)     (0.77)              
Ln(# of States-Distance 
Weighted) 
   0.003*     0.004*  
 
   (1.75)     (1.88)             
Ln(# of BHCs from Other 
States) 
    0.001     0.001 
 
    (1.41)     (1.56)            
Inter-Bank * Shock -0.081     0.024     
 (-1.32) 
    (0.42)                
Index-Bank * Shock  -0.153**     -0.079    
 








Table 6 (Cont.) 
Panel B (Cont.) 
 Full Sample Year <= 1997 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Ln(# of States) * Shock   -0.034**     -0.014   
 
  (-2.15)     (-1.14)              
Ln(# of States-Distance 
Weighted) * Shock 
   -0.061**     -0.035**  
 
   (-2.58)     (-2.01)             
Ln(# of BHCs from Other 
States) * Shock 
    -0.039***     -0.030** 
 
    (-3.25)     (-2.27)            
N 1887 1887 1887 1887 1530 969 969 969 969 612 
R-sq 0.329 0.332 0.330 0.332 0.276 0.497 0.500 0.497 0.502 0.429 







Table 6 (Cont.) 
Panel C: this panel focuses on the impact of interstate branching deregulation on unsmoothed shock. In addition to the simple dummy variable, Inter-Branch,  in Column (1) and 
(7), we employ Index-Branch in Column (2) and (8), Inter-Branch-Reci in Column (3) and (9), and Index-Branch-Reci in Column (4) and (10) as the measure of interstate 
branching deregulation. Column (5) and (11) employ the measure of each restriction without reciprocal condition, while Column (6) and (12) employ the restriction measure with 
the reciprocal condition. Column (1) to (6) uses the full sample, and Column (7) to (12) use sample since 1992, when states started interstate branching deregulation. All 
regressions include both state and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level, and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5%, and 
1%, respectively. 
Dependent Variable: Unsmoothed Shock 
 Full Sample Year >= 1992 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
State Output Shock 0.385*** 0.381*** 0.391*** 0.395*** 0.384*** 0.394*** 0.289*** 0.328*** 0.359*** 0.385*** 0.286*** 0.377*** 
 (5.08) (5.70) (5.12) (5.76) (5.03) (4.98) (3.38) (3.36) (3.94) (3.74) (3.33) (3.70)              
Inter-Branch 0.004    0.003  0.003    0.001  
 (1.37) 
   (0.87)  (0.87)    (0.33)               
Index-Branch  0.001      0.001     
 
 (0.51)      (0.83)                  
Inter-Branch-Reci   0.004   0.002   0.004   0.002 
 
  (1.52)   (0.64)   (1.08)   (0.44)              
Index-Branch-Reci    0.001      0.003*   
 
   (1.45)      (1.93)                
Index-MinAge     -0.001      -0.000  
 
    (-0.29)      (-0.06)               
Index-DeNovoBranch     -0.002      -0.002  
 









Table 6 (Cont.) 
Panel C (Cont.) 
 Full Sample Year >= 1992 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Index-BranchAcqui     0.003      0.005  
 
    (0.89)      (0.96)               
Index-DepoCap     0.005* 0.004     0.003 0.002 
 
    (1.86) (1.48)     (0.46) (0.31)              
Index-MinAge-Reci      0.000      0.003 
 
     (0.04)      (0.72)              
Index-DeNovoBranch-Reci      -0.005      -0.005 
 
     (-1.03)      (-0.69)              
Index-BranchAcqui-Reci      0.006*      0.010 
 
     (1.68)      (1.45)              
Inter-Branch * Shock -0.154*    -0.033  -0.064    0.056  
 (-1.97) 
   (-0.26)  (-0.59)    (0.45)               
Index-Branch * Shock  -0.058**      -0.044     
 
 (-2.26)      (-1.18)                  
Inter-Branch-Reci * Shock   -0.178**   -0.058   -0.152   -0.055 
 
  (-2.22)   (-0.48)   (-1.35)   (-0.47)              
Index-Branch-Reci * Shock    -0.086**      -0.084   
 
   (-2.60)      (-1.67)                
Index-MinAge * Shock     -0.250*      -0.261*  
 
    (-1.69)      (-1.76)               
Index-DeNovoBranch * Shock     0.062      0.071  
 








Table 6 (Cont.) 
Panel C (Cont.) 
 Full Sample Year >= 1992 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Index-BranchAcqui * Shock     0.038      0.039  
 
    (0.24)      (0.24)               
Index-DepoCap * Shock     -0.258* -0.221     -0.249* -0.214 
 
    (-1.85) (-1.53)     (-1.76) (-1.44)              
Index-MinAge-Reci * Shock      -0.242      -0.243 
 
     (-1.66)      (-1.63)              
Index-DeNovoBranch-Reci * Shock      0.039      0.045 
 
     (0.14)      (0.17)              
Index-BranchAcqui-Reci * Shock      0.009      0.013 
 
     (0.05)      (0.07)              
N 1887 1887 1887 1887 1887 1887 1224 1224 1224 1224 1224 1224 
R-sq 0.332 0.334 0.333 0.337 0.340 0.342 0.239 0.242 0.241 0.246 0.252 0.253 




 Appendix: The definition of key variables 
Variable Definition 
State Output Shock Log difference of real gross state output per capita. 
Personal Income Smoothing 
Log difference of real state personal income per capita - 
Log different of real gross state output per capital 
Personal Consumption Smoothing 
Log difference of real state personal consumption per 
capita - Log different of real state personal income per 
capita. 
Unsmoothed Shock 
Log difference of real state personal consumption per 
capita. 
Inter-Bank 
A dummy variable, equals to zero when a state prohibits 
interstate banking, and equals to one when a state allows 
interstate banking. 
Inter-Branch 
A dummy variable, equals to zero when a state prohibits 
interstate branching and equals to one when a state 
allows the interstate branching 
Index-Bank 
Equals to 0 if state i prohibits interstate banking in year t, 
equals to 0.5 if state i in year t allows interstate banking 
on a regional reciprocal basis, equals to 0.75 if state i in 
year t allows interstate banking on a national reciprocal 
basis, and equals to 1 if state i in year t allows 
nonreciprocal national interstate banking 
Ln(# of States) 
The natural logarithm of one plus the number of states 
whose banks/BHCs can enter into state i in year t. 
Ln(# of States-Distance Weighted) 
The natural logarithm of one plus the number of other 
states whose banks/BHCs can enter state i in period t, 
where each of those states are weighted by the inverse of 
its distance to state i. 
Ln(# of BHCs from Other States) 
The natural logarithm of one plus the number of BHCs 
from other states that can enter the state i in period t. 
Index-MinAge 
Equals to 0 if state i has a five-year minimum age 
restriction in year t, equals to 0.5 if state i has a three-
year minimum age restriction in year t, and equals to 1 if 
state i does not have minimum age restriction in year t. 
Index-DeNovoBranch 
Equals to 0 if state i does not allow de novo branching in 
year t, and equals to 1 if state i does allow de novo 
branching in year t.  
Index-BranchAcqui 
Equals to 0 if state i does not allow branch acquisition in 
year t, and equals to 1 if state i does allow branch 








Equals to 0 if state i has a deposit cap equal to or lower 
than 30% in year t, and equals to 1 if state i has a deposit 
cap higher than 30% in year t. 
Index-Branch 
Sum of Inter-Branch, Index-MinAge, Index-
DeNovoBranch, Index-BranchAcqui, and Index-
DepoCap. 
Inter-Branch-Reci 
Equals to 0.5 times Inter-Branch if there is an associated 
reciprocal condition, and equals to Inter-Branch if there 
is no reciprocal condition.  
Index-MinAge-Reci 
Equals to 0.5 times Index-MinAge if there is an 
associated reciprocal condition, and equals to Index-
MinAge if there is no reciprocal condition.  
Index-DeNovoBranch-Reci 
Equals to 0.5 times Index-DeNovoBranch if there is an 
associated reciprocal condition, and equals to Index-
DeNovoBranch if there is no reciprocal condition.  
Index-BranchAcqui-Reci 
Equals to 0.5 times Index-BranchAcqui if there is an 
associated reciprocal condition, and equals to Index-
BranchAcqui if there is no reciprocal condition.  
Index-Branch-Reci 
Sum of Inter-Branch-Reci, Index-MinAge-Reci, Index-
DeNovoBranch-Reci, Index-BranchAcqui-Reci, and 
Index-DepoCap. 
 
 
